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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
    
1.1 Background of the Study 
Sub-Saharan African (SSA) has 48 countries with over 12.3% of world’s 
population in 2009. More than 67.4% (33 out of 49) of countries grouped as 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are located in SSA. The region contributed 
as little as 1.41% of world’s total output in 2008 (World Population Reference 
Bureau, 2009; WTO, 2009; World Bank, 2010). The average per capita income 
of SSA in 2005 was US$572 with average annual growth rate of 2.1% between 
2000 and 2005 (World Bank, 2008; 2009). Also it has the combined Gross 
Domestic Products (GDP) of the same in value with that of Australia (Yang 
and Gupta, 2007). Some factors had been noted to account for the poor 
economic performance of the region, which include: weak political culture, 
corruption, devastating impacts of sicknesses and diseases especially malaria 
and HIV/AIDS, weak institutions, inadequate infrastructures, among others 
(Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Ayogu, 2007; Vylder, 2007; Fosu, 2008; Ike, 
2009). 
  
In the context of this poor economic performance, Olayiwola and Busari 
(2008) outlined economic growth episodes of SSA countries. The first was 
post-independence prosperity where some SSA countries inherited growing 
economies from the colonial regimes characterised by positive growth rates of 
real GDP and per capita GDP. Second was the growth episode that started in 
early 1970s where most SSA countries had poor economic outcomes that were 
characterised by negative growth in real GDP per capita, less favourable terms 
of trade, and so on. The last was between late 1970s and late 1990s with 
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macroeconomic instabilities in most of the SSA countries. The major reason, 
inter alia, which can be put forward for the reversal was inefficiency of 
institutions and mismanagement of the various economies (Collier and 
Gunning, 1999; Olayiwola and Busari, 2008). The third episode tallies with the 
period in which most of the countries were operating Import-substitution 
Industrialisation Strategy (ISI) as well as other forms of trade restrictions 
(Busari and Omoke, 2005; Aigbokhan and Ailemen, 2006). This poor 
economic performance also translates to poor performance in terms of 
international trade. 
 
International trade performance can be defined as the extent to which a country 
(or region) is able to benefit from trade with the rest of the world. It can be 
measured using some indicators such as: share of trade in world market, trade 
balance, percentage of different categories of exports to GDP, real growth in 
total trade; trade per capita (Goode, 2004; UNCTAD, 2006; 2008a; UNECA, 
2010; World Bank, 2010). Commenting on one of the indicators, Ajakaiye and 
Oyejide (2005) observed that Africa’s share of world’s merchandise exports 
declined by more than half, from about 6% in 1980 to 2.6% in 2004.  
 
In terms of international trade, SSA countries have performed relatively low. 
For example, SSA had negative trade balance from 1995 to 2008. The region’s 
trade balance as a percentage of GDP was -12.95% in 1995 and this 
deteriorated to -25.19% in 2008. The negative trade balance for SSA was 
worse than those of other regions as well as the global average (World Bank, 
2010). The ratio of imported products to exported products (RMPXP) for SSA 
was far above those of other regions denoting merchandise trade deficit (World 
Bank, 2010). In 2007, the RMPXP for SSA was 1.90 compared to world 
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average (1.36); Latin America and the Caribbean (1.45); Middle East and 
North Africa (1.28); and East Asia-Pacific (1.14). 
  
One of the major indicators of international trade performance is the 
performance of a country’s export. In this study, emphasis is placed on export 
aspect of international trade. This is because export represents an injection to 
the exporting country and it is a source for foreign exchange earnings. Thus, an 
improvement in the exporting ability of a country can translate to a better 
international trade performance, ceteris paribus. The percentage share of 
exports in GDP of SSA was far lower than that of other developing regions 
such as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); and Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). For instance, the percentage of manufacturing export in GDP 
in 2008 was 5.85% in SSA compared to the world average of 17.35%. In terms 
of service export, the percentage of service export in GDP was 7.72% in SSA, 
which was lower than 11.77% and 18.95% in 2008 for world average and 
MENA respectively (World Bank, 2008; 2010).  
 
Another contextual issue is that while most developing countries in other 
regions especially Asia experienced trade diversification, exports from many 
African countries concentrated on primary products. For instance, the share of 
manufacturing products in total merchandise exports of developing countries 
increased from 35.1% in 1985 to 65.8% in 2004 and manufactured export in 
terms of world export increased from 14.5% in 1985 to 30.3% in 2005. The 
improvement in international trade outcomes of developing countries resulted 
from their diversified export markets. On the contrary, Africa's share of 
manufactured export in terms of total export decreased from 4.3% to 2.9% of 
total export during the same period. One of the factors attributed to this 
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development was Africa's failure to integrate into the world trade with 
appropriate institutional framework (Bacchatta, 2007). 
 
Institutional framework can be defined as the set of humanly formulated 
arrangement that is capable of structuring political, economic and social 
interactions among economic actors. Hence, it is seen to have been crafted by 
human beings for the reduction of uncertainties in any exchange of economic 
values (North, 1991; 2005; Williamson, 2000; Grief, 2006). Available 
evidences have shown that most countries in SSA have weak institutional 
framework. For example, using rule of law with values which ranged from -2.5 
(worst) to 2.5 (best), SSA had average values between -0.76 and -0.70 from 
1996 to 2008. The values for SSA were lower than the global average that 
ranged from -0.09 to -0.03 within the same period (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2008; 2009).  
 
In terms of the level of regulatory framework SSA region had low values 
compared to others. For instance, between 1996 and 2008, the average values 
for SSA lied between -0.70 and -0.54 compared to the global average values 
that were from -0.11 to -0.02 during the same period. The values for SSA were 
not only below the world average, it was equally below those of other regions 
(Kaufmann et al, 2009).  As observed for international trade performance, 
institutional framework in SSA is equally not impressive. This is based on the 
low values of rule of law and regulatory quality indicators of institutional 
framework observed for SSA that were lower than the global average and that 
of other regions of the world.  
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1.2 Statement of the Research Problem  
In 1970s, the basic philosophy of economic theory had been that the economic 
growth of a country (and region) depends mainly on the level of investment 
(Solow, 1957). Other scholars such as Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) brought 
the concept of endogenous growth to the argument of economic growth. This 
was later made popular by the work of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) with 
respect to the relevance of human capital to economic growth. Both the 
classical economists and the endogenous growth theorists seem to assume the 
institutional framework in countries as exogenous. However, the insufficient 
benefits that accrue to developing countries especially those in SSA region 
from the global economy suggest that there are other determinants of economic 
growth as well as trade not considered by the neoclassical theorists (Umo, 
2001; Garba, 2003; Durlauf, Johnson and Temple, 2004; Ige, 2007).  
 
One of the determinants of economic growth not considered by the 
neoclassical is institutional framework. There is ample evidence supporting the 
fact that no society can exist without some form of institutional framework. 
Nevertheless, the difference in the level of economic growth would, to some 
extent, be predicated upon the strength of the institutional framework (Fosu, 
Bates and Hoeffler 2006; Rodrik, 2008a; Khawaja, 2009; Akitoby and 
Stratmann, 2009). In other words, the nature of institutional framework in a 
country can be growth-inducing or growth-inhibiting. For example, the 
implication of the difference in institutions has been seen to account for the 
disparity in economic growth between Democratic Republic of Korea (North 
Korea) and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). The institutions in South 
Korea were seen to be supportive for rapid economic development through the 
inducement of investment compared to North Korea (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2008). A similar conclusion has been made between economic growth of 
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Botswana and Zambia. The fact that Botswana outperformed Zambia in terms 
of economic performance was as a result of quality of institutions, among other 
factors (Parsons and Robinson, 2006). 
 
The nature of institutional framework in many SSA countries has resulted to 
state failures such as collapse of central administration (e.g. Somalia), 
insecurity of life and property (e.g. Zimbabwe), uncertainties, low 
infrastructural facilities and so on. These forms of institutional 
‘disfunctionalities’ have worked against the region’s developmental efforts 
with respect to international trade performance and economic growth (Ajayi, 
2002; Iyoha, and Oriakhi, 2002; Artadi and Sala-i-martin, 2003; Garba, 2003; 
Aluko, 2004; Ike, 2009). This is because, coup plots, violent  military take-
over as well as ethnic conflicts, which have occurred in most SSA countries, 
are indications of weak institutional frameworks (Artadi and Sala-i-Martin, 
2003; Fosu,2003; Garba, 2003).  This tends to point to the fact that the 
institutional framework in SSA countries may not be very supportive for 
economic activities when compared to other regions of the world. The above 
issue is exacerbated by non-resilient financial institutions in most of SSA 
countries, which are essential for providing financial resources for 
international trade (Papaioannou, 2009; Ojo, 2010).  
 
Given the low level of international trade performance and institutional 
framework, the basic question is “can there be possible link between 
institutional framework and international trade performance in SSA”? Put 
differently, can the level of international trade performance in SSA countries 
be attributable to their institutional framework? The above questions were 
major research problems that motivated this study.  
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Furthermore, trade policies in most SSA countries had been characterised by 
high tariffs, inappropriate use of export and import licenses, indiscriminate use 
of import bans, and some forms of undue government interventions (Iyoha and 
Oriakhi, 2002; Aigbokhan and Ailemen, 2006). Most of these policy measures 
have not worked much in their favour in terms of enhancing international trade 
performance. For instance, despite the opportunity of access to the world 
market, most SSA countries still face a great deal of challenges. The 
membership of World Trade Organisation (WTO) and regional economic 
communities (RECs) such as Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
among others, has not resulted to substantial benefits.   
 
Another issue worthy of mentioning is heavy reliance on exportation of 
primary commodities, which exhibits a major weakness in the terms of trade of 
SSA countries. For example, raw materials and petroleum products account for 
over 50% of international trade in most SSA countries, and petroleum products 
alone account for about 95% of Nigeria’s total export, while raw materials 
comprise over 54% and 50% of international trade revenue in Mauritania and 
Zambia, respectively (Fongue, 2007). The key problem with this trade 
structure is essentially the high level of fluctuation that usually characterise 
prices of primary commodities at the world market (Hansson, 1993; Ndella, 
1993; Fosu, 1996; 2003; Olomola, 2007).  Some of the prominent factors that 
have resulted in low international trade performance of most SSA countries 
include weak institutional framework, limited stock of human capital, poor 
infrastructural facilities, and so on.  
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1.3 Research Questions 
In the process of analysing the implication of institutional framework on 
international trade performance, some pertinent research questions were raised. 
They include: 
i. What impact do political institutions have in determining the level of 
international trade performance in selected SSA countries? 
ii. What are the roles of economic institutions in influencing international 
trade performance in selected SSA countries?  
iii. What roles do financial institutions in selected SSA countries play in 
determining their international trade performance? 
iv. How relevant are trade policies in selected SSA countries in promoting 
their international trade performance?  
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of the study is to evaluate how institutional framework 
influences international trade performance in SSA countries. The specific 
objectives of the study are: 
i. To assess the impact of political institutions on international trade 
performance of selected SSA countries. 
ii. To evaluate the role of economic institutions in promoting international 
trade performance of selected SSA countries.  
iii. To investigate the influence of financial institutions on international 
trade performance of selected SSA Countries. 
iv. To examine the impact of trade policies on international trade 
performance in selected SSA countries. 
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1.5 Research Hypotheses 
Some research hypotheses were formulated in the course of the study in order 
to proffer answers to the research questions. They were stated only in their null 
form (H0) since the alternative hypotheses (Ha) can easily be inferred from H0.  
The research hypotheses include: 
i. H0: Political institutions do not play significant roles in determining 
international trade performance in selected SSA countries. 
ii. H0: Economic institutions do not exert any significant influence on 
international trade performance in selected SSA countries. 
iii. H0: Financial institutions do not significantly influence international 
trade performance in selected SSA countries. 
iv. H0: Trade policies in selected SSA countries do not have any 
significant relationship with their international trade performance. 
 
1.6 Scope of the Study 
The study focused on selected countries in SSA. The choice of the countries 
was basically informed by availability of relevant data. The countries were 
made up of WTO members (both full members and observers) as at 23rd July, 
2009 and non-WTO members (WTO, 2009). This was seen to be useful in 
order to capture the influence of WTO on international trade performance of 
the selected countries. The countries in SSA selected in the study include the 
following: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, and 
Guinea. Others were: Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. In all, 34 countries were selected for this study out of 48 countries 
in SSA. This represents about 70.83% in number. In terms of real GDP and 
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population size, the chosen countries account for about 81.32% and 81.01%, 
respectively (International Financial Statistics, 2008; United Nations  
Statistical Division,2009). 
 
The period covered by the study was from 1996 to 2008. The rationale for the 
choice of this period was based on the fact that World Governance Indicators 
(WGI) computed by Kaufmann, et al (2008; 2009), which was the major 
source of political institutional variables started in 1996. More so, it can be 
assumed that the operations of WTO started having full influence on the 
members the following year given the fact that the agreements was rectified 
and signed in 1995 (Oyejide and Njinkeu, 2007).  
 
1.7 Significance of the Study 
In the period of 1990s there has been some measure of research interest with 
regard to the roles of institutions on the management of economies across the 
world. The significance of economic environments such as the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policies, price stability,  and secured property rights that 
are in tandem with efficient utilisation of resources have been found to exert 
some degrees of impacts on economic performance in some countries. In other 
words, the nature of institutional framework and policies in a country can 
determine such country’s economic performance (Temple, 1999). This implies 
that when the institutional framework in a country is weak, it can lead to the 
occurrence of sub-optimal economic outcomes. Thus, institutions matter. 
 
There are emerging views in economic growth and development literature that 
institutional factors play considerable influence in determining economic 
performance of countries (e.g. Garba, 2003; Gallo, Stegmann and  Steagall, 
2006; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008a; Hassan, Wachtel and Zhou,2009).  
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Some efforts have been made by examining the link between institutions 
within countries in relation to democracy and economic growth. However, 
majority of extant studies have focused on the relationship between institutions 
and economic growth. In addition, evidences abound from literature that not 
much has been done in relating institutions to international trade performance. 
This is particularly crucial for SSA countries that usually have lower values in 
major trade and institutional indicators than other regions of the world. In the 
work by Meon and Sekkat (2008), they related international trade to 
institutions using a panel data (1990-2000) that covered mainly countries in 
America and Asia. In the sample of 59 countries only eight of them were in 
Africa. In their study they classified total export into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing. Thus, there is the need to examine the impact of institutional 
framework on international trade performance using a sizable panel involving 
SSA countries. This is one of the areas this study makes its contribution to 
knowledge.   
 
In another dimension, it has been noted that institutions may be endogenous; 
and as a result it will be needful to ‘unbundle’ them in order to appropriately 
capture their influence (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005). Similarly, international 
trade performance may be too encompassing for general policy direction. This 
study observed that grouping total export simply into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing would be too general. This is essential especially in SSA region 
where non-manufacturing export such as fuel and mining and agricultural 
export form bulk of their international trade basket.  
 
In view of the above, this study extends previous works by categorising 
indicators of international trade performance as total, manufacturing, 
agricultural, fuel and mining, and services exports. Thus, it is essential to 
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‘unbundle’ both institutional framework and international trade performance. 
Hence, this study relates ‘unbundled’ international trade to ‘unbundled’ 
institutional framework. This is another area the study significantly differs 
from previous studies. 
 
More so, the few works that relate the international trade performance to 
institutions focused mainly on political institutions aspect. Though political 
institutions are crucial, other segments of institutional framework are also 
relevant. Hence, this study incorporates economic and financial institutions in 
addition to political institutions, which were related to the ‘unbundled’ 
indicators of international trade performance. This also is an aspect that the 
study contributes to knowledge. This study therefore becomes significant in 
filling the aforementioned gaps by examining international trade performance 
in SSA within the context of institutional framework in the region. The focus 
of this study on international trade performance is based on the relevance of 
international trade on economies in a globalised world. Therefore, 
recommendations that will help to promote international trade performance of 
SSA countries are proffered in the study. Thus, researchers and policy-makers 
in the region as well as other similar regions especially the developing 
economies would find the output of the study relevant. 
 
1.8   Structure of the Study 
The study is structured into six chapters. Next to this introductory chapter, 
which gives a general overview to the study, is chapter two. The chapter 
provides background information on some issues that relate to international 
trade performance and institutional framework in SSA. The essence of the 
chapter was to further provide the thematic base of the study. In addition, 
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discussions on SSA region were compared to other regions of the world in 
order to properly situate the scenario in SSA within the world context. 
 
Chapter three presents a review of definitional, theoretical and empirical issues 
in international trade performance and institutional framework. It also 
discusses the concepts of institutions and New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
with respect to international trade. The fourth chapter presents the analytical 
framework used in the study, which conceptually linked institutional 
framework to international trade performance. Moreover, the empirical models 
for the study, techniques of estimation, brief note on instrumental variables as 
well as sources of data and variables description, were encapsulated in the 
chapter. 
 
The fifth chapter presents empirical analyses and interpretation. It started with 
descriptive analysis that provided the trend of the indicators of international 
trade performance. The various indicators of institutional framework were 
presented in relation to the different indicators of international trade 
performance. The influence of trade policy and other factors such as human 
capital and infrastructural development indicators on international trade 
performance were equally presented in the chapter. The chapter equally reports 
some sensitivity and robustness checks of the empirical results. Finally, 
chapter six presents a summary of the major findings in the study, policy 
recommendations of findings, and conclusion. Suggestions for further research 
and limitations of the study were also presented. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN SSA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic history especially in the 1960s and 1970s was characterised mostly 
by economic theorists who generally opined that the policy-making processes 
were done rationally by planners and managers of economies. It was equally 
believed that economic policy instruments in countries were chosen in an 
optimal fashion with a view to maximising the welfare of their citizenry 
(Soludo and Ogbu, 2004). Thus, the workings of an economy were assumed to 
be shaped by policy-makers who accomplished their vision of social welfare. 
The policy-makers were presumed to choose policies that would be in the 
interest of the public. 
 
At any rate, evidences abound that human beings are not always ‘angels nor 
saints’ that will act in the best interest of others because ordinarily, human 
beings are self-seeking (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Oslen, 1971; Kimenyi, 
2001; Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007). Thus, institutional framework 
becomes crucial for addressing the possibility of adverse selection in human 
activities. This means that when markets function perfectly, there would be 
presumably efficient allocation of resources. However, when efficient markets 
are not in view or they operate less than optimal, then there would be need for 
intervention to ensure better functioning of the economy (Lall, 2004). This is 
generally the bottom-line for the argument for institutional framework in a 
given system that involves human activities. 
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Relating institutional framework to international trade performance, trade 
policies and institutions that are required for efficient functioning of the trading 
system need to be put in place to have meaningful results. This has been noted 
in political economy as well as public choice theoretical frameworks (Becker, 
1985). The public choice framework provides a way of incorporating utility 
maximisation concepts of traditional economics into policy-making process. It 
is based on the maxims that policy-makers tend to maximise their utility 
through the selection of policy mix that increase the possibility of continuing 
in the office. The public choice theory is similar to political theory of 
institutional development as enunciated by LaPorta et al (1999). Thus, the way 
and manner trade policies will be formulated and implemented will depend on 
the structure of a country in terms of frameworks that are operational, which 
will eventually have effects on the country’s international trade performance.  
 
This chapter provides background information on some key issues as they 
relate to international trade performance as well as institutional framework in 
SSA. The data employed were described using Tables and Figures with a view 
of providing a foreknowledge of what is being examined. The relevance of the 
chapter is to further provide the thematic base of the study. In addition, the 
analyses done on the SSA region were compared to other regions of the world. 
This is to properly situate the scenario in SSA in the world context. It starts 
with a brief overview of some trade policies and institutional framework that 
were related to international trade performance in SSA. 
 
2.2 Historical Perspective of International Trade performance and 
Institutional Framework in SSA Countries 
This section presents dimensions of the possible links between international 
trade performance and institutional framework in SSA. It draws instances from 
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some of the countries in SSA. It is worthwhile to note that institutional 
framework at a given period in time can be corrective, promotional, regulatory, 
and supportive with regard to their roles in a country (de Rosa and Malyshev, 
2008).  For instance, rule of law as a component of the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) can be said to be regulatory as well as corrective based on 
the fact that it stipulates actions and activities that are allowed in a given 
country. On the other hand, when an individual contravenes the provisions of 
the law, such an individual is brought to order by corrective measures such as 
fine and sanctions. 
 
This study used decadal categorisation of institutional framework that relate to 
international trade to make the discourse systematic. It started from 1960s 
when most of the SSA countries had their political independence from their 
colonial masters. However, the policy frameworks that were noted had some 
overlaps as some spanned from one decade to another. In the 1960s, most SSA 
countries embarked on Import-substitution Industrialisation Strategy (ISI) with 
the major aim of correcting balance of payments challenges and trade 
outcomes. The ISI, which were still pursued in 1970s in some SSA countries, 
was designed for a country to reduce import dependence. The ISI, which has 
features of international trade and economic policies, is based on the need for a 
country (especially a developing one) to lessen foreign dependency through 
domestic production.  
 
The ISI has some policy instruments that include the following: an active 
industrial policy of subsidising and coordinating  production of desired 
substitutes; protective barriers to trade through the use of tariff; use of 
exchange rate to enhance the import of capital goods such as machinery that 
are essential for  domestic manufacturing among others. It has been noted that 
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ISI was based on two underlying premises, namely: addressing the widening 
gap between rich and poor countries, given the absence of industry in the 
developing countries; and in order to industrialise, smaller countries required 
protection to the newly emerging manufacturing sector. These ideas were 
particularly influential in Latin America and some SSA countries (Baldwin, 
2003; UNECA, 2010). 
 
At any rate, the policy mix varies across countries/regions depending on their 
peculiar needs. For instance, in Brazil,  the ISI process that spanned  from 1930 
until the end of the 1980s entailed currency devaluation as a means of 
enhancing exports and discouraging imports, which promoted the consumption 
of domestic products, as well as the introduction of differential exchange rates 
for importing capital goods and consumer goods (Werner, 1972; 
UNCTAD,2005). However, the inability of most SSA economies to diversify 
their productive base as well as low level of technological advancement 
militated against the effectiveness of the ISI (Bhowon, Boodhoo and 
Chellapermal, 2004).  
 
In Kenya and Mauritius, ISI was pursued as a means of promoting 
industrialisation after their independence. The main objectives of the ISI 
include the following: the pursuance of rapid industrial growth, reduction of 
deficit balance of payments challenges, and reduction of unemployment 
through job creation. The major policy instruments used were an overvalued 
exchange rate, high tariff barriers, import licensing, foreign exchange controls 
and quantitative restrictions to protect local industries (Gerrishon, Olewe-
Nyunya, and Odhiambo, 2004). 
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The 1970s witnessed trade policy regimes that can be generally grouped as 
Export Promotion Strategy (EPS).  The EPS was essentially prompted by an 
increasing recognition of the economic realities facing most of the countries in 
SSA. To this end, most of SSA countries made some attempts to focus on 
export-led promotion alternative to economic development as reflected in their 
various Development Plans of the late 1970s and early 1980s. For instance, in 
Kenya the Fourth Development Plan (1979-1984), advocated a more open 
strategy for the industrial sector in order to promote exports. It was designed to 
create a conducive environment for industries, through reforms in trade and 
industrial regimes. An example was the gradual replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with equivalent tariffs. Another measure was the introduction of a 
more liberal exchange rate policy and the strengthening of export promotion 
schemes (Foroutan, 1993; Gerrishon, Olewe-Nyunya, and Odhiambo, 2004). 
 
At that time, several SSA countries had agriculture as the major component of 
their export baskets. Given the fact that most of their economies were not 
technologically equipped, they had challenges in processing and storing their 
products, which hampered their export competiveness. The aftermath of this 
was the low performance of the countries in international trade. To curb the 
problem, Marketing Boards were established in most SSA countries with the 
aim of buying products from farmers and prepare such products for export. 
However, the effectiveness of the Marketing Boards was inhibited by 
corruption, inadequate finance, among others (Lall, 2004; Bhowon, Boodhoo 
and Chellapermal, 2004). 
 
The institutional frameworks for international trade in 1980s in most SSA 
countries were to some extent influenced by the Bretton Woods Institutions –
notably the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This 
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resulted from the fact that most of the SSA countries were indebted to them 
and to qualify for loan reschedule or additional loans, they were made to 
embark on economic restructuring. This led to the introduction of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in most SSA countries (Ajakaiye and Oyejide, 
2005; Aknikugbe, 2008). The trade policies and institutional framework like 
other macroeconomic instruments were influenced by SAP.  
 
During this era, some institutional and market oriented initiatives were also 
embarked on with a view to re-orienting the economy. Some of the initiatives 
such as export compensation scheme, import duty and value added tax 
remission schemes had some elements of changing ISI to EPS. This was based 
on the fact that they were crafted to improve export competitiveness.  For 
instance, Mauritius in 1983 started the measures towards an export-led policy 
in its SAP, which include trade liberalisation, exchange rate management as 
well as export incentives (Bhowon, Boodhoo and Chellapermal, 2004).  
Nigeria had similar measures, which started in 1986 (Ogunrinola and 
Osabuohien, 2010). 
 
After the 1980s that witnessed the SAP era, the 1990s did not totally jettison 
the programme but it was improved by what may be described as a mixed 
policy regime. Export-led industrialisation was equally pursued in the 1990s, 
which was characterised by the establishment of export processing zones 
(EPZs) in most SSA countries. For example, the law for the establishment of 
the EPZs in Nigeria was the Nigerian Export Processing Zones Authority 
Decree No. 63 of 1992. The decree empowered the Nigerian Export Processing 
Zones Authority to control the Nigerian EPZs programme and grant licences to 
operators in EPZs (Nigerian Export Promotion Council, 2010). 
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The EPZs were essentially designed to improve the export base of SSA 
countries in the world market by providing tax holidays and other incentives.  
They were also meant to provide economies of scale production as operators 
(companies) agglomerate at the EPZs. Infrastructures were equally meant to be 
provided at the EPZs to reduce cost of production, improve productivity and as 
a result engender export competitiveness. However, establishment of several 
EPZs in many SSA countries was on political ground against economic 
efficiency. This coupled with infrastructural challenges has been one of the 
reasons why the laudable objectives of the EPZs are far from been realised. For 
instance, in Nigeria and Kenya, what all the EPZs in the respective countries 
produce are far less in value than what is been produced in a community in 
China (Collier, 2009).   
 
Given the increased recognition of export performance as vital agent of 
economic growth, the period after 1999 has witnessed the promotion of export 
capacities in many SSA countries. One of the measures was the need to 
improve export supply in SSA by reducing some of the inherent constraints 
(Bacchatta, 2007). The objective of promoting export supplies was to make 
SSA countries more competitive in international trade. The policy and 
institutional framework in this period can be described as New Trade and 
Industrial Strategy (Bhowon, Boodhoo and Chellapermal, 2004). This was 
based on the re-engineering of the existing trade and industrial policies, to 
develop new strategies that will enable SSA countries meet the challenges in 
the New World Economic Order and also benefit from international trade. 
 
Institutional frameworks in terms of various policy options and strategies that 
could promote international trade performance in SSA countries have been 
initiated and in some cases implemented. However, their ineffectiveness has 
21 
 
 
 
 
been one of the factors accounting for the low international trade performance 
in SSA countries judging from some indicators. The respective periods 
mentioned had some peculiar features but in terms of policy changes, there 
were not too different from one another. It will be worthwhile to note that 
adequate coordination of policy and institutional instruments are essential in 
realising any policy objectives. For example, the Brazilian industrialisation 
process was based on a network that involved the government, private, and 
foreign actors. The first target was development of infrastructures and heavy 
industries, the second was manufacturing of consumer goods, while the third 
was production of durable goods like as automobiles, which witnessed the 
establishment of Volkswagen, Ford, General Motors and Mercedes in Brazil. 
This aspect of strong co-ordination is one of the missing links in most SSA 
countries.  
 
2.3 Patterns of Trade Balance and Trade Integration in Selected 
Regions 
To appraise the level of international trade performance of a region some 
important indicators are usually employed. Some of them include: trade 
balance, trade integration, share of exports in world market, percentage of 
different components of exports to GDP, among others (Hoekman and 
Kostecki, 2001; Goode, 2004; UNCTAD, 2008; WTO, 2009; World Bank, 
2010). Some of these indicators were used to assess the international trade 
performance in SSA in relation to other regions of the world. The other regions 
that comparisons were drawn from are as follows: East Asia and the Pacific 
(EAP); Europe and Central Asia (ECA); Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC); and Middle East and North Africa (MENA). 
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The world average (World) was equally presented in the Tables and Figures in 
order to give an indication of the positioning of SSA in the global perspective. 
The values of high income regions such as High Income Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (HI-OECDs) and Non-OECDs (HI-
NonOECDs) were not presented to keep the analysis relatively comparative. 
The period of focus that information was used is 1995 to 2008 as provided in 
World Trade Indicators (World Bank, 2010).   
 
To start with, the values of trade balance as a percentage of GDP for SSA and 
those of other regions are made are presented in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Trade Balance as a % of GDP (1995-2008) 
Year/Region 
SSA 
(%) 
World 
(%) 
EAP 
(%) 
ECA 
(%) 
LAC 
(%) 
MENA 
(%) 
1995 -12.95 -6.57 -5.35 -6.81 -5.30 -10.85 
1996 -12.55 -6.79 -5.48 -9.87 -5.71 -8.71 
1997 -10.13 -6.32 -5.02 -10.93 -7.52 -4.88 
1998 -14.81 -8.06 -0.50 -13.21 -8.45 -9.25 
1999 -11.17 -5.67 -0.54 -9.27 -6.78 -2.95 
2000 -7.95 -3.75 -0.31 -7.51 -6.71 1.99 
2001 -9.73 -4.90 -5.97 -7.61 -7.88 0.27 
2002 -7.75 -4.32 -6.98 -8.89 -7.54 1.13 
2003 -9.62 -4.56 -6.42 -9.51 -6.89 2.44 
2004 -8.24 -4.29 -7.77 -9.20 -6.09 1.00 
2005 -9.93 -5.04 -7.92 -8.83 -7.80 5.56 
2006 -9.13 -4.06 -8.02 -10.07 -3.29 6.82 
2007 -25.19 -7.95 -0.45 -8.42 1.65 -3.47 
2008 -25.19 -8.21 -7.76 -9.95 1.81 -0.73 
Note: EAP-East Asia and the Pacific; ECA-Europe and Central Asia; MENA-Middle East and North 
Africa; LAC-Latin America and Caribbean; SSA-Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Source: World Bank (2010) World Trade Indicators 2009/10. 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, most of the regions had negative trade balance all 
through the period (1995-2008) except MENA and LAC in few years. 
However, the percentage of negative trade balance to GDP for SSA was higher 
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than all other regions as a well as the world average. For instance, it was -
12.95% for SSA in 1995 while the values for EAP, ECA, LAC and MENA 
were -5.35%, -6.81%, -5.30% and -10.85% respectively. That of the world 
average was -6.57%. In 2007 and 2008, SSA region did not only have the 
worst value but the magnitude further deteriorated as it was moved to -25.19% 
from -9.13% in 2006. Thus, using trade balance an indicator of international 
trade performance denotes that SSA region lags behind other regions of the 
world. 
 
Table 2.2: Trade Integration (Trade as a % of GDP)  (1995-2008) 
Year/Region 
SSA 
(%) 
World 
(%) 
EAP 
(%) 
ECA 
(%) 
LAC 
(%) 
MENA 
(%) 
1995 76.37 84.63 92.67 75.59 87.97 77.58 
1996 75.69 85.67 91.65 87.59 85.54 74.24 
1997 74.04 86.16 97.27 89.57 87.19 70.31 
1998 75.99 86.38 107.12 88.05 86.14 65.23 
1999 74.52 86.21 106.99 87.77 85.41 64.68 
2000 71.43 90.34 112.92 97.66 87.36 69.25 
2001 76.75 89.95 108.32 97.79 83.93 69.50 
2002 80.35 90.56 106.38 98.15 82.14 76.48 
2003 75.66 90.27 111.43 101.59 85.50 80.94 
2004 77.70 94.67 114.50 105.91 89.50 88.26 
2005 82.00 97.96 117.39 107.08 93.60 93.62 
2006 86.63 100.86 117.09 111.68 92.48 95.19 
2007 88.38 98.20 116.13 105.03 90.23 96.96 
2008 88.38 100.45 115.40 106.46 91.55 97.70 
Note and Source: Same in Table 2.1 
 
The study assessed trade integration computed as percentage of trade to GDP 
as another indicator of international trade performance as reported in Table 2.2. 
The Table revealed that SSA had values that were lower than the world 
average and other regions (except for MENA in some years). For example, in 
year 2008 the value for SSA was 88.38% while that of the world average was 
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100.45%. Those of other regions were as follows: EAP (115.40%), ECA 
(106.46%), LAC (91.55%) and MENA (97.70%). This gives an indication that 
SSA is the least integrated in international trade compared to other regions of 
the world.  
 
2.4 Nature of International Trade in Selected Regions 
To further buttress the issues with respect to international trade performance in 
SSA in relation to other regions, the study considered the number of traded 
products as an indicator. This is presented in Table 2.3.  
 
Table 2.3:  Number of Products Exported and Imported (1995-2007) 
 Number of Products Exported  
 
Number of Products Imported  
 Year SSA World EAP ECA LAC MENA SSA World EAP ECA LAC MENA 
1995 77 143 114 197 127 146 194 216 210 231 214 216 
1996 77 143 119 201 133 143 193 218 214 230 221 213 
1997 78 143 126 198 133 132 191 217 212 235 217 220 
1998 85 145 121 195 133 146 197 220 212 236 218 222 
1999 77 144 118 201 129 149 202 219 208 233 216 219 
2000 85 143 112 197 132 151 197 217 202 233 219 221 
2001 81 142 120 190 140 153 196 218 209 232 218 225 
2002 86 147 120 193 141 162 196 220 212 235 219 227 
2003 88 155 128 195 153 175 193 220 209 238 219 233 
2004 92 155 127 202 146 173 196 221 207 241 220 233 
2005 114 163 140 198 148 182 209 227 219 241 222 239 
2006 113 168 153 211 154 186 214 229 226 241 223 239 
2007 113 168 153 211 154 186 214 229 226 241 223 239 
Note and Source: Same in Table 2.1 
 
It could be observed from Table 2.3 that in terms of products imported and 
exported, SSA imported far more than it exported with a great difference in 
relative terms compared to other regions from 1995 to 2007. For example, SSA 
exported an average of 77 products but the number of imported products was 
far more than double the number of exported products in 1995. In 2007, SSA 
had 113 number of exported products compared to number of imported 
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products of 194. When the number of imported and exported products of SSA 
is compared with both world average and those of other regions presented in 
Table 2.3, SSA had the least. 
 
The ratio of imported products to exported products was computed with a view 
to having a clearer assessment as reported in Table 2.4.  
 
Table 2.4: Ratio of Imported Products to Exported Products 
Year SSA World EAP ECA LAC MENA 
1995 2.50 1.51 1.85 1.17 1.68 1.47 
1996 2.50 1.52 1.80 1.15 1.66 1.49 
1997 2.44 1.52 1.68 1.19 1.63 1.67 
1998 2.30 1.51 1.75 1.21 1.64 1.52 
1999 2.61 1.52 1.76 1.16 1.67 1.47 
2000 2.33 1.52 1.80 1.18 1.65 1.46 
2001 2.41 1.54 1.74 1.22 1.56 1.47 
2002 2.27 1.49 1.76 1.22 1.55 1.40 
2003 2.20 1.42 1.64 1.22 1.43 1.33 
2004 2.12 1.43 1.63 1.19 1.51 1.34 
2005 1.84 1.39 1.56 1.21 1.50 1.32 
2006 1.90 1.36 1.48 1.14 1.45 1.28 
2007 1.90 1.36 1.48 1.14 1.45 1.28 
Note: The data for 2008 were not available 
Source: Computed by the Researcher using data from World Trade Indicators. 
 
The values in the Table 2.4 clearly revealed that SSA has the greatest ratio of 
imported products to exported products all through the period (1995-2007). For 
instance, in 1995 the ratio of imported products to exported products for SSA 
was as high as 2.50 while that of the world average was 1.51. Those of other 
regions were 1.17, 1.47, 1.68, and 1.85 for MENA, ECA, LAC and EAP 
respectively. Similar pattern can be observed for other years. 
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The key fact that emanated from the discourse on Tables 2.1 to 2.4 was that 
international trade performance of the SSA region using the indicators of trade 
balance, trade integration, and the number of imported and exported products 
was lower than both the world average those of other regions. Therefore, the 
fundamental question that comes to mind is: why has SSA’s region remained 
below other regions as well as world average? The answer to the above 
question is provided in the course of the study. 
 
2.5   Contribution of Export Categories to Gross Domestic Products in 
Selected Regions  
Another important indicator of international trade performance as discussed in 
this section is the contribution of different exports categories to the GDP. This 
international trade performance indicator is essential given the fact that it 
shows the magnitude of a country’s export with respect to its economy. This 
section examines the respective categories of exports, namely: total, 
manufactured, services, agriculture, and fuel and mining, respectively. They 
are illustrated using graphical exposition as shown in Fig.2.1 to Fig.2.5. 
 
For the contribution of total export to GDP, Fig.2.1 revealed the trend from 
1995 to 2008 for SSA and other regions. As can be seen from Fig.2.1, the 
values remained below 38% all through the period for SSA. It was the lowest 
among all the regions except in 1998 when it was a little above MENA. A 
similar trend can be observed for the contribution of manufacturing export to 
the GDP where SSA remained the lowest among the regions from the 
beginning of the period to 2002 where it managed to scale above LAC.  
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Fig.2.1 Trend in Total Export across Regions
 
Note: EAP-East Asia and the Pacific; ECA-Europe and Central Asia; MENA-Middle East and North 
Africa; LAC-Latin America and Caribbean; SSA-Sub-Saharan Africa. The values for each region, 
including the world, are the averages for the respective region. The same unit of measurement is applicable 
to the two vertical axes. Two vertical axes were used with a view to bringing out the values more clearly 
for easy comparison.  
Source: Computed by the Researcher using data from World Bank (2010).  
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Note and Source: Same in Fig.2.1 
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Note and Source: Same in Fig.2.1 
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 Note and Source: Same in Fig.2.1  
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However, the values were below 10% all through the period compared to the 
global average of 14% and 18% as shown in Fig. 2.2. A different picture can 
be seen for the proportion of agricultural export to GDP, where it was above 
the world average as shown in Fig.2.3.  
 
Another important observation from Fig.2.3 is that the variability was more 
than those experienced by other export categories. The case for fuel and 
mining export is shown in Fig.2.4. Just like the trend seen in agricultural 
export, the value for the SSA region was above some regions like LAC up until 
2007 where it became the least among the regions and below the global 
average. The fluctuations in some of the above mentioned indicators of 
international trade performance in the latter part of the period (especially 2007 
and 2008) may be as a result of the effects of global economic crises that hit 
the world at that time. It might also have resulted from the use of bio-fuels in 
some developed countries that reduce their demand for fossils fuels. For 
instance, in USA ethanol production experienced an exponential growth in 
2007 amounting up to 6500 million gallons (Earley, 2009). 
 
Fig.2.5 brought to limelight that the ratio of service export to GDP for SSA 
was equally the lowest among all the regions between 1996 and 2008. The 
values ranged between 6% and 8%, which was lower than those of the global 
average that ranged between 10.87% and 13.11%.  
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Note and Source: Same in Fig.2.1 
 
Figures 2.1 to 2.5 also show the ratio of the export categories to GDP as 
indicators of international trade performance for SSA countries. From the 
figures, it was clear that SSA did not only remain low but lagged behind both 
the world average and other regions in most of the years. The possible reason 
for this may be that SSA countries’ participation in global trade has not 
resulted to significant improvement in their domestic economies (Ajakaiye and 
Oyejide, 2005). This study posed the question whether the low level of 
international trade performance in SSA can be related to the quality of 
institutional framework in the region? In view of this, the next section presents 
some measures of institutional framework. 
 
2.6  Some Measures of Institutional Framework  
This section presents some institutional indicators. These were sourced from 
the World Governance Indicator as computed by Kaufmann et al (2009). They 
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include: rule of law (RL), regulatory quality (RQ), control of corruption (CC), 
government effectiveness (GE), political stability/absence violence and 
terrorism (PS), voice and accountability (VA). Some of the measures of 
institutional framework are presented in Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Voice and 
accountability was not presented due to the fact that it was not in WTI and was 
not grouped by region in Kaufmann et al (2009). The period 1996-2008 was 
used because WGI started in 1996. Political stability/absence violence and 
terrorism is hereafter taken as political stability (PS) for sake of clarity. 
 
Table 2.5: Measures of Institutional Framework (Respect for Institutional Framework) (1996-2008) 
Region/Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Rule of Law (RL) 
SSA -0.76 -0.73 -0.72 -0.70 -0.73 -0.76 -0.76 -0.73 -0.74 -0.74 
World -0.09 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
EAP -0.41 -0.43 -0.43 -0.46 -0.32 -0.32 -0.16 -0.18 -0.21 -0.25 
ECA -0.44 -0.61 -0.66 -0.64 -0.65 -0.58 -0.58 -0.60 -0.53 -0.45 
LAC -0.30 -0.32 -0.27 -0.34 -0.30 -0.31 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33 -0.36 
MENA -0.58 -0.47 -0.45 -0.50 -0.50 -0.44 -0.52 -0.55 -0.56 -0.54 
 
Control of Corruption (CC) 
SSA -0.63 -0.63 -0.58 -0.59 -0.62 -0.67 -0.68 -0.64 -0.63 -0.62 
World -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
EAP -0.43 -0.52 -0.60 -0.59 -0.62 -0.50 -0.53 -0.57 -0.59 -0.57 
ECA -0.70 -0.61 -0.62 -0.66 -0.60 -0.62 -0.52 -0.49 -0.53 -0.48 
LAC -0.35 -0.20 -0.18 -0.23 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.15 -0.16 -0.12 
MENA -0.46 -0.53 -0.57 -0.48 -0.46 -0.49 -0.55 -0.60 -0.54 -0.62 
Note: The values ranges from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) i.e. the higher the better.  EAP-East Asia and the 
Pacific; ECA-Europe and Central Asia; MENA-Middle East and North Africa; LAC-Latin America and 
Caribbean; SSA-Sub-Saharan Africa. The values for each region, including the world, are the averages for 
the respective region. This means the value of a representative country in for the respective region.  
Source: World Bank (2010) World Trade Indicators 2009/10 based on Kaufmann et al (2009) 
 
In Table 2.5, the values of RL as well as CC for SSA were quite low and far 
lower than the world average and those of other regions.  The figures for RL 
were even worse than those of CC. The RL revolved around the value of -0.70 
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to -0.76, while those for CC were -0.58 and -0.67. Similarly, the values for GE 
and RQ, which depict quality of government action as a measure of 
institutional framework, are presented in Table 2.6. The values for GE ranged 
from -0.66 and -0.79, which were lower than those of other regions as well as 
the world average. A similar picture can be observed for RQ where its values 
remained below global average within the same period. 
 
Table 2.6: Measures of Institutional Framework (Government Actions) (1996-2008) 
Region/Year 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
 
Government Effectiveness (GE) 
SSA -0.66 -0.69 -0.72 -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.78 -0.79 -0.76 -0.78 
World -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 
EAP -0.30 -0.49 -0.48 -0.47 -0.55 -0.53 -0.46 -0.46 -0.54 -0.53 
ECA -0.58 -0.49 -0.51 -0.48 -0.39 -0.37 -0.37 -0.34 -0.36 -0.31 
LAC -0.34 -0.11 -0.15 -0.25 -0.21 -0.20 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 
MENA -0.45 -0.68 -0.63 -0.58 -0.55 -0.53 -0.63 -0.63 -0.64 -0.61 
 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) 
SSA -0.65 -0.66 -0.64 -0.66 -0.69 -0.72 -0.75 -0.72 -0.73 -0.70 
World -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
EAP -0.35 -0.59 -0.61 -0.73 -0.77 -0.62 -0.56 -0.61 -0.63 -0.69 
ECA -0.59 -0.52 -0.49 -0.41 -0.38 -0.30 -0.32 -0.31 -0.20 -0.10 
LAC 0.22 0.18 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 
MENA -0.64 -0.85 -0.78 -0.78 -0.68 -0.66 -0.73 -0.72 -0.68 -0.63 
 
                      Political Stability / Absence of Terrorism (PS) 
SSA -0.56 -0.65 -0.70 -0.65 -0.60 -0.54 -0.56 -0.54 -0.57 -0.56 
World -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 
EAP -0.04 0.02 -0.17 -0.09 0.07 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.14 0.10 
ECA -0.36 -0.48 -0.52 -0.41 -0.42 -0.53 -0.44 -0.36 -0.24 -0.13 
LAC -0.14 -0.15 -0.05 -0.18 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.13 
MENA -0.90 -0.90 -0.74 -0.83 -0.89 -0.94 -0.94 -0.97 -0.94 -0.91 
Note and Source: Same in Table 2.5 
 
In the lower part of Table 2.6, another measure of institutional framework 
namely, PS, was presented.  Like others, the values were still very low and 
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quite lower than those of other regions as well as the global average. The 
above discourse points out that the quality of institutional framework in SSA is 
low. When this is juxtaposed with international trade performance that which 
was also low then can it be presumed that the low international trade 
performance can be related to the low institutional framework in SSA. 
 
2.7 Some Stylised Facts on Selected SSA Countries 
Having assessed the position of SSA region within the global context in terms 
of international trade performance indicators and selected institutional 
framework indicators, this section gives some background on the selected SSA 
countries with a view to investigating if the countries with relatively better 
institutional framework will have better international trade performance. To 
achieve this, some other institutional indicators besides those of WGI 
mentioned above were chosen from institutional environment indicators in 
World Trade Indicators-WTI (World Bank, 2010). This study used ‘Enforcing 
Contracts’ and ‘Starting Business’ as reported in WTI under ‘Ease of Doing 
Business’ measure of institutional environment. This is because the ease or 
difficulty of carrying out business activities in a country will influence the 
level of production as well as her capacity to export, ceteris paribus. 
 
The Enforcing Contract indicator shows the efficiency of a country’s contract 
enforcement processes. It takes into account the evolution of a sale of goods 
dispute and tracking the time, cost, and number of procedures involved from 
the time a complainant files a lawsuit until it is concluded. It has a rank from 1 
to 183 with a lower value representing poor contract enforcement process and 
institutional framework, vice versa. The Starting Business indicator indicates 
the bureaucratic and legal hurdles that an entrepreneur has to surmount in order 
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to establish and register a new firm. It is also ranked from 1 to 183 and lower 
ranks show less favourable institutional environment (World Bank, 2010). 
 
The above indicators of institutional framework were compared with some 
other indicators of international trade performance. Real growth in total export 
and export share in the world market, which were selected from trade outcome 
indicators in WTI were used in comparison with the institutional framework.  
 
Table 2.7: Institutional Framework and International Trade Performance Indicators (1995-2009) 
Country Enforcing Contract (Rank) 
Starting Business 
(Rank) 
Real Growth in Total 
Export (%) 
Export Share of 
World Export (%) 
Benin 176 149 2.56 0.01 
Botswana 88 89 4.64 0.04 
Burkina Faso 110 113 6.37 0.00 
Burundi 164 130 15.25 0.00 
Cameroon 173 170 4.53 0.03 
Cape Verde 40 153 16.80 0.00 
Central Africa Republic 171 157 3.64 0.00 
Cote D’Ivoire 126 167 5.56 0.07 
Ethiopia 67 108 11.09 0.01 
Gabon 148 146 -1.68 0.04 
Gambia 64 105 3.16 0.00 
Ghana 49 138 6.40 0.03 
Guinea 130 177 1.83 0.01 
Kenya 114 116 2.62 0.05 
Lesotho 105 129 10.21 0.00 
Madagascar 154 46 5.62 0.01 
Malawi 140 121 -1.38 0.01 
Mali 149 149 9.67 0.01 
Mauritania 84 153 7.07 0.01 
Mauritius 73 9 3.97 0.04 
Mozambique 133 123 14.40 0.01 
Namibia 39 114 -0.03 0.02 
Niger 135 158 4.87 0.00 
Nigeria 92 96 2.91 0.29 
Rwanda 45 49 15.81 0.00 
Senegal 149 119 2.64 0.02 
Seychelles 66 67 10.37 0.01 
South Africa 83 56 4.28 0.51 
Swaziland 129 153 4.70 0.02 
Tanzania 32 109 8.80 0.02 
Togo 153 177 4.66 0.01 
Uganda 117 125 12.76 0.01 
Zambia 87 83 17.28 0.02 
Zimbabwe 75 153 1.83 0.03 
SSA Average 118 127 7.04 0.03 
Note: 0.00 in the last column does not mean a country had no export contribution; it may imply that value was less 
than 0.01 as the figures were rounded to two decimal places. SSA average represents the average for the entire Sub-
Saharan African region not essentially the average of the countries presented. 
Source: World Trade Indicators of the World Bank (2010). 
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The two respective indicators of institutional framework and measure of 
international trade performance were presented in Table 2.7 for the 34 selected 
SSA countries. The average value for the period 1995-2009 were presented as 
generated from WTI with a view to avoiding the challenge of omitted 
observation. A quick point that can be drawn from values in Table 2.7 is that 
there is a possible link between the institutional framework and international 
trade performance using the respective indicators presented. For instance, 
under the Enforcing Contract column, 19 countries out of the 34 presented had 
values that were lower than the SSA average rank of 118. 
 
On a similar note, in the starting business indicator, 18 of the countries in 
Table 2.7 had values lower than the average for the region, which represents 
over 50%. The fact from the above is that the institutional framework in these 
selected countries was quite low. Comparing institutional framework with the 
presented international trade performance shown in Table 2.7, it was observed 
that for real growth in total export, 22 countries out of the 34 presented 
representing over 64% had values that were lower than the average of the 
region. In the export share of world market, 24 out of the total countries 
presented had values that were lower than the average for the SSA region 
average. The above facts point out that some measure of relationship possibly 
exists between institutional framework and international trade performance in 
SSA. 
 
2.8 Roles of WTO and Regional Economic Communities in SSA 
In the international trade arena, a key institution that plays a major role in 
enhancing international trade participation among most countries of the world 
is the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The regional economic communities 
(RECs) can also play some important role in improving international trade 
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performance of member countries. This sub-section discusses the roles of 
WTO and RECs in SSA.  
 
The WTO was established and became operational 1st January, 1995. It is one 
of the most influential international inter-governmental organisations with 
respect to economic globalisation (Rose, 2004). The origin of WTO has its 
roots in GATT (1947) and International Trade Organisation-ITO (1948) after 
the Second World War. This was when the issue of labour standards and trade 
was recognised, that unfair labour conditions with respect to production for 
export, can create difficulties in international trade (United Nations, 1948; 
Hansson, 1983). However, the statutes of ITO were not ratified and as a result, 
the GATT (1947) that was agreed upon as part of the discussions on 
establishing the ITO became the organisation that govern the liberalisation of 
international trade in the post-war era (Hansson,1983). Decisions, procedures 
and customary practices of the GATT guide the WTO in its actions. For 
instance, Article XVI: 1 of the WTO agreement states that except as otherwise 
provided under the Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the WTO 
shall be guided by the procedures the contracting parties to GATT 1947 
established in the framework of GATT 1947 (WTO, 2005a; 2005b;WTO, 
2007). 
 
The history of GATT began in December 1945 when USA invited its war-time 
allies to enter into negotiations to conclude a multilateral agreement for the 
reciprocal reduction of tariffs on trade in goods. At the end of USA’s proposal, 
the United Nations Economic and Social Committee adopted a resolution with 
regard to reduction of tariff on trade in goods in February, 1946. At 1944 
Bretton Woods Conference where IMF and the World Bank were established, 
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the need for a complementary and comparable international institution for 
trade was recognised (Jackson, 1998).  
 
Over the years, through experimentation the GATT evolved to include some 
fairly elaborate procedures for conducting its business. GATT was able to 
reduce tariffs on trade in goods, in particular on industrial goods from 
developed countries. For instance, in eight negotiating rounds between 1947 
and 1994, the average level of tariffs of developed countries on industrial 
products reduced from 40% to 4%. The first five rounds including Geneva 
(1947); Annecy (1949); Torquay (1951); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1960-1961) 
focused on tariff reduction. Others that followed like Kennedy Round (1964-
1967) negotiations included other issues such as non-tariff barriers (NTBs), in 
which the GATT was less successful. Due to the fact that reduction of NTBs 
was complex, another institutional framework other than GATT became 
needful (WTO, 2005; 2007).  
 
Another round– Tokyo Round (1973-1979) produced better results on NTBs, 
than the Kennedy Round. The Uruguay Round on Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations covered trade in goods, including agricultural products, trade in 
textiles and clothing and for the first time included trade in services known as 
Ministerial Declaration of Punta del Este. It was in February 1990 that the 
then Italian Trade Minister (Renato Ruggien) moved the first idea to establish 
a new international organisation for international trade. In April 1990, Canada 
formally proposed the establishment of ‘WTO’ to administer the different legal 
instruments related to international trade, including GATT, GATS and other 
lateral instruments. In similar manner, the European Community submitted a 
proposal in July 1993 for the establishment of a ‘Multilateral Trade 
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Organisation’ (MTO) to strengthen GATT with a sound institutional 
framework to implement the ‘ruler’ of Uruguay Round.  
 
Regardless of United States’ moves at dissuading the European Community’s 
efforts, by early 1993 most participants in the round were prepared to agree to 
the establishment of MTO. The United States formally agreed to the 
establishment of the new organisation on December 15, 1993 and advocated a 
change of name as a condition for its consent and suggested the name ‘World 
Trade Organisation (WTO)’ as earlier proposed by Canada. The proponents of 
International Trade Organisation (ITO) had opted for MTO as proposed by 
European Community. Finally, the agreement establishing the WTO was 
signed in Marrakesh in April 1994, which entered into force on 1st January 
1995. It will be necessary to reiterate that GATT involved a set of rules agreed 
upon by countries; the WTO is an institutional body.  
 
The ultimate objectives of WTO are as follows (WTO, 2005a):  
a) Increased standard of living;  
b) Attainment of full employment;  
c) Growth of real income and effective demand; and  
d) Expansion of production of and trade in goods and services.  
However, the preamble stresses the importance of sustainable economic 
development and integration of developing countries and LDCs in the world 
trading systems, which were not in GATT 1947.  
 
The primary function of WTO is to provide the common institutional 
framework for the conduct of trade relations among its members in matters 
related to the agreements and associated legal instruments included in the 
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Annexes to WTO Agreement (Article II:1). The specific assigned functions 
include the following, to:  
a) facilitate the implementation, administration and further the objectives of the 
agreement;  
b) provide the forum for negotiations among its members concerning their 
multilateral trade relations in matters, and resolve same under the 
agreement;  
c) administer the understanding rules and procedures governing the settlement 
of disputes;  
d) control the trade policy review mechanism (TPRM);  
e) cooperate as appropriate with IMF and World Bank; and  
f)  provide technical assistance to developing countries.  
 
The basic rules range from tariffs, import quotas and customs formulations to 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), food safety regulations and national 
security measures. The basic rules and principles were categorised into the 
following (WTO, 2005a; 2007):   
a) principles of non-discrimination;  
b) rules on market access, including rules on transparency;  
c) regulations on unfair trade; 
d) guidelines on resolution of conflicts between trade liberalisation and other 
societal values and interests;  
e) procedures on special and differential treatment for developing countries;  
f) other key institutional treatment and procedural rules relating to decision-
making and dispute settlement. 
 
Besides the WTO that helps to facilitate international trade around the world, 
some trade groupings especially regional economic communities (RECs) also 
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known as regional trade arrangements (RTAs) exist in SSA that have been 
established to promote international trade performance. As noted by UNECA 
(2010) regionalism has proliferated in post-independence SSA countries but 
intra-regional trade in SSA have remained lower than projected. For instance, 
export to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Members 
as percentage of total export value was only 10.1% and that of the import from 
ECOWAS Members as percentage of total import value was 11.5% in 2007 
(ECOWAS Commission, 2010).   
 
The memberships of RECs are usually distributed across the geographical sub-
regions, namely: Central, East, Southern, and West. A few of them cut across 
with membership from more than one geographical sub-region. However, there 
are eight RECs recognised by the African Union (AU). They include: Arab 
Maghreb Union -AMU; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa -
COMESA; Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African 
Community (EAC), Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) [UNECA, 2010; African Union 
Commission, 2011]. The activities of the eight RECs have been assessed with 
regard to their status and efforts in realising Free Trade Area and Customs 
Union. Five of them, namely: COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS, EAC and 
SADC were found to have launched RTAs, which are believed to improve 
intra-RECs trade flows (UNECA, 2010). Brief information on these five is 
provided. 
 
The COMESA, which was founded in 1994, has 19 members. The members 
include: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
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Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. On the other 
hand, the EAC is the regional intergovernmental organisation that involves 
Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Rwanda. The treaty that established 
EAC was signed on 30th November 1999 and entered into force on 7th July 
2000 following its ratification by the three founding Members –Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania (African Union Commission, 2011).  
 
The ECCAS was founded in 1983 with 11 members, including: Angola, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome 
Principe. The ECOWAS inaugurated in 1975 and it has 15 members, namely: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. While 
the SADC was established in 1992 with 14 members, namely: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe  (UNCTAD, 2006; 2008a; WTO, 2008; 2009; UNECA, 2010; 
African Union Commission, 2011).   
 
From the five RECs discussed above, all of them have been in existence prior 
to 1996 except the EAC. Hence, this study focused on four of them that have 
been in operations within the period of the study, namely COMESA, ECCAS, 
ECOWAS, and SADC.  Though there is the issue of multiple memberships in 
few of the RECs, it will not portend a serious challenge given the fact that this 
study is interested in assessing their roles as they relate to economic 
institutions. 
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The RECs essentially exist to help the region maximise their benefits of 
engaging in international trade and minimise possible costs that are involved. 
This is usually pursued through the reduction of trade restrictions and creation 
of market access. However, the effectiveness of their roles depends on some 
other factors (Oyejide, 1997; Elbadawi, 1997; Oyejide and Njinkeu, 2007). For 
example, Yang and Gupta (2007) noted that RTAs in Africa have not been 
effective in promoting trade due to external trade barriers and low level of 
resource harmonisation among members.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews extant literature with regard to international trade 
theories, definitional and empirical issues in institutional framework and 
international trade performance. It starts off with brief review of conventional 
theories of international trade.  
 
3.2 Review of Conventional Theories of International Trade 
There are a number of international trade theories that explain the factors that 
determine a country’s performance in international trade. International trade 
theories involve different models of international trade that have been 
developed to underscore the different views relating to exchange of goods and 
services across national boundaries.  
 
The first early international trade theory was mercantilism, which is at times 
referred to as classical theory of international trade (Appleyard, Field and 
Cobb, 2010). Prior to the 18th century, mercantilism posits that countries 
should encourage exports in other to maximise their gains from the 
international trade. Though the mercantilist theory is an old trade theory, its 
features still persist in modern politics and trade policies of some countries.  
 
Following the classical international trade theory was the neoclassical theory. 
The neoclassical theory of international trade was championed by Adam Smith 
who developed the theory of absolute advantage. The theory of absolute 
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advantage was the first to explain why unrestricted free trade is beneficial to a 
country. It argues that the invisible hand of the market mechanism, rather than 
government policy, should determine what a country exports and imports 
(Krugman, 1983; Pugel, 2008). The theory of absolute advantage maintained 
that tariffs and quotas should not restrict international trade flow; rather 
international trade should be dictated by the market forces. Unlike 
mercantilism, Smith argued that a country should concentrate on production of 
goods in which it has absolute advantage, which negates the mercantilist idea 
that international trade is a zero-sum game (Pugel, 2008). In the process of 
time, two international trade theories have been developed from the absolute 
advantage theory. The first was the Ricardian comparative advantage, while 
the other was developed by Eli Hecksher and Bertil Ohlin, which is simply 
known as Heckscher-Ohlin theory of international trade (Appleyard, Field and 
Cobb, 2010). 
  
The Ricardian theory of international trade was built on the maxim of 
comparative cost advantage. The underlying principle of comparative 
advantage is that countries involved in international trade should specialise on 
the production of goods and services and export the products in which they 
have comparative (or relative cost) advantage and should import the goods and 
services in which they have comparative disadvantage (Pugel, 2008). The 
Ricardian theory of international trade argues that through such specialisation, 
there will be the possibility that greater benefits will accrue to countries that 
are involved. It has been debated that the theory of comparative advantage has 
assumptions that limit its application to the real world phenomenon. For 
instance, the assumption that countries are obsessed by the maximisation of 
production and consumption and not by other issues such as the welfare of 
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workers and consumers was unrealistic (Stiglitz, 2002; Hare, 2004; Pugel, 
2008). 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin theory (also called factor proportions theory) was 
developed in the early 20th Century. It has the basic principle that countries 
should produce and export goods that require factors that they have in 
abundance and import goods that require resources which they have in short 
supply. The Heckscher-Ohlin theory differs from both absolute advantage and 
comparative advantage in terms its submission that a country should specialise 
production and export using the factors that they are most abundantly 
endowed. For instance, Leontief (1953) tested the validity of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theory where it was revealed that the United States was more abundantly 
endowed in capital compared to other countries. This means that the United 
States should export capital-intensive goods and import labour-intensive 
goods. 
 
In recent times especially the 21st century, there have been some modifications 
with regard to the empirical application of international trade theories. One of 
the most popular one is the gravity model of trade, which provides an 
empirical explanation of international trade. The gravity model submits that 
countries’ economic size and distance between trading countries are the main 
factors that determine their pattern of international trade (Appleyard, Field and 
Cobb, 2010). From the foregoing, it could be observed that international trade 
theories deal with issues that influence international trade, emphases were not 
on institutional framework.  
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3.3 Review of Institutional Theories 
The major theories of institutions are the New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
theory and LaPorta et al (1999) theories of institutional development. The NIE 
theory is often seen as a new development in economic thoughts based on 
institutional economics and some of the principles of neo-classical economics 
(Natal, 2001). NIE has been applied in varying contexts. For instance, Greif 
(1998) engaged it as non-technologically determined controls that can 
influence social interactions through the provision of incentives to maintain 
regularity in human behaviour.  
 
The NIE theory posits that economic activities that individuals engage in can 
be influenced by some social and legal relationships that exist among them.  
Thus, NIE embraces other areas outside the immediate domain of economics 
like political science and sociology as well as the interaction they can exert on 
economic outcomes (Williamson, 2000; Greif, 2006). This is what makes 
institutions to be an area of economics that has made economics more closely 
in touch with other social science disciplines as they can be subjected to 
economic analysis.  
 
The basic assumptions of NIE that can be related to trade can be grouped into 
three. They are assumptions on: a) individuals; b) how and why individuals 
engage in contract; and c) how individuals govern collective actions (Natal, 
2001). The underlying fact on the three assumptions is that there is need for 
some institutional framework mechanism that can regulate behaviour of 
economic agents because individuals can be opportunistic (Akerlof, 1970). 
There have been some arguments on the assumptions of NIE in terms of 
institutional change and predictability. However, the tenet of NIE is still 
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relevant especially when evaluating the roles of institutions in economic 
relations, including international trade.  
 
The LaPorta et al (1999) theories of institutional development centre on factors 
that can lead to the formation and persistence of a given institutional 
framework in a society. The theories of institutional development can be 
classified into three based on their structural composition, namely: economic, 
political, and cultural institutional theories. The economic theory of 
institutional framework posits that institutions are essentially crafted when it is 
efficient to create them. The connotation of this is that institutions are mostly 
created by economic actors when the perceived social benefits of such creation 
significantly exceed the perceived transaction costs that are associated with 
their creation. 
 
Political theory of institutional development as enunciated by LaPorta et al 
(1999) hinges fundamentally on redistribution of societal resources much more 
than economic efficiency. The basic maxim of the political of institutional 
development is that institutions are fashioned by those that have political 
powers in such a way that they can stay in power with a view to extracting 
economic rents. This is very ubiquitous in a multi-ethnic society where there is 
the existence of conflict of interests between voters of different groups and 
their representatives in the parliament. The conflict of interests is with regard 
to skirmish of policy preferences, which can result to a number of inefficient 
public policies that are based on political logrolling and compensation of 
political allegiances instead of efficiency (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2003; 
Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007). The last category of institutional 
development theory is the cultural theory of institutional development. The 
cultural theory of institutional development postulates that a given society will 
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usually hold beliefs that can shape collective actions of the constituting human 
agents.  
 
Another theory which is related to LaPorta et al (1999) theories of institutional 
development especially the political theory of institutional development is the 
public choice theory. The public choice theory is based on the incorporation of 
utility maximisation concepts of traditional economics into policy-making 
process. Its main belief is the fact that policy-makers will tend to maximise 
their utility by selecting policy mix that will increase the possibility of 
continuing in the office (Becker, 1985). This is quite similar to LaPorta et al 
(1999) political theory of institutional development as both public choice 
theory and political theory of institutional development recognise the rent-
seeking inclinations of political leaders.  
 
This study employs the institutional theories especially LaPorta et al (1999) 
theories of institutional development and NIE as theoretical foundation to 
investigate how institutional framework exert impact on international trade 
performance. 
 
3.4 Review of Definitional Issues on Institutions and International 
Trade 
Institutions have been seen to play key roles in the management of economies 
in the last two decades. This was due to the fact that political economic 
literature has supported the view that economic agents that are involved in 
transactions are not only influenced by economic variables (especially price) 
but also by a host of other factors that are classified as institutions (Natal, 
2001). North (1991) defined institutions as the humanly formulated constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interactions, which consist of both 
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informal constraints (such as sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes 
of conduct) and formal rules (like constitutions, laws, and property rights). 
Institutions have been crafted by man to create a peaceful habitation and 
reduce uncertainty in the exchange of values. 
 
Institutions create the choice pattern that affects not only transactions and 
production costs but also the likelihood of engaging in economic activities 
(Ike, 1977; 1984; Williamson, 2000; Rodrik, 2008b). Institutions can reduce or 
increase transaction costs because they determine the nature of exchange. They 
form a link for connecting the past with the present and the future- a kind of 
path dependency. Institutions provide the incentive structure of any economy 
because they create the structure that shapes the direction of economic change 
towards growth, stagnation, or decline (Matthews, 1986; North, 1991).  
 
According to North (1991), history is largely a story of institutional evolution 
in which the historical performance of an economy can be understood as part 
of a sequential story. The major focus of the literature on institutions and 
transaction costs has been on institutions as efficient solutions to problems of 
organisation in a competitive framework (Matthews, 1986; North, 1991; 1994; 
Williamson, 2000).  
 
On the other hand, Greif (1998), using the term ‘Historical Comparative 
Institutional Analysis’ (HCIA) defined institutions as non-technologically 
determined constraints that can influence social interactions and provide 
incentives that will maintain regularity in human behaviour. Though the HCIA 
relied considerably on past events in explaining human relations, it is closely 
related to NIE in terms of acknowledgement of both formal and informal 
institutions. For instance, the essence of HCIA is the examination of the factors 
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determining the relevant rules of the game, the forces that make these rules 
self-enforcing on behaviour of individuals involved. These factors are also 
encapsulated within NIE framework. 
 
In addition, the formal institutions which generally entail rules and regulations 
that control the existence of a system can be grouped into two, namely: 
economic and political institutions. However, for the purpose of this study, a 
third category, which is financial institution is been explored. This is given the 
important role of financial institutions in the provision of financial resources 
for international trading activities (Papaioannou, 2009). Economic institutions 
are essential for economic growth in a country due to their influence in shaping 
incentives for various economic actors in a society (Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2008). Economic institutions not only determine the level of economic growth 
potential of a country, they also determine the distribution of resources and 
economic gains in the country (IMF, 2005). This is because they influence 
physical and human capital investments, technological innovations and the 
organisation of production (World Bank, 2002).  
 
The political institutions deal with the way the political structure in a country 
influences the behaviour of agents in the society especially with the 
distribution of political power (de jure and de facto). Examples of political 
institutions include the form of government in a country (democracy or 
dictatorship), rule of law and the extent of constraint of political power 
(Olomola, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008; Hassan, Wachtel and Zhou, 
2009; Acemoglu, 2010).   
 
Matthews (1986) noted that institutions have become one of the liveliest areas 
in economics. Thus, it can be inferred that institutions are essential and their 
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influence can be subjected to economic analysis. This is because institutions 
involve sets of formal and informal rules on how economic agents behave. The 
bottom-line of economic agents’ behaviour in this regard is to make Pareto-
efficient choices in the midst of alternatives (LaPorta et al, 1999). This means 
that NIE would become popular as the roles institutions play in economic life 
is better understood and appreciated. 
 
When institutional factors are not handled properly in a given transaction, there 
would be contractual incompleteness with added problems of opportunism in 
form of adverse selection, moral hazard, shirking, among others. This is 
because economic agents involved in economic activities may not reliably 
disclose true position or situation of events upon request neither would they be 
willing to fulfil all forms of contracts when not supported by credible rules. In 
other words, contracts are not self-enforcing and humans may not act in the 
best interest of others. This may be one of the reasons why witnesses that 
appear in the law courts are made to swear an oath to tell the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth (Williamson, 2000). This may also be the rationale why 
guarantors and witnesses are usually needed when serious contractual 
arrangements like employment, lending and hire purchases are to be made. 
Thus, some form of institutional arrangement is needed to make humans 
adhere to commitments. In this wise, parties to contract who look ahead and 
observe potential flaws would certainly seek to work out contractual 
adjustments, which will make them enjoy some advantages over those who are 
myopic on the terms or leave their fate to chance. 
 
Other possible sources of contractual hazards include bilateral dependence; 
weak property rights especially intellectual property rights (IPRs), failure of 
probity, and so on. These have propensities to compromise contractual 
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integrity and cause some form of distortions (Coase, 1992). For instance, the 
relevance of contract enforcement and credible contracting have been found 
valid for commercial contracting in Vietnam (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999) 
and contract farming in Kenya (Grosh, 1994). Thus, without appropriate 
institutions no market economy of any significance is possible (Coase, 1992).  
 
The significance of economic environments such as monetary and price 
stability, secure property rights, and openness to international exchange that is 
consistent with the development and efficient use of resources have been found 
to exert positive impacts on countries’ economic growth. In other words, 
inappropriate institutional arrangements and policies in a country can lead to 
sub-optimal performance (Temple, 1999). This may be the relevance of 
international trade organs such as WTO and various RECs with a view to 
harmonising policies that improve the members’ gains from international trade. 
 
In as much as it is not always possible to have such benign public officers, it 
becomes imperative to put in place institutional constraints on public officers 
and technocrats, which will minimise the extraction of rent from the state and 
thereby improve its performance (Gonzalez de lara, Greif and Jha, 2008). More 
so, Adewole (2006) related the issue of unemployment in Nigeria to the quality 
and perception (altruistic or individualistic tendency) of the managers of the 
country’s economy as dictated by the quality of institutions. The author noted 
that general macroeconomic problems and unemployment in particular are 
indications of institutional weaknesses. In this way, the use of fiscal and 
monetary policy instruments without taking into cognisance the institutional 
framework may lead to policy failures. 
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From the foregoing, it can be summarised that institutional framework are 
humanly formulated arrangements that is capable of structuring political, 
economic and social interactions among economic agents. Thus, institutions in 
précis entail rules and regulations put in place by human beings in order to 
reduce uncertainties in the exchange of economic values by controlling the 
behaviour of individuals in a given human interactions.  
 
3.5 Review of Theoretical Issues of Institutions in Relation to Trade 
The early forms of economies were conceived as local exchange within a small 
community. Trade usually expands beyond this kind of community scene to 
the region; longer distances and eventually to the rest of the world 
(international). At each developmental stage, economies have elements of 
increasing specialisation, division of labour, and more efficient technological 
usage. The story of gradual evolution from local autarky to specialisation and 
division of labour was derived from the German historical school of thought 
(Sheptun, 2005).  Specialisation is elementary whereby self-reliance is one of 
the key features of most individuals. Limited level of community trade exists 
within a given social network of informalities, which determined the local 
exchange of goods and services (North, 1991). Thus, the transaction costs that 
associate limited trade are low because people have somewhat intimacy with 
one another due to repeated transaction.  
 
As trade continues to expand, the likelihood for conflicts over the exchange of 
values becomes a source of concern- an issue that has to be considered before 
engaging in trade. The size of the market increased and transaction costs also 
increased markedly due to the existence of multifaceted social networks. In 
this case, more resources have to be employed in order to enforce rules and 
orders for effective trade to take place. In the absence of a state that can 
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enforce contracts; religious and cultural beliefs can also exert some measure of 
standards for the conduct of those involved in the process (North, 1991; 1994). 
However, their effectiveness in lowering the costs of transacting depends on 
the degree to which the laid down guidelines were followed. With time, some 
economies of scale and specialisation would emerge as a major characteristic 
of the trade relation. This has been noted in early Britain where overseas 
ventures were pursued through trade expansion and joint stock corporations 
(Gonzalez de lara, Greif and Jha, 2008). 
 
The growth of long distance trade usually poses two distinct transaction cost 
problems (North, 1994). One is the traditional problem of agency- the 
costliness of measuring performance where the influence of kinship determines 
the outcome of such agreements (or contracts). As the size and volume of trade 
expands, the problems of ‘agencification’ would become a significant 
constraint to trade. The second problem consists of contract negotiation and 
enforcement where there is no readily accessible way to achieve agreements 
and ensure contract enforcements. Negotiation and enforcement with other 
parts of the world involve the development of standardised weights and 
measures, units of account, a medium of exchange, merchant law courts, and 
enclaves of foreign merchants, among others (Williamson, 2000).  
 
The expansion of the market normally entails more specialised producers. 
Economies of scale would result in the hierarchy of organisations with workers 
working either in a central workplace or in a sequential production process. 
Occupational distribution of the population would reflect a considerable 
increase in the proportion of the labour force that is engaged in manufacturing 
and services, though the predominance in agriculture still exists. These 
evolving stages also reflect a significant shift towards societal urbanisation. 
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These kinds of societies would need effective, impersonal contract 
enforcement due to personal attachments. Isolations are no longer effective as 
more complex and impersonal modes of exchange occur (North, 1991; 
Williamson, 2000). 
 
To establish a realistic commitment to property rights, protection would 
require either a leader that exercises forbearance and restraint in using 
coercion, or the restraint on the ability to avert illogical seizure of assets. For 
example, it has been found that in countries where political institutions have 
considerable discretionary powers in the allocation of resources relative to 
market institutions considerable efforts would be used in capturing political 
powers. This will lead to the dissipation of financial, physical and intellectual 
resources and thereby leaving diminutive resources needed to create suitable 
conditions for development (Adewole and Osabuohien, 2007).  
 
In the last stage where specialisation has increased, agricultural activities 
require a small percentage of the labour force1. Economies of scale here apply 
to large-scale organisation, not only in manufacturing but also in agriculture. 
Thus, individuals live by taking part in a specialised function and relying on a 
network of interconnection to provide the large amount of goods and services 
necessary for them. The occupational distribution of the labour force is 
expected to shift progressively from dominance by agriculture to 
manufacturing, and eventually to services (Matthews, 1986; Williamson, 
2000).  
 
                                               
1 Even in this modern era, the prevalence of agriculture and primary production as reflected by 
the percentage of labour force that engage in them, still exist in SSA, which points out the 
deficient transformation in the process of time. 
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In this final stage, specialisation requires increasing percentages of the 
resources of the society to be engaged in transacting, so that the transaction 
sector rises to be a large percentage of GDP. This is so because specialisation 
in international trade, finance, transport, communication, banking, insurance 
and so on, involves an increasing proportion of the labour force. Therefore, 
highly specialised modes of transaction and organisations will emerge. 
Specialisation and division of labour across countries would require 
institutions and organisations to safeguard property rights across different 
international boundaries in order for markets to take place with trustworthy 
obligation of all the agents or actors that are involved (North, 1994).  
 
The essential issue in the processes mentioned above is whether information 
costs and economies of scale together with the development of improved 
enforcement of contracts will permit and encourage more complicated forms of 
exchange. It also include whether organisations have the incentives to acquire 
knowledge and information that will induce them to evolve in more socially 
productive directions. Robinson and Torvik (2005) noted that patronage 
activities that characterised governance in SSA were direct results of faulty 
political arrangements that made government the main organ responsible for 
the allocation of resources. 
  
Specific innovations and particular institutional framework evolved from 
interaction between fundamental economic forces include the economies of 
scale associated with a growing volume of trade. Similar to economies of scale 
is the development of improved mechanisms to enforce contracts at lower 
costs, which entails institutions. For instance, in the Netherlands there are 
different innovations and institutions that coalesce to create the precursor of 
the efficient modern set of markets, which makes the growth of exchange and 
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commerce possible (North, 1991). In this formulation, countries with a more 
open immigration policy will, ceteris paribus, attract more business people vis-
à-vis international trade. In the institutional accounts given earlier, the 
direction and forms of economic activities by individuals and organisations 
reflected the opportunities created by the basic institutional framework of 
customs, religious precepts, and formal rules as well as the effectiveness of 
enforcement (Williamson, 2000). Thus, those involved in international trade 
are usually constrained by the institutional framework (North, 1994). 
 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) is another issue in international trade as a 
result of the expanded authority of WTO (Nwajiuba and Nwosu, 2007). The 
IPRs are the rights given to people over their intellectual creations or 
innovations. Different forms of IPRs are patents for innovations, trade marks 
for brand identity, designs for products appearance and copy rights for 
materials such as films, music, among others. As trade related aspects of 
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) agreements were signed by the government 
of most countries including the SSA countries with the formation of WTO, 
IPRs had been given a global perspective. This is a great challenge to the SSA 
as TRIPs do not recognise indigenous knowledge of seeds and plants since 
they were not included in the treaty.  This is a serious issue given the fact that 
in SSA the agricultural sector still employs of over 50% of the labour force 
(UNCTAD, 2006; 2008a). 
 
3.6   Review of Empirical Issues on Institutions and International 
Trade 
Some economists have tried to look at the link between institutions within 
countries especially developing countries in relation to democracy and 
economic growth using cross-national studies (Barro, 1996; Boko, 2002). 
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Building on aggregate production function, Kagochi, Tackie, and Thompson 
(2007) examined a specific developing country-Nigeria, using economic 
freedom index and political freedom index as proxy for institutional 
framework in the country and established that political freedom was significant 
while economic freedom was not statistically significant in explaining 
economic growth. They suggested the need for the Nigerian government to 
pursue policies that would create favourable political environment in order to 
enhance her performance. 
 
On the other hand, Baba (1997) focused on democracy and institutions and 
argued that democracy will ensure the development of institutions, which will 
in turn guarantee the transparent policy making process and thereby promote 
economic growth. This is because fallouts of sound institutional arrangements 
like protection of property rights and effective rule of law are important for 
economic growth as well as trade as the productive capacity of countries would 
be enhanced. Feige (1990) applied the framework of NIE and conceptualised 
the metric for measuring the dimensions of each underground activity based on 
the aggregate income generated by the activity and highlighted four specific 
underground economies, which include: the illegal economy; the unreported 
economy; the unrecorded economy; and the informal economy. Kimenyi 
(2006) also used the NIE concept in determining how ethnic groups influence 
choice of collective actions especially in relations to public goods provisions. 
 
Kimenyi (2001) observed that from 1960 to 1982, about 80% of the 45 
independent SSA countries had experienced coup d’états. This situation and 
trend will always occur and result in intense competition for political power, 
where political institutions are allowed the luxury of unrestrained power in the 
allocation of national output. The regime of one party system and personal rule 
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in many African countries was is as a result of institutional weaknesses that fail 
to put a limit on the expenditure profile of government and made it the main 
centre of resource allocation. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) had 
substantiated this for Nigeria, when they noted that one of the reasons for the 
existence of natural resource curse in the country was the prevalence of weak 
institutional framework. 
 
The limited form of private sector activities depends essentially on government 
patronage for survival (Robinson and Torvik, 2005). This is so because in the 
absence of strong institutional framework, reduced governance cost would 
only happen when a set of benign public officers is at the helm of the 
countries’ affairs. It has also been noted that institutional factors, especially 
civil liberties’ index and revolution have a strong influence on a state’s 
fragility, after accounting for economic, demographic and geographic factors 
(Baliamoune-Lutz, 2009; Bertocchi and Guerzoni, 2010). 
  
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001a) have shown that weak institutional 
framework in a country might encourage coup d’etat and revolutions that could 
lead to political and economic instability. In other words, institutional failures 
may make economic adjustment difficult. Just as Rodrik (1999) argued that 
countries with weak institutional framework are unable to deal with major 
economic shocks and identified the major shocks with those that took place 
during the 1970s. Rodrik (1999) made submission that the inability to deal 
with, or adjust to global economic changes contributed to the low economic 
growth performance of many less developed countries during the 1980s and 
1990s especially in terms of international trade performance. Also Johnson et 
al (2000) observed that among the emerging markets that are open to capital 
flows, the ones with weaker institutional frameworks (political and financial) 
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experienced more severe economic crises during the late 1990s. In general, the 
argument is that it is the inability of institutionally weak societies to deal with 
their own economic shocks and, perhaps more importantly, their political 
shocks that has fuelled their economic crises (Olayiwola and Busari, 2008). 
 
Grosh (1994) applied the concept of NIE to contract farming between a farmer 
and a firm that will process and/or market the farmer's crop in Africa drawing 
evidence from Kenya. The practice, according to the author, which is a 
growing phenomenon in Africa, is sustained as a result of institutional 
arrangement between farmers and parastatal processing firms and the terms of 
the contracts between smallholders and parastatals. McMillan and Woodruff 
(1999) made similar empirical finding that contract enforcement and credible 
contracting were essential for commercial contracting in Vietnam. Similarly, 
Ramestteiner (2002) used the concept of NIE to the role of government in 
forest certification in Austria. The author suggested that the task of the 
government should include the encouragement of private sector by promoting 
transparency and standard practices.  
 
Yang and Gupta (2007) observed that regional trade arrangements in Africa 
have not been effective in promoting trade (including foreign direct 
investment-FDI) due to external trade barriers and low level of resource 
harmonisation amongst member countries. Other reasons that were attributed 
to low international trade performance of African countries were small size of 
markets, poor transport facilities and high trading costs, double taxation, which 
have made them benefit marginally from the potential benefits of trade. Yang 
and Gupta (2007) suggest the need for African countries to undertake a broad-
based trade liberalisation and streamlining existing regional trade arrangements 
as well as improving in infrastructure to facilitate trade in order to benefit more 
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from trading. Ayogu (2007) made similar observation that infrastructure is 
crucial for the promotion of economic activities including trade. 
 
The extent to which countries can manage initial and possible revenue losses 
from trade liberalisation can be influenced by their macroeconomic policies 
and their level of economic development. In this regard, Agbeyegbe, Stotsky 
and WoldeMariam  (2004) have shown that trade liberalisation in SSA may not 
have a considerable relevance on total revenues if it is not accompanied by 
sound monetary and exchange rate policies. On a similar note, Baunsgaard and 
Keen (2004)  provided empirical  evidence using panel data for 125 countries 
between 1975 and 2000 that high-income countries usually recover easily from 
loss of international trade revenues, while middle-income countries can 
recover about 35 to 55% of revenues, low-income countries like SSA recover 
none. The study was unable to find evidence to support the notion that the 
presence of a value-added tax makes it easier to offset revenue losses from 
trade liberalisation. 
 
The African share in global trade was observed to have declined from about 
4% in the 1970s to about 2% in 2007 (World Bank, 2008b). The trend was 
similar when oil export was excluded and a good indicator of Africa’s weak 
competitiveness is its poor performance in manufacturing export. For example, 
between 1970 and 2003, Africa’s share in world manufacturing export 
revolved around 0.5% all through (Yang and Gupta, 2007). Other studies such 
as Foroutan and Pritchett (1993), Coe and Hoffmaister (1999), Rodrik (1999), 
Subramanian and Tamirisa (2003)  have equally established that the declining 
share of African products in world trade can be attributed to its growth of 
income, size of population, geography, and most importantly the nature of 
economic policy.  
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Ng and Yeats (2002) have also argued that Africa should diversify away from 
traditional exports or continue to suffer from a decline in the terms of trade and 
slow growth of demand for these exports. Consequently, Africa’s 
competitiveness declined sharply during the 1980s before this deterioration 
slowed in the 1990s. However, it did not show major decline during the period 
2000–2005. Its concentration in commodities has helped boost its exports for 
the first time since the 1970s based on constant market analysis, which suggest 
that Africa’s export competitiveness is closely linked to its overall economic 
performance (Ng and Yeats, 2002; Usman,2005). 
 
Oyejide (2007) noted that a reduction in real exchange rate overvaluations 
could improve exports relative to GDP. This is because overvaluation of the 
domestic currency would act as tax on exports and thereby inhibit their prices 
compared to the prices of domestic products. In this case, changes in the real 
exchange rate may be induced by policy changes in some areas such as: 
international trade, fiscal and monetary policies, capital movements, and 
autonomous shifts in the terms of trade. Meanwhile, an increase in import 
restrictions raises the domestic price of importables relative to those of 
exportables and domestic products. In USA, Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha 
(2004) found real exchange rate depreciation to have significant effect on the 
long-run trade balance from major trading partners. However, in Cote d’Ivoire, 
real exchange depreciation did not have any significant effect trade especially 
manufacturing despite currency devaluation of 1994 (Diomonde and Kone, 
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2008). The difference in the examples above may be that USA might have met 
the Marshall-Lerner condition2. 
 
It has been shown also that major trade policy reforms in many developing 
countries are often strongly connected with corresponding reforms of exchange 
rate policy and changes in the external terms of trade will affect the prices of 
tradables relative to those of non-tradables (Busari and Olayiwola, 1999; 
Oyejide, 2007). Making reference to the Nigeria scenario, Alege and Ogun 
(2004) reached a similar conclusion that trade policies are usually inconsistent 
despite of various trade reforms. The authors made a case for the promotion of 
duty-free inputs importation to enhance the productivity of the manufacturing 
sector. 
 
In furtherance, Fosu (2003) examined the influence of political instability on 
export performance in 30 SSA countries using various coups incidences 
(‘successful’ coups, abortive coups, and coup plots) from 1967 to 1986. The 
author, building on the augmented production function, found that unstable 
political environment adversely affects export performance through 
competitiveness. On the other hand, it was equally established that the political 
instability plays more crucial role in export than in overall growth of GDP, 
which denotes that the effect of political instability was more detrimental on 
exports than overall GDP. This may be one of the reasons why the average 
annual growth rate of SSA merchandise exports between 1967 and 1986 was 
3.5% compared to that of the developing countries of 4.6% (World 
Bank,1989).  
                                               
2 The Marshal-Lerner condition simply states that for a currency devaluation policy to have a 
significant and positive effect on international trade performance (especially trade balance); 
the sum of price elasticities of export and import in absolute terms must be greater than one 
(Appleyard, Field and Cobb, 2010). 
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Allan (2004) used data from Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) within the 
framework of general equilibrium model to analyse selected scenarios of tariff 
and subsidy reductions. The author observed that the extent of government 
provisions in vegetable production and trade was not as high as other farm 
sections such as meat and dairy products. With respect to horticultural 
products, it was found that the degree of liberalisation as witnessed by the roles 
of Central and South America, and Middle East and North Africa as exporters, 
the EU15 and the rest of Europe, US and Japan as major importers; can be 
expected to increase horticultural products.  
 
In another dimension, the effects of institutional quality was examined on trade 
by Meon and Sekkat (2008) with panel data from 1990 to 2000 for about 59 
countries mainly in the America’s and Asia and eight from Africa, namely: 
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and 
Zambia. The authors, using a fixed effects model along with instrumental 
variables, established that export of manufactured products were positively 
affected by control of corruption, rule of law, government effectiveness, and 
lack of political violence.  They categorised total exports into manufactured 
and non-manufactured as percentage of GDP and were related to real effective 
exchange rate, and GDP growth rates of trading partners. Their model was 
estimated and then the country fixed effects were regressed on set of time-
invariant variables, namely: measure of a country’s market potential, index of 
institutional quality that includes the six governance indicators. The authors 
found that among the institutional variables used, control of corruption exerted 
more effects on export of manufactured products compared to non-
manufactured and total exports. However, the authors were cautious given the 
fact that the World Governance Indicators (WGI) used did not have sufficient 
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time-dimension. Hence, they called for further research to examine more on 
trade-institutions nexus.  
 
Besides focusing mainly on SSA countries, this present study fills the observed 
gap in Meon and Sekkat (2008) in two major ways. The first was the further 
classification of exports into five categories, namely: total, manufacturing, 
agricultural, fuel and mining, and service exports as percentage of GDP to 
measure international trade performance. The second important extension of 
extant literature was the inclusion of other indicators of institutional 
framework, namely: economic and financial institutions in addition to political 
institutions. 
 
In furtherance, using a model involving 145 countries in a panel spanning from 
1984 to 2002 and governance indicators from international country risk guide 
Lavallee (2005) examined the influence of proximity and quality of institutions 
on trade.  The author noted that institutional proximity tends to increase trade. 
Lavallee (2005) added that corruption in both importing and exporting 
countries acts as barrier to bilateral exports, which is harmful to trade 
especially in a situation of weak bureaucratic quality. On the other hand, 
Levchenko (2004) built on Grossmann-Hart-Moore framework of contract 
incompleteness to assess the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, 
and shareholder protection (as forms of institutional quality) with a sample that 
covered 389 industries in 117 countries averaged for the period 1980-1998. 
The study submitted that interactions between institutions and trade are 
imperative and as such the type of effects that prevail will require further 
research. 
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Taking the issue the other way round, Wanchek (2009) appraised the influence 
of international trade on institutional quality. Using industry level data from 
Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union for year 2000, the study 
ascertained that international trade played a key role in influencing institutions 
(measured with freedom indices). This was based on the fact that businesses 
predicting their potential to export would tend to lobby for more credible 
institutions in order to reduce transaction costs that are related to exports. This 
was similar to Levchenko (2008)’s submission that international trade impact 
on the quality of institutions (from Kaufmann et al, 2005 data set). The author 
established using a sample of 141 countries for the period 1996-2000 that in a 
situation of similar technology, counties that trade together would be made to 
improve the quality of their institutions.  
 
In addition, Dollar and Kraay (2009) used rule of law (from Kaufmann et al, 
2002) as a measure of institution and ratio of trade to GDP on cross-country 
level of 168 for the average period of 2000-2001. The study found that changes 
in trade and changes in institutional quality had substantial effect of trade on 
growth and thus suggest the possibility of a joint role for trade and institutions 
on growth. Contrarily, Segura-Cayuela (2006) added that poor countries may 
not have benefited from international trade due to the fact that increase in trade 
may lead to weak political institutions especially in societies with weak 
policies. The author’s submission was based on average data on trade from 
Penn World Table and institution data from Polity IV. 
 
It is argued that institutions are somehow difficult to measure (Rodrik, 2005). 
However, there are a number of institutional indicators that have been devised 
to compare the quality of institutions and governance across the globe. The 
popular ones include: World Governance Indicators (WGI) involving six 
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parameters as compiled for the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi (2008; 2009); corruption perception index of Transparency 
International (employed by Dahlstrom, 2009); and political and economic 
freedom index of the Freedom House (used by Kagochi et al, 2007). Others 
include: global competitiveness index of the World Economic Forum; political 
constraint - POLCON index as computed by Henisz (2010);  International 
Country  Risk Guide (ICRG) political risk rating (used by Papaioannou,2009); 
Polity IV governance and institutions indicator; Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA); World Business Environment Survey  
(WBES) of the World Bank (applied by Thede and Gustafson,2009), among 
others.  
 
Some of the institutional quality indicators mentioned above (namely: CPIA, 
ICRG and WEBS,) are quite recent and cover a sizeable number of countries 
just like WGI. However, they do not cover most of the SSA countries within 
the period of study. The intention of this study is not to compare the relative 
appropriateness of these institutional indicators but employ the most suitable in 
terms of coverage and comprehensiveness. This study used WGI for political 
institutions given its coverage especially for SSA countries.   
 
One important point from the empirical literature reviewed is that there is 
possible interaction between international trade and institutional quality. In 
addition, the interaction between international trade and institutional 
framework could run from trade to institutions, on one hand and institutions to 
trade, on the other. Furthermore, institutional framework can influence 
international trade performance indirectly. This suggests the possibility of 
institutional framework being endogenous, which was taken care of in the 
estimation technique with the use of instrumental variables in this study.  
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Another notable observation was that most empirical studies in the area of 
international trade and institutions did not cover substantially SSA countries. 
In other words, it was observed that not much empirical work has been done in 
relating the role of institutional framework to international trade performance 
in SSA. Thus, this present study differed markedly in this regard as attention is 
focused mainly on SSA countries. In addition, the period (1996-2008) covered 
by this study was very different from the previous studies as the most recent 
extant empirical literature worked on period that ended in 2002. The above 
were the main gaps that this study was poised to fill. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analytical framework for the study with the basic aim 
of conceptually link international trade performance to institutional framework. 
More so, the empirical models for the study were formulated in this chapter. 
The chapter equally discussed the technique of estimation for the model, the 
instrumental variables employed as well as sources of data.  
 
4.2 Analytical Framework 
As discussed in the previous chapter, a number of international trade theories 
that explain the factors that determines a countries performance on 
international trade exist. However, it was observed that most of the 
international trade theories were concerned with issues that influence 
international trade with little or emphasis on institutional framework. Thus, 
this study engaged LaPorta et al (1999) theories of institutional development 
and New Institutional Economics (NIE) as theoretical foundation in examining 
the impact of institutional framework on international trade performance. This 
was done by linking the transmission mechanisms from institutional 
framework to international trade performance. This is illustrated in Figure. 4.1.  
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Institutions  
de jure and de facto.  
E.g. Norms, 
Traditions, 
etc. 
 
Transaction Cost  
 
Informal  Formal 
Economic  Political  
Trade performance 
Trade Facilitation 
International Institutions – 
-WTO,  
-RECs,  
-Multilateral etc 
 
Domestic e.g. Ministry 
of Trade, Customs 
Authorities, etc. 
 
Contract Enforcement  
 
Financial  
Trade 
Financing 
e.g. Banks 
Other factors: 
Infrastructures,  
Human Capital, etc  
Fig. 4.1 Institutional Framework and Interactions 
Source: Compiled by the Researcher  
Economic Growth 
Trade Policy 
Note: The dashed lines are not given much discussion given the focus of the study that 
explains international trade performance within institutional frameworks; however, it is 
expedient to note that these issues are essential 
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From Figure 4.1, two broad forms of institutions can be identified- namely: 
informal and formal (North, 1991; Greif, 1998). The informal involves basic 
human rules (usually not written down) that guide the behaviour of individuals 
in a given society. Examples of informal institutions include: norms, traditions, 
culture, and so on (North, 1991; North, 2005; Greif, 2006). The formal 
institutions comprise laid down rules (usually written) that outline contractual 
obligations among the parties involved. Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) 
classified formal institutions into political and economic; however, this study 
highlights another category, namely: financial institutions. The reason for this 
is the crucial role that financial institutions play in international trade 
performance. For instance, the availability of credit facilities to exporters 
would have some influence on their exporting capacities.   
 
In terms of the channels and mechanisms of institutional framework on 
international trade performance, the nature of the institutional framework will 
have some effects on contract enforcement as depicted in Figure 4.1. For 
example, when institutions are weak there would be ineffective contract 
enforcement compared to a situation of strong institutional framework. On the 
other hand, the level to which contracts are enforced would have effects on 
transaction costs. Thus, having ‘good type agent’ will reduce the cost of 
transacting (Greif, 2006). 
 
Similarly, economic institutions can have international coverage (e.g. WTO 
and RECs) and domestic dimensions (e.g. Ministry of trade etc). In this study, 
membership of WTO and regional economic communities (RECs) are 
underscored as key examples of economic institutions. On the other hand, 
financial institutions consist of those institutions that help to enhance 
international trade participation especially with regard to the provision of 
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credit facilities and payments for international trade activities. This study 
captures financial institutions by the prevailing lending rate in the countries, 
contract intensive money (CIM) and financial depth in the economies. The 
rationale for this is that the prevailing Lending Rate, level of CIM as well as 
depth of the financial institutions in a country would influence the accessibility 
and willingness of economic agents to borrow financial resources (Clague et 
al, 1999). This will exert some influence on level of international trade 
performance.  
 
Basically, the more effective the nature of contract enforcement, the lower 
would be the level of transaction costs. For instance, when individuals that are 
involved in a given transaction understand the underlying rules/laws, it will 
influence contract enforcement. This is because there will be better 
predictability of the actions of participants, which will reduce transaction costs. 
This may be the reason, among other things, why the services of specialists 
such as lawyers are usually required when parties are entering into contracts. 
This is to help situate the terms of the contract in order to reduce transaction 
costs and contractual hazards that might result from adverse selection.   
 
A reduced transaction cost will boost the level of economic activities by 
reducing the risks and uncertainties involved in doing business and as a result 
influence the economic growth, and by extension international trade.  In other 
words, transaction costs would have influence on the overall economic 
performance of a country. This is because, the higher the transaction cost, the 
more costly it would be to undertake economic activities. This means that high 
transaction costs would lead to higher cost of doing business, which will lower 
the level of economic activities, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, trade 
policy will influence trade facilitation as it gives direction to the activities of 
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those that are engaged in trade, which will affect the level of international trade 
performance. 
 
As can be observed in Figure 4.1, there are other factors such as infrastructure 
and human capital that will possibly influence the performance of international 
trade (Lyakurwa, 2007). This is given the role that infrastructure and human 
capital can play in the trading process especially with respect to 
communication which is essential to transaction cost. However, given the fact 
that this study is focused on the influence of institutional framework on 
international trade, these factors are not given much emphasis.  
 
In addition, the level of economic growth (economic activities) has some 
influence on the performance of international trade, export level for example. It 
has equally been noted in the empirical literature reviewed (e.g. Lavallee, 
2005) that countries that have a better level of international trade would 
experience better economic performance. This means that increased economic 
growth would lead to better international trade performance because increased 
economic activities in the country will lead to better trading activities (Rodrik, 
1998). Furthermore, better international trade can provide an important 
stimulus to industrialisation and economic growth (Akinkugbe, 2008). On the 
other hand, there is the possibility of trade and economic performances 
exerting some influence on the quality of institutions in a country (Levchenko, 
2008). These inter-relationships are captured in the framework depicted in 
Figure 4.1. However, given the focus of the study, these inter-relationships are 
not given much attention.  
 
This study essentially focused on formal institutions in the formulated model. 
However, the use of instrumental variables such as ethnolinguistic 
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fractionalisation, legal origin and formalism was employed to capture some 
aspects of informal institutions especially with respect to their influence on 
formal institutions. This is further explained later in Section 4.5. 
 
4.3 Formulation of Econometric Models  
The econometric models of the study relate international trade performance 
indicators (ITRAPF) to institutional framework. It also incorporates other 
factors such as economic growth, real effective exchange rate that have been 
noted to have some influence on international trade performance. The model 
greatly extends the works of Fosu (2003) and Meon and Sekkat (2008).  In the 
process of adapting and extending the models of Fosu (2003) and Meon and 
Sekkat (2008), this study categorises international trade performance (ITRAPF) 
into five indicators, namely:  total export (toex); manufactured export (maex); 
agricultural export (agrex); fuel and mining export (fmex); and service export 
(svex).  
 
The functional relationship between the indicators of international trade 
performance (ITRAPF) and other deterministic factors are stated in equation 
(4.1) in a nonlinear and implicit form as:  
ITRAPF=f(EXCH,ECOGR(-1), U)                                             (4.1) 
 
The explicit form of equation (4.1) is stated as follows: 
URGOCEHCXEFPATRI 2)1(
1
0
               (4.2) 
 
Equation (4.2) is linearised by taking logarithmic transformation of both sides 
of the equation. Writing the variables in their lower cases and stating the 
resulting transformed equation in a panel data format involving time and space 
dimensions lead to equation (4.3). This transformation is considered essential 
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with a view to applying the classical Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation 
technique. However, a cursory inspection of data on ECOGR indicates that 
some countries had negative values and taking absolute values of the periods 
with negative values will change the implication3. As a result, the logarithmic 
transformation of ECOGR was not taken. A similar process was done by Meon 
and Sekkat (2008) for GDP growth rates of country i’s partners (RYP), though 
they did not state this reason. 
 
itttiiti
j
it
j eecogrBexchBBfitrap   )1(210 ln)(ln         (4.3) 
where: 
itrapf j :various components of  international trade performance i.e. j =1,---,5; 
implying total (toex), manufacturing (maex), agricultural (agrex), fuel and 
mining (fmex), and services  exports (svex). This gives rise to five (5) 
different equations. 
B0i: country fixed effects. 
exch: real effective exchange rate. It measures an effective or trade-weighted 
exchange rate based on real exchange rates instead of nominal rates.  
ecogri(t-1): lagged economic growth rate. The lagged values of the economic 
growth are used to avoid possible feedback effects since international trade 
performance and economic growth are not contemporaneously measured. 
Hence, this study used the lagged growth rates and not partners’ growth as 
done by Meon and Sekkat (2008)4.  
                                               
3 For instance, if the growth rate for a given country in a particular year was -5.2, taking the 
absolute value of 5.2 will completely change the real economic phenomenon. 
4 This is because market potential will in a way control for partners’ growth influence. More 
importantly, this study is interested on the promotion of international trade performance of 
SSA countries and as a result it is expected that improvement in their economies should 
improve their capacity to trade. An alternative to this would have been the use of growth rates 
of the respective international trade performance categories, but these were not available for 
most of the sectors in most of the countries. Moreover, the values for the outputs from the 
76 
 
 
 
 
t : time effect capturing the trend in the data. This study presupposes that 
including time effects will help to pick omitted shocks that affect 
international trade performance across the countries in a similar manner 
(Dollar and Kraay, 2003)5. 
e : logU denoting the error terms that is assumed to be identically and 
independently distributed with mean zero and constant variance, i.e.  
.),0( 2Niid   
 
The expectation is that:  B1 <0 and B2 >0. This is with the understanding that 
an appreciation of real exchange rate would imply less competitiveness for the 
exporting country. While a positive sign of economic growth would signal 
better productivity which will lead to increase in capacity to export, ceteris 
paribus.  
 
The respective country fixed effects (Bj0i ) generated in equation (4.3) for the 
five categories of international trade performance indicators are used in the 
second aspect of the estimation process, which help in obtaining 
heteroscedastic consistent estimates (Meon and Sekkat, 2008). This is stated in 
equation (4.4) below: 
Bj0i  = λ0 + λ1ln(Mkpoti)  +  λ2ln(Instki) +ei                                                           (4.4) 
where: 
                                                                                                                           
sectors that would have helped in the computation of their growth rates were also not available 
for most SSA countries within the period of the study. In addition, economic growth shows the 
rate at which an economy improves or decays over a given period. Thus, this study is able to 
know whether the growth (decay) of selected countries enhances (decreases) their international 
trade performance. Thus, the issue of multicollinearity does not portend a serious problem. In 
fact this was confirmed from correlation matrix carried out, not reported. 
5 A check was performed on the model with/without time effects, the one with time effect 
performed relatively better. A sample of results with time effects as well as country effects is 
reported in the Appendix. 
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Mkpot :market potential as defined that controls for the closeness of a country 
to other markets.  
Instki  :the various measures of institutional quality classified into three (3) 
frameworks – political, economic, and financial i.e. k = 1-3.  
The a priori expectation is that: λi > 0 (i =0, 1, 2). This denotes the fact that an 
improvement in institutional quality will result in better international trade 
performance. 
 
In capturing the influence of political institutions on international trade 
performance, this study, like Meon and Sekkat (2008), used WGI institutional 
quality as defined by Kaufmann et al (2008; 2009)’s six indicators. Thus, 
equation (4.4) can be restated by further simplification as: 
Bj0i  = a0 + a1ln(Mkpoti)  +  a2ln(poinsxi) +ei                                                       (4.4a) 
where:  
poins: are the political institutional quality and x  are the different aspects of 
political institutions, namely: voice and accountability (VA); political 
stability (PS); government effectiveness (GE); regulatory quality (RQ); rule 
of law (RL); and control of corruption (CC). That is: x = 1... 6.   
 
The economic institutional aspect (ecoins) is captured by WTO membership 
and membership of regional economic communities (RECs) in SSA in 
capturing the influence of the various RECs on the members’ international 
trade performance (Njinkeu, Wilson and Fosso, 2008). Thus, equation (4.4) 
can be rewritten in equation (4.4b) as: 
Bj0i  =b0 + b1ln(Mkpoti)  +  b2ecoinsyi +ei                                                         (4.4b) 
where: 
ecoins: are the different aspects of economic institutions, namely : WTO and 
RECs. The RECs in SSA selected include: COMESA, ECCAS, ECOWAS 
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and SADC. The choice was based on the AU’s recognition and those that 
have launched RTAs (UNECA, 2010; African Union Commission, 2011). 
Logarithmic transformation on economic institutions was not taken due to the 
fact that there were dummy variables. 
 
The last category of institutional framework in the study is financial 
institutions (finst). They are measured by contract intensive money (cim), the 
prevailing lending rate in the countries (plr) and financial depth in the 
economies (findep). Thus, equation (4.4) is modified as: 
Bj0i  =c0 + c1ln(Mkpoti)  +  c2ln(finstzi) +ei                                                        (4.4c) 
where:  
finst: are the measures of financial institutions, namely: contract intensive 
money (cim), prevailing lending rate (plr), and financial depth (findep). i.e. 
z= 1-3. 
 
Furthermore, trade policy (TRP) was captured by applied tariff including 
preferences (apt), and customs and other import duties (cod).  In addition to 
institutional variables, the study introduced landlocked dummy referred to as 
‘landlockedness’ (lockd) is represented in equation (4.5) along with trade 
policy indicators. 
i
m
iii
j elockdtrpMkpotB  32100 )(ln)(ln          (4.5) 
where:  
trp:  are the measures of trade policy, namely:  applied tariff (apt), and customs 
and other import duties (cod), i.e. m = 1 and 2.  
The coefficients of trade policy variables (θ2) are expected to positive while 
that of lockd is expected to be negative (i.e. 3 < 0). This because tariff and 
customs duties are imposed on imported goods to discourage importation and 
79 
 
 
 
 
improve export capacity, while ‘landlockedness’ increases transaction costs 
such as transportation, which will negatively affect international trade 
performance. 
 
Lastly, other factors that could influence international trade performance apart 
from the various institutional framework and trade policy were also examined. 
This is given the role that human capital and infrastructures can play in 
international trading activities. These are shown in equations (4.6) and (4.7): 
iiii
j ehdiMkpotB  )(ln)(ln 2100                                  (4.6)   
ii
n
ii
j eradMkpotB  )(infln)(ln 2100                      (4.7) 
where:  
hdi: is the human development index capturing human capital development. 
infrad:  is  the measure of infrastructural development captured by number of 
telephone users per 100 population (tel), personal computers per 100 
population (pcom), and internet users per 100 population (itnet). i.e. n = 1-3. 
The coefficients of hdi and infrad are expected to be greater than zero. This is 
given the understanding that better human development indicator as well as 
better infrastructural development should lead to better performance in 
international trade. 
 
4.4 Estimation Techniques  
The estimation techniques employed in the study were in two phases. The first 
phase used panel data fixed effects (FE) model to obtain the country fixed 
effects for the time variant variables, which were used in the second aspect. 
The aim of the FE was to obtain the country fixed effects. Also the time effects 
were equally included to have a more robust model. In addition, the ordinary 
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least square (OLS) was estimated as a starting point and for robustness checks. 
Another alternative to this would have been the use of generalised method 
moments (GMM) technique, which can also handle the issue of measurement 
error. However, this can be explored in further studies. 
 
The descriptive analyses of the main variables were presented before the 
econometric results in order to have a fore knowledge of their patterns. 
Furthermore, this study used panel data analysis as variables were defined 
based on annual data for the period and across 34 countries selected in SSA, 
which was estimated using STATA 10.1 Statistical Software. In the panel 
model, there is the advantage of possibly controlling for unobserved fixed 
effects. It equally helps in providing sufficient degree of freedom in analyses.  
Panel data are said to be repeated observations on the same cross-section, 
typically of individual variables that are observed for several time periods 
(Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2000; Wooldridge, 2003; Baum, 2006).  
 
Panel data analysis is an important method of longitudinal data analysis 
because it allows for a number of regression analyses in both spatial (units) and 
temporal (time) dimensions. It also provides a major means to longitudinally 
analyse the data especially when the data are from different sources and the 
time series are rather short for separate time series analysis. Another advantage 
of panel data regression technique is that the combination of time series with 
cross-section data usually improves the quality and quantity of data which may 
not be possible when using only one of them (Gujarati, 2003; Wooldridge, 
2003; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Also in panel data analytical method both 
spatial and temporal dimensions are involved in the regression estimation 
process. Panel data framework is usually structured in a particular manner as 
presented in the Appendix. 
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The advantages of using panel data are highlighted as follows, it: 
i) gives more informative data, more variability, less co-linearity among 
variables, more degrees of freedom, and more efficiency. This is because it 
combines time series of cross-section observations. 
ii) can detect and measure effects that simply cannot be observed when using 
only cross-section or time series data.  
iii) minimises the bias that might result from aggregation of individual units 
into broad aggregates. This is due to the fact that data are made available 
for several units in a panel data setting. 
iv) helps to take care of heterogeneity in the estimation process because it 
allows for individual/specific variable assessment.  
v) helps in handling more complicated behavioural models such as 
technological change, which may not be easy with only cross-section or 
time series data. 
vi) is better suited when a study is dealing with the dynamics of change such as 
turnover because it involves the repeated cross section of observations. 
 
The aforementioned advantages of using panel data notwithstanding, there are 
some estimation and inference problems. In view of the fact that panel data 
involve cross-section and time dimensions, the problems that are associated 
with cross-sectional and time series data such as the issues of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, respectively are encountered. Another 
possible problem that can be faced when dealing with panel data is the issue of 
cross-correlation in individual units at the same point in time.  
 
In the FE technique, the intercept in the regression model is allowed to vary 
across space (individuals) as a result of the fact that each cross-sectional unit 
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may have some special characteristics. The FE technique is very suitable in 
cases where the individual specific intercept may be correlated with one or 
more regressors and especially when the number of observations (N) is not too 
large. Thus, the µi are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and the 
remaining disturbances stochastic with vit identically independently distributed 
with zero mean and constant variance, i.e. iid N (0, σ2). In this regard, the 
regressors (Xit) are taken to be independent of the vit  for i  and t (Baltagi, 2005; 
Baum, 2006; Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  This is shown in equation (4.8) 
below: 
ititiit uxy                                                                                 (4.8)    
 The constant term, i  are random that help to capture unobserved 
heterogeneity and yit is the dependent variable. Therefore, the mean of the error 
term can be stated as:  
TtwherexxuE iTiiit ,...,10],...,,[ 1                                                 (4.9) 
 
The second aspect of the econometric analyses deals with the use of 
instrumental variable (IV) also known as two-stage least squares (2SLS). The 
choice of the technique was informed by the need to solve the problems of 
endogeneity and measurement errors. In other words, the institutional variables 
can be perceived to be endogenous as stated in equations 4.4a-c. Thus, there is 
need to identify (instrumental) variables that are correlated with the 
institutional variables but directly uncorrelated with indicators of international 
trade performance. This is commonly referred to as orthogonality assumption. 
Several of these instrumental variables have been mentioned in literature such 
as distance from the equator, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, and settlers’ 
mortality by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson- AJR (and the augmented 
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version) among others6. A brief discussion of the instrumental variables used 
in the study is presented in the next section. 
 
4.5 Brief Note on Instrumental Variables  
The use of instrumental variables for institutional indicators in econometric 
analysis have been documented in literature ( Djankov et al, 2002; Acemoglu 
and Johnson, 2005; Papaioannu, 2009). A number of instrumental variables 
have been specified such as: distance from the equator (equator); 
ethnolinguistic fractionalisation; fraction of population that speaks English, 
French or a major European language. Others are: religious affiliation 
especially Catholics, Muslims and Protestants (La Porta et al, 1999; Bossert, 
D’Ambrosio and Laferrara, 2006); settlers’ mortality and the augmented 
version; legal origin and legal formalism (Du, 2010); latitude; area; among 
others.  
 
The choice of valid instruments is usually determined by examining the results 
of the first stage especially the F-statistic, which has a rule of thumb of 10 
when using 2SLS estimation technique (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Papaioannu, 
2009). The optimal instruments can also be determined with Sargan and 
Basmann tests (Baum, 2006). To avoid having a ‘weak’ instrument, the 
instrumental variables employed should be highly correlated with the 
regressors (in this case institutional framework) but directly uncorrelated with 
the dependent variables (international trade performance).  
 
In respect of the five indicators of international trade performance used in this 
study, choice was made in favour of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation/its 
                                               
6 Some of them are provided by Hopkins (2006) at 
http://public.gettysburg.edu/~mhopkins/datasets.html. 
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generalised version (ethfra), settlers’ mortality and the augmented version 
(logemaug), and legal origin (legalor)7. The choice these instrumental 
variables was based on some reasons. First, instruments like latitude, area, and 
distance from the equator may have some measure of influence on some trade 
performance indicators especially agricultural export. This is because distance 
to equator, latitude and area will affect agricultural productivity, which might 
affect its trade potential.  
 
The second reason is that in most SSA countries, religious affiliation has great 
interaction with the ethnicity, as it is not uncommon to see a given religion 
dominant in some ethnic groups than others. For example, among the Hausa 
ethnic group in Niger Republic and Nigeria, Muslims are dominant. To this 
end, ethfra will almost capture the religious influence.  The third and easily 
placed reason is that in SSA, there are two major legal origins, namely: English 
(common law) and French (civil law). The legal origin has great influence in 
their major official languages. For instance, La Porta et al (1999) classified 
legal origin into English, French, German, Scandinavian, and Socialist. SSA 
countries belong either to the English (englaw) or French (frenlaw) dichotomy 
as revealed by their study. 
 
In similar line of envisaging, the nature of legal formation will determine the 
extent of barriers to entry as the legal framework in the country will influence 
entry and other procedural issues. This has been varied by LaPorta et al (1999), 
                                               
7 ethfra was referred to politically relevant ethnic group (PREG) by Posner (2004). This study 
assessed the difference between ethfra  and PREG in the First Stage Least Squares results of 
the 2SLS, the latter performed relatively better on the average than the former. Hence, resolve 
was made to use PREG as augmented version (gethfra). In addition, gethfra is more 
encompassing that just official language as it entail show fractionalized a society is, among 
others. This also applies to legal formalism.  
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though their study was in relation to government performance. It can easily be 
seen that their measure of government performance is tantamount to 
government effectiveness of World Governance Indicators (WGI). To avoid 
the shortcoming of having too many instruments as cautioned by Roodman 
(2009), this study resolved to three instrumental variables. The chosen 
instrumental variables include: ethnolinguistic fractionalisation with the 
generalised version (gethra), legal formalism and origin - English and French 
dichotomy (legalor) and settler’s mortality and its augmented version 
(logmeaug). 
 
In view of the above factors that could influence institutions, equation (4.10) 
can be formulated for the First Stage regression of the 2SLS as:  
Instki  = f(gethra, legalor , logmeaug, u )                                                        (4.10) 
Equation (4.10) is expressed in explicit form as: 
ln(Instki ) = χ0+ χ1 gethra + χ2 legalor + χ3 logmeaug +ei                  (4.11) 
where: 
Instki : the various measures of institutional framework earlier defined. 
gethra: ethnolinguistic fractionalisation with the generalised version.  
legalor: legal formalism and origin - English and French dichotomy. 
logmeaug: settler’s mortality and its augmented version. 
 
The coefficient of gethra is expected to be negative (i.e. χ1 <0) based on the 
fact that a more ethnically fractionalised society will result in weak 
institutions. The sign of χ2 and χ3 cannot easily be stated apriori because it will 
depend on the quality of institutions left behind by colonisers in the selected 
SSA countries. 
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From the above discourse, equation (4.11) can be substituted into the 
respective institutional framework depicted in equations 4.4a-c in the previous 
section. This will result in the extended models in equations 4.12a-c for 
political, economic and financial institutional framework as shown below: 
Bj0i=a0+a1ln(Mkpoti)+a2ln(poins xi=χ0+χ1gethra+χ2legalor+χ3logmeaug)+ei  
          (4.12a)     
Bj0i=b0+b1ln(Mkpoti)+b2(ecoins yi =χ0+χ1gethra+χ2legalor+χ3logmeaug)+ei     
        (4.12b) 
Bj0i=c0+c1ln(Mkpoti)+c2ln(finst zi =χ0+χ1gethra+χ2legalor+χ3logmeaug)+ei      
(4.12c) 
 
The level of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation can influence the level of voice 
and accountability. Also legal origin and formalism would affect the time 
taken to resolve a court case and procedural complexity that are akin to rule of 
law of World Governance Indicators (WGI), which is important for trade 
(Djankov, Freund and Pham, 2010). The measure of legal origin will influence 
the nature of legal system and time and procedures involving a dispute. The 
settlers’ mortality will have some effects on the quality of institutions that 
colonisers left behind. It has been argued that the regions where European 
Colonizers found ‘lucrative’ to extract ‘economic rent’, they have established 
good institutions, contrary to other areas that were not found so ‘lucrative’ 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). Furthermore, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation can influence the perception and willingness of a country to 
make the needed political/institutional changes.  
 
4.6 Sources of Data and Description of Variables  
The data used in the study for estimation process were obtained from 
secondary sources. The sources would include: World Trade Indicators (WTI, 
2010) dataset of the World Bank, World Development Indicator (WDI) of the 
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World Bank, World Governance Indicators (WGI) computed by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008; 2009) for the World Bank, and International Trade 
Statistics of WTO (2008; 2009).  
 
The data for international trade performance indicators and trade policy 
variables were obtained from WTI and WDI.  The data for political 
institutional indicators were obtained from WGI. These are standardised on a 
scale of -2.5 to +2.5 with a maximum value of +2.5 indicating excellent quality 
and a minimum value of -2.5 indicating very poor quality. Earlier version of 
WGI has been used by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003). Following the 
approach of Meon and Sekkat (2008), the figures for political institutional 
variables WGI were rescaled. This was done by adding 3.5 to the original 
values, which means that the rescaled values will range from 1 to 6. This was 
done to remove difficulties encountered when negative values are used in their 
logarithmic form during estimation process. This rescaling was considered 
appropriate as higher values still indicate stronger institutional framework, vice 
versa. To avoid possible multicollinearity, the respective indicators of political 
institutions were estimated in step-wise. 
 
The measures of infrastructural development (infrad) are represented by: 
number of telephone -fixed and mobile users per 100 population (tel), personal 
computers per 100 population (pcom), and internet users per 100 population 
(itnet), which were sourced from WDI. The period covered by the study was 
from 1996 to 2008 due to the fact that World Governance Indicators (WGI) as 
computed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007; 2008) started in 1996. 
More so, the WTO agreement was rectified 1st January, 1995 (Oyejide and 
Njinkeu, 2007) and it can be presumed that its operation started in earnest the 
following year. The descriptions of the variables used in the study are 
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summarised in Table 4.1. The Table also include the sources of data and 
apriori expectation of the variables. 
 
Table 4.1: Description of Variables and Sources of Data 
Variable Description Source 
 
Dependent Variables ( international trade performance indicators - itrapf)  
Toex Total export  World Trade Indicators 
(WTI) 
2009/2010 
Maex Manufacturing export 
Agrex Agricultural export  
Fmex Fuel and mining export 
Svex Services export  
 
These five indicators of international trade performance were taken as percentage of GDP. This 
is to adjust for the difference in economic size of the selected countries in similar manner like 
Meon and Sekkat (2008).  
 
Macroeconomic Variables  
Exch 
Real effective exchange rate. It is measured by the value of a given country’s currency against a trade weighted average of a basket of selected foreign currencies, adjusted by the 
relative price index between the domestic and foreign countries. It is measured at year 2000 
constant prices. 
World 
Development  
Indicators 
(WDI) 
Ecogr Economic growth rates.               
 
Political Institutions (poins)Variables  
RL 
Rule of law- captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
World 
Governance 
Indicators 
(WGI)  of  the 
World Bank  
VA 
Voice and accountability- measures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, association, and a 
free media. 
RQ 
Regulatory quality- shows the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
CC 
Control of corruption- shows the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption. 
GE 
Government effectiveness- measure the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service 
and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. 
PS 
Political stability - measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilised or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means.  
 
The values were available for all the period except for 1997, 1999 and 2001. The original values, 
which are standardised on a scale of -2.5 to +2.5 with higher values indicating better institutional 
quality, were rescaled by the addition of 3.5 in order to have logarithmic transformation. 
 
Financial Institutions(finst) Variables  
Cim 
Contract intensive money- measured as  broad money supply (M2) less currency outside the 
banking system (C) divided by  M2  {i.e. CIM= (M2-C)/M2)}. It measures how institutional 
quality influences the choice of people to hold money in contract intensive form (M2-C) or cash. 
International 
Financial 
Statistics (IFS) 
and WDI plr  Lending interest rate  capturing the level of access of credit facility in the countries 
findep   Financial deepening in the country- measured as commercial banks’ lending to private sector  
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Note: The apriori expectation of all the independent variables are positive (+) except for exch 
and lockd  that are expected to be negative (-). 
divided by GDP. It captures the level to which financial institutions are able to provide financial 
resources for economic activities. 
 
Economic Institutions(ecoins) Variables  
Wto Dummy for WTO membership as at July 2008;1 for members,0 elsewhere 
International 
Trade Statistics 
(2008; 2009); 
UNECA 
(2010). 
Comesa Dummy for Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa;1 for members,0 elsewhere 
Eccas Dummy for Economic Community of Central African States;1 for members,0 elsewhere 
Ecowas Dummy for Economic Community of West African States; 1 for members,0 elsewhere 
Sadc Dummy for Southern African Development Community;1 for members,0 elsewhere 
 
Trade Policies (TRP) Variables  
Apt 
Applied Tariff including preferences –all goods – measured as the average of the applied tariff 
rates including preferential rates, available at HS 6-digit product level in a country’s customs 
schedule 
WTI and WDI 
Cod Customs and Other Import Duties – measured as a percentage of total tax revenues.             
 
Human Capital and Infrastructural Development Indicators  
hdi  
Human Development Index –captures human capital. It ranges from 0 (worst) to 1 (best) with 
0.5 as average. Human 
Development 
Reports 
(various issues) 
and WDI 
Itnet Internet users (per 100 people) 
Tel Mobile and fixed-line telephone subscribers (per 100 people) 
Pcom Personal computers  (per 100 people) 
 
Market potential, landlockedness and Instrumental Variables  
Mkpot 
Market potential measured as the inverse-distance weighted average of a country’s partners 
GDP. 
  CEPII;  
Porta et al 
(1999); 
Acemoglu, 
Johnson and 
Robinson 
(2001); and 
Hopkins (2006). 
Lockd Dummy for ‘landlockedness’. Countries that are landlocked are represented as 1, 0 otherwise. 
Gethfra 
Augmented/generalised ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. It is the average value of five different 
indices of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation - i) the probability that two randomly selected persons 
from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group; ii) probability that 
randomly selected individuals speaking different  languages; iii) probability of two randomly 
selected individuals do not speak the same language; iv) percentage of population  not speaking 
the official  language ;and v) percentage of population not speaking the most widely used 
language. The values ranges from 0 (0%) to 1 (100%). 
Logmeaug log of AJR augmented settlers’ mortality.  
Legalor 
Legal origin and formalism. It measures the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial 
Code of a country.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
 
5.1  Introduction  
This chapter presents and discusses empirical results of the study. The 
discussion started with descriptive analysis and summary statistics, which 
provided trend analysis of basic indicators of international trade performance 
and institutional framework in the selected SSA countries. The chapter also 
provided some robustness and sensitivity checks using some test statistics in 
order to ensure that the estimated results are reliable for meaningful inferences. 
 
5.2.  Descriptive Analysis of International Trade Performance  
The list of the 34 selected SSA countries based on their sub-regional grouping 
is provided in Table A1.2 in the Appendix. The Table also contains each 
country’s identifier as used in the estimation. The five indicators of 
international trade performance, namely: total (toex), manufacturing (maex), 
agricultural (agrex), fuel and mining (fmex), and service (svex) exports are 
plotted in Fig.5.1. This is done with a view to examining the trend as well as 
carrying out a comparative analysis of these indicators.  
 
As shown in Fig.5.1, all the indicators of international trade performance 
except total export were below 12% of GDP all through the period from 1996 
to 2008. Their values as percentage of GDP revolved around 2% to 10% with 
the exception of agricultural export that was more than 10% in 2007, but 
subsequently decreased to about 6% in 2008. Service export appeared more 
stable than the other indicators of international trade performance as can be 
observed from its values that ranged between 6.8% and 8.4%. This means that 
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countries that trade (export) predominantly service products will experience 
less shocks than others that are engaged in other forms of exports.  
 
2
4
6
8
10
12
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Tr
ad
e 
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 In
di
ca
to
rs
 (a
s 
%
 o
f G
D
P
)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
year
TOEX MAEX
AGREX FMEX
SVEX
Fig.5.1 Trend in Trade Performance Indicators
 
Note: Toex; Maex; Agrex; Fmex; Svex, represent total; manufacturing; agricultural; fuel and mining; and service 
exports. The same unit of measurement is applicable to the two vertical axes.  
Two vertical axes were used for easy comparison. 
Source: Computed by the Researcher. 
 
On the other hand, fuel and mining export had the greatest fluctuations 
especially between 2005 and 2008 where the values fluctuated between 2.9% 
and 7.0%. The reason for this scenario may not be unconnected with the 
changes in the global demand for fuel within this period. The basic implication 
of this instability is that SSA countries that are highly dependent on fuel and 
mining export are prone to unfavourable shocks in the global market compared 
to others. This finding clearly attests to the fact that a major challenge facing 
many African countries in the global market is the exportation of mainly 
primary products (Fosu, 1996; Olayiwola and Osabuohien, 2009). 
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Fig. 5.1 also depicts that the contribution of agricultural and manufacturing 
exports as indicators of international trade performance exhibited a 
considerable level of fluctuation between 2001 and 2008. For instance, 
agricultural export decreased from 9.1% in 2001 to 8.1% in 2002. It increased 
to 10.1% in 2004 and fell to 9.7% in 2005; though it increased to 10.7% in 
2007, it eventually decreased to 6.3% in 2008. Manufacturing export had a 
similar pattern with agricultural export between 2007 and 2008 as it decreased 
from 10.1% in 2007 to 5.8% in 2008. One of the reasons that can be adduced 
for the sharp decline (i.e. 10.1% to 5.8% for maex and 10.7% to 6.3% for 
agrex) in the later years for these indicators of international trade performance 
may be related to the global economic downturn that hit the world market at 
that time. This is coupled with the fact that the export capacities of most SSA 
countries are not as competitive compared to the rest of the world as a result of 
constraints such as bureaucratic challenges. 
 
These constraints and bureaucratic challenges are depicted by trade facilitation 
measures. As shown in Table 5.1, the indicators used were: the number of 
documents required for exports, the number of days required to prepare goods 
for export and the cost involved in exporting a container.  
 
Table 5.1 revealed that the measures of trade facilitation had more constraints 
in SSA than those of other regions as well as world average. The Table brought 
out the fact that it takes an average of 36.07 days to process export document 
in SSA compared to the world average of 25.76 days, which implies more 
export constraints. Similarly, Table 5.1 revealed that it cost about twice to 
export a container from SSA compared to East Asia-Pacific. The issue here is 
that there are more constraints to export in SSA countries when compared to 
other regions including developing ones.  
93 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Some Indicators of Trade Facilitations across the World 
Region 
No. of Documents for 
Export 
Days for 
Export 
 Cost to Export (US$ per 
Container) 
1995-2009 1995-2009 1995-2009 
Sub-Saharan Africa 8.12 36.07 1,770.50 
South Asia  8.40 33.95 1,261.30 
Latin America and Caribbean 7.01 21.56 1,166.40 
Middle East and North Africa  7.15 28.37 1,162.40 
East Asia-Pacific 7.14 26.21 950.00 
World Average 6.91 25.76 1,288.60 
Note: The figures represent the average for the period. This was done in order to avoid the issue of omitted 
observations. 
Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
5.3 Summary Statistics of Major Variables 
Summary statistics of key variables are presented in Table 5.2. The Table 
revealed that the mean value for total export was 34.22% of GDP. An 
examination of other indicators of international trade performance brought out 
the fact that fuel and mining export had the lowest mean value (5.73% of GDP) 
but it had the highest level of standard deviation. The implication of this 
observation is that among the indicators of international trade performance, 
besides total export, fuel and mining export contributed the least to GDP but 
exhibited the greatest variation. This finding might have resulted from the fact 
that fuel and mining sector in most SSA countries are highly capital intensive 
and also their outputs are exported with little or no processing (Olomola, 2007; 
Fongue, 2007). Thus, the needed multiplier effects that would have permeated 
the domestic economies in terms of employment, among others, are minimal.  
 
The mean values of the rest international trade performance indicators were 
6.18%, 7.82% and 8.07% for manufacturing, agricultural and service exports, 
respectively. Thus, ranking the indicators of international trade performance in 
terms of their contribution to GDP using their mean values revealed that the 
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highest was service export followed by agricultural, manufacturing and fuel 
and mining exports. 
 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Selected Variables  
 Variables (Units of Measurement) Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
Dependent Fuel and Mining Export (% of GDP) 5.73 10.76 334 
 Manufacturing Export (% of GDP) 6.18 10.28 369 
 Agricultural Export (% of GDP) 7.82 7.03 366 
 Service Export (% of GDP) 8.07 6.61 441 
 Total Export (% of GDP) 34.22 21.79 441 
Political  Rule of Law 2.97 0.61 340 
Institutions* Government Effectiveness 2.98 0.57 340 
 Control of Corruption 3.03 0.56 340 
 Voice and Accountability 3.08 0.69 340 
 Regulatory Quality 3.13 0.62 340 
 Political Stability 3.14 0.86 340 
Financial  Contract Intensive Money (Index) 0.77 0.14 395 
Institutions Financial Depth (Index) 0.19 0.17 396 
 Lending Rate (%) 25.92 46.62 312 
Macroeconomic Real Effective Exchange Rate (Index) 105.14 21.19 390 
 Economic Growth (%) 4.26 3.65 441 
Trade Policies Average Applied Tariff (%) 14.47 5.74 227 
 Customs and other Import Duties (% of 
total tax revenue) 26.24 15.63 171 
Human Capital Human Development Index (Index) 0.49 0.13 382 
& 
Infrastructural Internet Users (per 100 persons) 6.72 28.29 435 
Development Personal Computers (per 100 persons) 4.72 15.67 337 
 Telephone Users (per 100 persons) 12.12 18.50 427 
*The original values of political institutions variables ranged from -2.5 to +2.5; higher values indicating 
better institutional quality, but the rescaled values ranged from 1 to 6. Economic institutions are not 
presented due to the fact that they are dummy variables. 
Source: Computed by the Researcher. 
 
With respect to the institutional variables, the values in Table 5.2 revealed that 
all the six indicators of political institutions were far lower than the average 
value of 3.5. As reported in Table 5.2, rule of law (RL) was the lowest with the 
mean value of 2.97, which was followed by government effectiveness (GE) 
that had the average value of 2.98. Control of corruption (CC) and voice and 
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accountability (VA) had the respective mean values of 3.03 and 3.08, while the 
average values for regulatory quality (RQ) and political stability (PS) were 
3.13 and 3.14, respectively. This implies that the political institutional 
environment of the selected SSA countries is not quite conducive for economic 
activities.  
 
Table 5.2 also documents the financial institutional variables. The average 
lending rate was at a high value of 25.92%, which implies that the rate might 
not induce the propensity to borrow from the formal financial system. This 
may in turn lead to the reduction of the level of investment including 
international trading activities. This is based on the fact that lending rate and 
investment are inversely related. On the other hand, the depth of financial 
intermediation had a mean value of 0.19, which indicates that the credit to the 
private sector as a ratio of GDP was low. The implication of this finding is that 
financial intermediations in the selected SSA countries are not sufficiently 
deep for improved trading activities. This may be linked to the predominance 
of informal financial activities in many SSA countries. 
 
As reported in Table 5.2, the mean value growth rate in the selected SSA 
countries was 4.26 while the average values of the two measures of trade 
policy, applied tariff and custom and excise duties were 14.47% and 26.70%, 
respectively. This gives an indication that trade policy measures are rather high 
in SSA, which denotes some form of restrictiveness. Furthermore, the mean 
value of indicators of human capital was 0.49 while the indicators 
infrastructural development had average values of 6.72 per 100 persons for 
internet users, 4.72 persons for personal computers and 12.12 per 100 persons. 
The values were quite very low and given the fact infrastructure are essential 
for international trade participation with respect to transactions. The 
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implication of this is that there is the existence of low level of infrastructural 
provisions in the selected SSA countries, which will increase transaction costs 
that are associated with export of goods and services. 
 
5.4.1 Empirical Results and Discussion 
The empirical results of this study obtained from the estimation of the 
formulated models are reported and discussed in this section. The main 
purpose of the empirical analysis was to test the stated hypotheses with regard 
to ascertaining the determinants of the different indicators of international 
trade performance. The estimation process was carried out in two main aspects 
using FE and 2SLS. The FE technique examined the factors that are time-
varying while the 2SLS examined the determinants of international trade 
performance that have limited time variation with emphasis on indicators of 
institutional framework, namely: political, economic and financial institutions.  
 
5.4.2  International Trade Performance, Economic Growth and 
Exchange Rate 
The interaction between the five indicators of international trade performance 
and economic growth as well as real effective exchange rate is presented in 
Table 5.3. The starting point of the empirical analysis was the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS). This was done for the purpose of robustness checks. The FE 
results are documented in Table 5.3 and discussed in this section, while those 
of the OLS are addressed in the robustness and sensitivity checks section.   
 
As shown in Table 5.3, the previous economic growth had the expected 
positive sign for all the indicators of international trade performance except for 
agricultural export.  However, in terms of significance, it was not significant at 
10%. This means that an increase in economic growth in a given period has the 
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potential to enhance international trade performance for the next period (except 
for agricultural export) but such potential was not significant for the selected 
SSA countries. 
 
Table 5.3: Results for International Trade Performance Indicators 
       Dependent Variables: The Indicators  of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), Manufacturing,   
maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
 Toex Maex Agrex Fmex Svex 
Regressor OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
Lnexch -0.042a 
(.000) 
0.576a 
(.000) 
-0.123a 
(.001) 
1.086a 
(.001) 
-0.056b 
(.027) 
0.169 
(.263) 
0.027 
(.571) 
1.326a 
(.006) 
-0.023 
(.197) 
0.878a 
(.000) 
L.ecogr -0.026a 
(.006) 
0.037 
(.417) 
-0.075b 
(.021) 
0.008 
(.570) 
-0.019 
(.382) 
-0.003 
(.597) 
-0.055 
(.190) 
0.035 
(.131) 
0.014 
(.321) 
0.005 
(.342) 
Lnmkpot 0.082a 
(.008) 
 0.377a 
(.000) 
 -0.112 
(.108) 
 1.110a 
(.000) 
 -0.018 
(.702) 
 
LnRL 0.646 
(.144) 
 -1.608 
(.295) 
 0.553 
(.558) 
 -6.535a 
(.001) 
 3.857a 
(.000) 
 
LnVA -0.678a 
(.007) 
 -0.036 
(.967) 
 -0.872 
(.133) 
 -2.650 
(.017) 
 -0.663c 
(.089) 
 
LnRQ -0.374c 
(.077) 
 2.813a 
(.000) 
 0.163 
(.748) 
 1.085 
(.247) 
 -2.187a 
(.000) 
 
LnCC -0.219 
(.563) 
 3.151b 
(.014) 
 -0.720 
(.400) 
 0.139 
(.930) 
 -1.593 
(.008) 
 
LnGE 0.761c 
(.071) 
 -1.374 
(.334) 
 0.614 
(.513) 
 1.765 
(.359) 
 2.207a 
(.001) 
 
LnPS 0.769a 
(.000) 
 0.936c 
(.099) 
 0.107 
(.779) 
 2.510a 
(.001) 
 0.043 
(.873) 
 
Constant 2.752a 
(0.00) 
3.756a 
(.000) 
-2.900a 
(.001) 
1.415a 
(.000) 
2.192a 
(.000) 
1.882a 
(.000) 
4.116a 
(.000) 
0.488 
(.446) 
-0.213 
(.955) 
2.547a 
(.000) 
R2  0.385 0.328 0.308 0.232 0.115 0.041 0.464 0.108 0.482 0.173 
Time effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Obsv. 325 392 287 330 275 327 264 314 324 390 
Notes: Ln and L.- logarithm and lag operator. Probability values are in parenthesis. OLS -Ordinary Least 
Squares; FE -fixed effects. The R2 in OLS is the adjusted and that of FE is within. Superscripts a,b, and c  
mean significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. Coefficients of time effect were not reported for brevity 
sake; however, a sample of results that contains them is presented in the Appendix. 
Source: Estimated by the Researcher. 
 
This implies that economic growth in the selected SSA countries have not 
significantly promoted their international trade performance within the period 
of this study, which might have resulted from the fact that most SSA countries 
usually experience slow economic growth. This finding tends to substantiate 
the observation of Bacchatta (2007) that poor economic performance and low 
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development in Africa accounts for one of the factors why the continent 
experienced low share in world market. 
 
The real effective exchange rate had significant positive impact on all the 
indicators of international trade performance except agricultural export.  This 
is rather contrary to the expected negative influence. The basic implication of 
this finding is that depreciation of the real exchange rate may not lead to an 
inducement of international trade performance in the selected SSA countries. 
This seems to be at variance with Bahmani-Oskooee and Ratha (2004) who 
found real exchange rate depreciation to have significant effect on the long-run 
trade balance in USA. However, it supports the submission of Diomonde and 
Kone (2008) that real exchange depreciation did not have significant effect on 
trade in Cote d’Ivoire.  
 
The above finding might also be connected to the fact that most SSA countries’ 
export commodities especially those of fuel and mining, which are not 
essentially determined by the level of exchange rate. This is given the 
oligopolistic tendencies that are latent in the sector where there exist few 
exporting companies (mainly trans-national where their policies are tilted 
towards those that are available in their parent companies). More so, since 
most of the countries depend on imports of inputs needed for production 
especially the manufacturing sector, so unguided depreciation will increase 
cost, which will make exports less competitive. Thus, the Marshal-Lerner 
condition for the effectiveness of real exchange rate depreciation in promoting 
international trade have not been satisfied in the selected SSA countries.  
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5.4.3  International Trade Performance and Political Institutions  
The interaction between the indicators of international trade performance and 
the various aspects of political institutions are presented in Tables 5.4(a-e). The 
dependent variables were the respective country fixed effects obtained for the 
five indicators of international trade performance. Column A represents 
equations without the use of instrumental variables, while column B is with 
instrumental variables. The empirical discussion is focussed on results of the 
equations with instrumental variables because they performed better than those 
without instrumental variables8.  
 
The relationship between total export and the six political institutional 
variables are reported in Table 5.4a. As can be observed from the Table, the 
respective measures of political institutions had positive and significant 
influence on total export except regulatory quality (RQ). This gives the 
implication that improving the political institutional environment will lead to 
the enhancement of total export in the selected SSA countries, ceteris paribus. 
This finding tends to reinforce the observation of Fosu (2003) that political 
instability had adverse effects on exports.  
 
A look at the magnitude of the influence of the political institutional variables 
on total export revealed that the rule of law (RL) exerted the greatest impact, 
which was followed by voice and accountability (VA), government 
effectiveness (GE), control of corruption (CC), and political stability (PS). 
                                               
8 Discussion was not made on market potential to keep the analysis focused. However, from 
the results, there were some indications that market potential had significant and positive 
influence in some of the indicators of international trade performance except for agricultural 
export, which might have resulted from the predominance of small-scale farming in many SSA 
countries. Thus, the indicators of international trade performance would be better explained by 
other explanatory variables especially measures of institutional framework. 
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Thus, to promote total export, it is not only imperative to ensure political 
stability but other categories of institutional framework especially rule of law. 
 
Table 5.4a: Political Institutions and Total Export 
                    Dependent Variable: Total Export (Toex). 
Regressor A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot 0.009 
(.918) 
0.102 
(.407) 
-0.127 
(.169) 
0.358b 
(.029) 
-0.054 
(.568) 
0.081 
(.147) 
0.002 
(.985) 
0.085 
(.418) 
-0.171c 
(.053) 
0.348b 
(.015) 
0.050 
(.587) 
0.297c 
(.064) 
LnRL 3.775a 
(.000) 
4.673a 
(.000) 
          
LnVA   2.526a 
(.000) 
4.607a 
(.000) 
        
LnRQ     -0.268 
(.670) 
0.970 
(.447) 
      
LnCC       4.447a 
(.000) 
3.443a 
(.002) 
    
LnGE         4.042a 
(.000) 
4.422a 
(.000) 
  
LnPS           2.201a 
(.000) 
3.025a 
(.006) 
R2  0.136 0.121 0.075 0.180 0.025 0.019 0.139 0.095 0.163 0.153 0.110 0.089 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.364  0.248  0.157  0.488  0.272  0.303 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Notes: Instrumental variables - logemaug, gethfra and legalor. Columns A and B are without and with instrumental 
variables, respectively. Probability values are in parenthesis. The p-values from Sargan and Bassman tests were almost 
the same, hence only the former (Sargan-P) is reported. Constants were included in all the 2SLS estimations but not 
reported for brevity sake. A sample of complete result from 2SLS is presented in the Appendix. Superscripts a,b, and c  
mean significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Estimated by the Researcher. 
 
In Table 5.4b it was shown that all the six measures of political institutions had 
positive and significant impact on manufacturing export. This implies that 
improvement on the political institutional factors will engender an increase in 
the level of manufacturing export in the selected SSA countries. From their 
coefficients, it was observed that rule of law exhibited the greatest influence on 
manufacturing export, which was followed by government effectiveness, 
control of corruption, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and 
accountability. In the work of Meon and Sekkat (2008) control of corruption, 
rule of law, government effectiveness, and political stability were seen to be 
relevant for manufacturing export. The difference between the finding of this 
study and that of Meon and Sekkat (2008) may be as a result of the difference 
in the countries and period studied. 
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Table 5.4b: Political Institutions and Manufacturing Export 
                    Dependent Variable: Manufacturing Export (Maex). 
Regressor A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot 0.389b 
(.017) 
0.335 
(.167) 
0.174 
(.304) 
-0.391 
(.205) 
0.259 
(.136) 
0.253 
(.262) 
0.344b 
(.031) 
0.280 
(.151) 
0.092 
(.257) 
0.599c 
(.060) 
0.458a 
(.006) 
0.597a 
(.007) 
LnRL 4.184a 
(.000) 
4.963a 
(.000) 
          
LnVA   3.338a 
(.000) 
4.137a 
(.000) 
        
LnRQ     2.395b 
(.043) 
4.506a 
(.004) 
      
LnCC       4.122a 
(.000) 
4.567a 
(.000) 
    
LnGE         4.760a 
(.000) 
4.859a 
(.000) 
  
LnPS           3.505a 
(.000) 
4.515a 
(.001) 
R2  0.137 0.122 0.090 0.186 0.026 0.141 0.172 0.183 0.145 0.163 0.112 0.089 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.272  0.314  0.221  0.294  0.288  0.303 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note and Source:  Same as in Table 5.4a. 
 
The relationship between agricultural export and the political institutional 
variables are reported in Table 5.4c. From the values in the Table, it was 
observed that the six indicators of political institutions had positive and 
significant impact on agricultural export in the selected SSA countries. With 
regard to their level of influence, it was revealed that government effectiveness 
had the greatest impact, which was closely followed by voice and 
accountability, control of corruption, rule of law, regulatory quality, and 
political stability. The implication of this finding is that the pursuance of 
favourable political institutions especially government effectiveness will help 
in improving the level of agricultural export in the selected SSA countries. 
This might be related to the fact that agricultural products are perishable and as 
a result, effectiveness in the regulatory environment is essential in terms of 
adequate processing and storage facilities as well as distribution.  
 
 
 
102 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4c: Political Institutions and Agricultural Export 
                    Dependent Variable: Agricultural Export (Agrex). 
Regressor A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot -0.145b 
(.021) 
-0.017b 
(.028) 
-0.169a 
(.009) 
-0.325a 
(.001) 
-0.142b 
(.027) 
-0.206b 
(.012) 
-0.152b 
(.016) 
-0.192a 
(.007) 
-0.191a 
(.003) 
-0.394a 
(.000) 
-0.133b 
(.036) 
-0.099c 
(.088) 
LnRL 0.879b 
(.032) 
3.339a 
(.001) 
          
LnVA   0.441a 
(.000) 
3.919a 
(.000) 
        
LnRQ     -0.486 
(.158) 
3.116b 
(.027) 
      
LnCC       1.123b 
(.017) 
3.658a 
(.001) 
    
LnGE         1.077b 
(.012) 
3.963a 
(.000) 
  
LnPS           0.572b 
(.029) 
2.783b 
(.010) 
R2  0.057 0.112 0.039 0.098 0.026 0.141 0.047 0.058 0.049 0.068 0.044 0.069 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.491  0.184  0.221  0.218  0.519  0.148 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note and Source:  Same as in Table 5.4a. 
 
Table 5.4d reports the interaction between fuel and mining export and the 
measures of political institutions. It could be observed from the Table that the 
political institutional variables, with the exception of regulatory quality, had 
positive and significant influence on fuel and mining export. In terms of their 
magnitude of impact, it was revealed that among the political institutional 
variables, voice and accountability had the greatest influence, which was 
followed by political stability, government effectiveness, rule of law, and 
control of corruption. The basic economic implication of this finding is that 
political institutions especially voice and accountability are very important in 
promoting fuel and mining export in the selected SSA countries. This finding 
can be supported by the Niger Delta issue in Nigeria where there are agitations 
by the indigenes for more accountability of rich oil deposits in their area (Dike, 
2004; UNDP, 2006). 
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Table 5.4d: Political Institutions and Fuel and Mining Export 
                    Dependent Variable: Fuel and Mining Export (Fmex). 
Regressor A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot 0.998a 
(.000) 
0.908a 
(.001) 
0.943a 
(.000) 
0.354 
(.124) 
0.021a 
(.000) 
1. 022a 
(.000) 
0.964a 
(.000) 
0.880a 
(.000) 
0.841a 
(.000) 
0.297 
(.115) 
1.042a 
(.000) 
0.924 
(.088) 
LnRL 1.837 
(.185) 
3.623a 
(.022) 
          
LnVA   0.592 
(.641) 
4.993a 
(.006) 
        
LnRQ     -2.687c 
(.065) 
-2.245 
(.187) 
      
LnCC       3.042b 
(.012) 
3.106b 
(.040) 
    
LnGE         3.447b 
(.021) 
4.200a 
(.004) 
  
LnPS           2.084b 
(.019) 
4.844a 
(.008) 
R2  0.081 0.113 0.082 0.097 0.095 0.104 0.099 0.171 0.103 0.082 0.103 0.074 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.472  0.175  0.178  0.479  0.409  0.195 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note and Source:  Same as in Table 5.4a 
 
The relationship between the last indicator of international trade performance – 
service export and the measures of political institutions is presented in Table 
5.4e. The results indicated that the six political institutional variables had 
positive and significant impact on service export except for regulatory quality. 
The coefficients of the political institutional variables revealed the fact that the 
most influential among them was control of corruption followed by 
government effectiveness, voice and accountability, rule of law and political 
stability. This finding implies that pragmatic control of corruption with 
sincerity as well as promoting effectiveness in government, among others, 
would enhance the tradability of service export in the selected SSA countries. 
This is particularly essential for SSA countries that are landlocked given the 
fact that the export of services like e-commerce does not require much logistics 
in transportation compared to other export categories. This may be due to the 
fact that the sector is still emerging and its growth depends on institutional 
quality (Soludo and Ogbu, 2004). 
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Table 5.4e: Political Institutions and Service Export 
                    Dependent Variable: Service Export (Svex). 
Regressor A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot -0.057a 
(.000) 
0.126 
(.151) 
-0.304b 
(.029) 
0.584b 
(.018) 
-0.173 
(.124) 
0. 060 
(.173) 
-0.074 
(.134) 
0.081 
(.167) 
-0.371a 
(.005) 
0.581a 
(.006) 
-0.012 
(.239) 
0.267 
(.156) 
LnRL 2.709a 
(.000) 
3.611a 
(.000) 
          
LnVA   3.471a 
(.000) 
3.986a 
(.000) 
        
LnRQ     -0.752 
(.143) 
1.395 
(.152) 
      
LnCC       3.438a 
(.000) 
4.383a 
(.000) 
    
LnGE         3.684b 
(.021) 
4.235a 
(.004) 
  
LnPS           2.411a 
(.000) 
2.330c 
(.069) 
R2  0.188 0.121 0.105 0.085 0.088 0.090 0.172 0.118 0.208 0.158 0.117 0.054 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.242  0.129  0.126  0.346  0.185  0.284 
Countries  34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Note and Source:  Same as in Table 5.4a 
 
The major finding made from the interaction between indicators of 
international trade performance and political institutional variables was that 
different measures of political institutional quality exert different degrees of 
impact on the indicators of international trade performance. This does not only 
support Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)’s maxim of unbundling institutions in 
assessing their influence but also it is essential to unbundle the different 
indicators of international trade to accentuate international trade-institutional 
framework nexus. This is summarised in Table 5.5.  
 
From Table 5.5, one can observe that the rule of law was most important 
determinant of total and manufacturing exports but it was the fourth 
determinant of agricultural, fuel and mining, and service exports. Government 
effectiveness was a major factor for consideration for agricultural export but it 
was the second determinant of manufacturing and service exports, and third 
determinant of fuel and mining export.  
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Table 5.5: Ranking of Political Institutional Indicators 
Trade 
/Rank 
1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  6th  
Total Export Rule of Law Voice & 
Accountability 
Govt. Effectiveness Control of 
corruption 
Political 
stability 
*Regulatory 
Quality 
Manufacturing 
Export 
Rule of Law Govt. Effectiveness Control of 
Corruption 
 
Political 
Stability 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Voice & 
Accountability 
Agricultural 
Export 
Govt. 
Effectiveness 
Voice & 
accountability 
Control of 
Corruption 
 
Rule of 
Law 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Political 
Stability 
Fuel & 
Mining Export  
Voice & 
Accountability 
Political Stability  Govt. Effectiveness  Rule of 
Law  
Control of 
Corruption 
*Regulatory 
Quality 
Service 
Export 
Control of 
Corruption  
Govt. Effectiveness  Voice & 
Accountability  
Rule of 
Law 
Political 
Stability 
*Regulatory 
Quality 
Note: *Regulatory Quality was not significant for total, fuel and mining, and service exports. The rank in this Table is 
a summary of the relevance of political institutional variables (poins), which was generated from Tables 5.4a-e. The 
major aim is to see, at a glance, which aspect of poins exhibit greater influence on the respective indicators of 
international trade performance. 
Source:  Compiled by the Researcher from the estimated results. 
 
On the other hand, voice and accountability was the most important 
determinant of fuel and mining export, but it was the second determinant of 
total and agricultural exports, and third determinant of service export. For 
control of corruption, it was the most important determinant of service export; 
however, it was the third determinant of manufacturing and agricultural 
exports and the fourth determinant of total export. The issue above may arise 
due to difference in sectoral characteristics. For example, the level of contract 
enforcement required for transactions in manufacturing export differs from 
service and agricultural exports.  
 
5.4.4  International Trade Performance and Economic Institutions  
This sub-section presents and discusses the influence of economic institutions 
(proxied by wto and dummies for various RECs in SSA) and indicators of 
international trade performance. Instrumental variables were used for wto but 
not for the respective RECs given the fact that the RECs are the various 
regional bodies while wto is somewhat external to the region. As a result it 
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would be necessary to find out if internal institutional framework can influence 
its effects. The results are reported in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6: International Trade Performance and Economic Institutions 
Dependent Variables: The Indicators of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), Manufacturing,   
maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
 Toex  Maex  Agrex  Fmex  Svex  
Regressors A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot -0.149c 
(.055) 
-0.179b 
(.047) 
0.080 
(.611) 
-0.065 
(.760) 
-0.266a 
(.000) 
-0.263a 
(.000) 
0.895a 
(.000) 
0.864a 
(.000) 
-0.212b 
(.048) 
0.212 
(.108) 
Wto -2.249a 
(.000) 
-2.384b 
(.037) 
-2.199a 
(.004) 
-5.153a 
(.004) 
-0.684c 
(.056) 
0.945 
(.250) 
-3.576a 
(.007) 
-6.961b 
(.022) 
-4.310a 
(.000) 
-6.040a 
(.000) 
comesa  0.518c 
(.078) 
0.586 
(.207) 
2.486a 
(.000) 
4.076a 
(.000) 
0.661a 
(.005) 
0.448 
(.191) 
0.466 
(.550) 
2.118c 
(.058) 
0.561a 
(.182) 
0.810 
(.232) 
eccas -1.197a 
(.008) 
-0.996c 
(.090) 
-1.678b 
(.026) 
-1.276 
(.178) 
-1.191a 
(.000) 
-0.976b 
(.018) 
-1.192 
(.304) 
1.844 
(.175) 
-0.823a 
(.210) 
-0.199 
(.833) 
ecowas 3.166a 
(.000) 
3.857a 
(.000) 
4.848a 
(.000) 
6.420a 
(.000) 
-0.561 
(.111) 
-0.192 
(.678) 
5.448a 
(.000) 
6.820a 
(.000) 
4.651 
(.000) 
5.737a 
(.000) 
Sadc 1.586a 
(.000) 
1.790a 
(.000) 
3.964a 
(.000) 
4.627a 
(.000) 
0.416 
(.116) 
0.555c 
(.089) 
3.723a 
(.000) 
4.258a 
(.000) 
2.339a 
(.000) 
2.891b 
(.000) 
R2 0.479 0.415 0.525 0.456 0.261 0.163 0.382 0.388 0.492 0.398 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.209  0.422  0.149  0.259  0.297 
Notes: Instrumental variables - logemaug, gethfra and legalor. Columns A and B are without and with instrumental 
variables, respectively. Probability values are in parenthesis. P-values from Sargan and Bassman tests were almost 
the same, hence only the former (Sargan-P) is reported. Constants were included in all 2SLS estimations but not 
reported for brevity sake. Superscripts a,b, and c  mean significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Estimated by the Researcher. 
 
From the results presented in Table 5.6, the influence of economic institutions 
on the indicators of international trade performance revealed that the respective 
RECs presented have varying degrees of influence on the five indicators of 
international trade performance. The results underscored that wto, and 
Economic Community of Central African States (eccas) came out with a 
surprising contrary sign in some of the international trade performance 
indicators. Other RECs had the expected positive sign.  
 
Considering their respective level of significance, one can observe that WTO 
membership (wto) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ecowas) were significant except for agricultural export (agrex), while the 
eccas was only significant for total export and agricultural export. On the other 
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hand, the Southern African Development Community (sadc) was significant 
for all the indicators of international trade performance.  
 
It could also be observed from the magnitude of the economic institutional 
variables that the Southern African REC (notably sadc) was much more 
relevant in promoting international trade performance in SSA. In addition, 
within the indicators of international trade performance, SADC seem to 
promote manufacturing export most followed by fuel and mining export. The 
difference between economic institutional variables and the indicators of 
international trade performance can be linked to the different rules and 
regulations that are operational in the respective RECs.  The contrary sign 
observed for wto and eccas may be as a result of the fact that membership of 
SSA countries in these bodies have not exerted much significant impact on 
their international trade performance. For example, some rules such as rule of 
origin as well as Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) measures have 
been argued to pose some constraints on African export capacity and hence, 
limit their potential in international trade (Biggs, 2007; Lyakurwa, 2007).  
 
5.4.5  International Trade Performance and Financial Institutions  
The results of the impact financial institutional variables on the five indicators 
of international trade performance are presented in Table 5.7 and discussed in 
this sub-section. In the estimation process, instrumental variables were used for 
contract intensive money (cim) as informed by Clague et al (1999).  This was 
considered necessary because the level of institutional framework can 
influence to some extent the enforceability of contracts and as a result 
influence the level of international trade performance. 
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Table 5.7:   International Trade Performance and Financial Institutions 
              Dependent Variables: The Indicators of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), 
Manufacturing,   maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
 Toex  Maex  Agrex  Fmex  Svex  
Regressors A B A B A B A B A B 
Lnmkpot -0.289a 
(.000) 
-0.386b 
(.003) 
-0.039 
(.749) 
0.538 c 
(.087) 
-0.313a 
(.000) 
-0.616a 
(.000) 
0.633a 
(.000) 
0.520a 
(.000) 
-0.559a 
(.000) 
0.728a 
(.000) 
Lncim 2.941a 
(.000) 
4.648a 
(.001) 
1.770b 
(.025) 
2.509a 
(.007) 
2.017a 
(.000) 
2.160a 
(.003) 
1.876b 
(.024) 
2.085b 
(.030) 
1.362a 
(.000) 
2.925a 
(.000) 
Lnplr  -0.897a 
(.000) 
-1.233b 
(.000) 
-1.375a 
(.000) 
-1.796b 
(.015) 
-0.312b 
(.042) 
-0.032 
(.229) 
-2.048a 
(.000) 
-1.790a 
(.000) 
-0.685a 
(.003) 
-1.122b 
(.034) 
Lnfindep 0.764a 
(.000) 
0.331 
(.288) 
1.670a 
(.000) 
0.458 
(.500) 
-0.042 
(.706) 
-0.680c 
(.067) 
1.400a 
(.000) 
1.304a 
(.000) 
1.144a 
(.000) 
0.424 
(.334) 
R2 0.418 0.396 0.264 0.086 0.222 0.143 0.327 0.141 0.434 0.102 
Instruments No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Sargan-P  0.321  0.259  0.320  0.249  0.227 
Notes and source are the same as in Table 5.6. 
 
The results in Table 5.7 revealed that contract intensive money had the 
expected positive and significant impact on all the five indicators of 
international trade performance. The coefficient of contract intensive money 
gave the indication that it exerted the greatest influence on total export, which 
was followed by service, manufacturing, agricultural and fuel and mining 
exports. For depth of financial service in the economies, it had the expected 
positive sign except for agricultural export. However, in terms of influence, it 
was only significant for fuel and mining export. On the other hand, the last 
financial institutional variable – lending rate had the expected negative sign 
and was significant for all the indicators of international trade performance 
with the exception of agricultural export.  
 
The discrepancy observed for agricultural export might have resulted from the 
fact that financial institutions did not induce the agricultural sector 
development as the financial service providers may prefer extending financial 
resources to other sectors of the economy like services. This can also be traced 
to the fact that the agricultural sector has relatively longer gestation period 
with respect to the time required for investment compared to other sectors. 
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Similarly, the fact that depth of the financial sector was observed to be only 
significant for fuel and mining export underscored the fact that in most SSA 
countries, providers of financial services are interested in the financing of fuel 
and mining export much more than other categories of exports (Sanusi, 2009). 
This is not too out of place as it has been seen that in SSA (especially Nigeria) 
providers of financial facilities usually favour the exports of crude oil, which is 
a sign of the less resilient nature of the financial institutions. This has been 
mentioned as one of the reasons for the weakness of the financial sector in 
Nigeria (Ojo, 2007; 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the positive and significant impact observed for contract 
intensive money on all the indicators of international trade performance has the 
implication that enforcement of contracts is very crucial for international trade 
performance. This means that to enhance international trade performance in the 
selected SSA countries, the pursuance of contracts enforcement is a veritable 
tool. This may emanate from the understanding that contract enforceability 
makes each of the parties involved in a given transaction involving 
international trade to be optimistic as the challenges of moral hazards and 
adverse selection are reduced (Papaioannou, 2009). In addition, adequate 
modalities for enforcing contracts will reduce general transaction costs, which 
will improve export capacities and competitiveness. 
 
5.4.6  International Trade Performance, Trade Policies and 
‘Landlockedness’ 
The influence of trade policies as measured by applied tariff, and custom and 
excise duties on the indicators of international trade performance is presented 
in Table 5.8 and discussed in this sub-section. The Table also contains the 
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interaction between landlocked dummy simply referred as ‘landlockedness’ 
(lockd) and the indicators of international trade performance. 
 
Table 5.8: International Trade Performance and Trade Policies 
 Dependent Variables: The Indicators of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), 
Manufacturing, maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
Regressor Toex Maex Agrex Fmex Svex 
Lnmkpot -0.280 
(.197) 
0.418c 
(.201) 
-0.142 
(.122) 
0.732b  
(.189) 
-0.479 
(.134) 
Lnapt -0.220 
(.668) 
-0.339 
(.662) 
0.047 
(.461) 
0.151 
 (.792) 
-0.241 
(.545) 
Lncod -0.330 
 (.428) 
-0.502 
(.425) 
0.103 
(.564) 
-0.767  
(.449) 
-0.440 
(.474) 
Lockd -2.181a 
(.000) 
-4.016a 
(.000) 
-2.179a 
(.000) 
-4.527a 
(.000) 
-1.492a 
(.000) 
Constant 2.106 
(.124) 
3.745c 
(.058) 
0.309 
(.180) 
3.264 
(.143) 
2.930 
(.161) 
R2 0.222 0.366 0.364 0.266 0.255 
F-stat. 
(p-value) 
6.850 
(.000) 
11.400 
(.000) 
11.300 
(.000) 
7.160 
(.000) 
8.19 
(.000) 
Notes:  Probability values are in parenthesis. Instruments were not because, as discussed in 
preceding chapter, they were meant for indicators of institutional framework.  Superscripts a,b, 
and c  mean significant at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Estimated by the Researcher. 
 
From the values in Table 5.8, applied tariff as a measure of trade policy had the 
expected positive sign for only agricultural and fuel and mining exports. 
However, with respect to the impact it was not significant for any of the 
indicators of international trade performance. For the other measure of trade 
policy -custom and excise duties, it had a negative sign for all the indicators of 
international trade performance except for agricultural export but it was 
significant for none of them. This finding suggests that trade policy measures 
in the selected SSA countries did not exert significant influence on the 
indicators of international trade performance. This might have resulted from 
inappropriate use of trade policies in most the SSA countries (Iyoha and 
Oriakhi, 2002)9. 
                                               
9 This is interpreted with some caution as the trade policy variables had some missing values. 
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On the other hand, ‘landlockedness’ had the expected negative sign as can be 
observed in Table 5.8. In terms of impact, it was significant for all the 
indicators of international trade performance. The implication of the above 
finding is that landlocked countries experienced lower international trade 
performance than coastal countries that are easily navigated. This is not 
unexpected as landlocked countries will have increased cost of transportation, 
which will adversely influence their export competitiveness (Wanchek, 2009; 
Bertocchi, and Guerzoni, 2010). Furthermore, the results revealed that the 
impact of landlockedness was greatest for fuel and mining export, followed by 
manufacturing export. It had the least impact on service export. The basic 
economic implication of this observation is that fuel and mining export 
requires high transport cost and logistics followed by manufacturing export. 
Therefore, it means that for the landlocked countries in SSA, the promotion of 
service export will help to reduce some of the militating effects of 
‘landlockedness’. 
 
5.4.7  International Trade Performance, Human Capital and 
Infrastructures    
The impact of human capital development on the indicators of international 
trade performance is presented in Table 5.9. The Table also reports the 
influence of infrastructural development proxied by the number of personal 
computers (pecom), internet users (itnet) and telephone subscribers (tel) on the 
indicators of international trade performance.  
 
As can be seen in Table 5.9, human capital development had the expected 
positive and significant influence on all the indicators of international trade 
performance. With respect to the magnitude it is reflected from the results that 
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human capital had the greatest impact on manufacturing export followed by 
service, fuel and mining, total and agricultural exports. 
 
Table 5.9: International Trade Performance and Human Capital and Infrastructures 
        Dependent Variables: the respective indicators of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), 
Manufacturing,   maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
 Toex  Maex  Agrex  Fmex  Svex  
Regressors I II I II I II I II I II 
lnmkpot -0.130c 
(.094) 
-0.066 
(.494) 
0.084 
(.538) 
0.201 
(.239) 
-0.189a 
(.001) 
-0.085 
(.186) 
0.754a 
(.000) 
0.909a 
(.000) 
-0.292b 
(.011) 
-0.121 
(.267) 
Lnhdi 1.934a 
(.000) 
 3.866a 
(.000) 
 1.091a 
(.000) 
 2.796a 
(.000) 
 3.813a 
(.000) 
 
lnitnet   0.260c 
(.095) 
 0.196 
(.506) 
 0.355a 
(.001) 
 0.176 
(.662) 
 0.413a 
(.002) 
lnpcom   0.206 
(.200) 
 0.427 
(.155) 
 0.108 
(.342) 
 0.586 
(.146) 
 0.358 
(.121) 
Lntel  0.129 
(.364) 
 0.662a 
(.010) 
 0.104 
(.279) 
 0.276 
(.440) 
 0.114 
(.584) 
R2 0.213 0.195 0.193 0.142 0.063 0.104 0.154 0.132 0.207 0.207 
Notes and Source: Same with Table 5.8. 
 
This implies that improvement in human capital development will help to 
enhance the level of international trade performance especially manufacturing 
and service exports in the selected SSA countries. This is substantiated by the 
fact that human capital plays essential roles in the process of trade negotiations 
and other aspects of international trade such as policy formulation and 
implementation (World Bank, 2002; Olayiwola and Osabuohien, 2009). Thus, 
to boost the level of international trade performance in SSA countries, the role 
of quality development of human capital cannot be overemphasised.  
 
Furthermore, the results in Table 5.9 revealed that all the measures of 
infrastructural development had the expected positive sign. However, with 
regard to their level of significance, internet usage had significant impact on 
service and agricultural exports, while the number of telephone subscription 
was only significant for manufacturing export. The implication of this finding 
is that efforts made towards the improvement of internet facilities in the 
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selected SSA countries will help to improve their service exports. Similarly, 
increase in telephone subscription in the selected countries will boost their 
manufacturing export. This finding corroborates Ayogu (2007) who found that 
increased teledensity engendered economic activities. Thus, access to 
information made possible through the use of internet as well as telephone 
usage has the ability of creating opportunities across the world, which can 
promote international trade especially for service export.  
 
5.5  Robustness of Results 
To examine the robustness of the estimates, first the estimation process started 
with OLS as presented in Table 5.3. The OLS results indicated that out of the 
six political institutional variables, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, and political stability influenced total export. For 
manufacturing export, it was regulatory quality, control of corruption, and 
political stability, while none of them had any effects on agricultural export. 
For fuel and mining export, it was rule of law, voice and accountability and 
political stability but for service export all of them had influence except 
political stability. 
 
A glance at real effective exchange rate and previous economic growth rate in 
Table 5.3, gave the indication that the OLS results supported the effectiveness 
of real exchange rate depreciation for total export, manufacturing and 
agricultural exports, while previous economic growth was seen to be counter-
productive for total and manufacturing exports. The OLS results appear 
inconsistent and biased compared to the fixed effects (FE) estimates as earlier 
mentioned. The above analysis is further buttressed by the sample of FE 
estimation in Table A2.1 in the Appendix where the value of the F-test of 
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110.46 (in the very last row), which was significant at 1% indicates the 
appropriateness of the FE technique. 
 
The study equally carried out Hausman test to determine the choice to be made 
between FE and random effects (RE).  As would be expected, the test reported 
in Table A3.1 in the Appendix indicates that the results from FE were more 
efficient than that of RE. At any rate, given the fact that the study had the 
interest of obtaining country fixed effects that were relevant in the second 
aspect of the estimation, it would have still been appropriate to make a choice 
in favour of FE (Leyaro and Morrissey, 2010). 
 
Table 5.10: Sample of First Stage Regression Results  
Dependent variables: The indicators of Political Institutional Framework, namely: Rule of Law (RL), 
Voice and Accountability (VA), Regulatory Quality (RQ), Control of Corruption (CC), 
Government Effectiveness (GE), and Political Stability (PS). 
Regressors RL VA RQ CC GE PS 
Legalor 0.686a 
(.008) 
0.099a 
(.001) 
0.020a 
(.000) 
-1.608 
(.295) 
0.079 a 
(.000) 
0.046  
(.106) 
Logemaug -0.045a 
(.000) 
-0.033a 
(.000) 
-0.034a 
(.001) 
-0.049a 
(.000) 
-0.046a 
(.000) 
-0.039b 
(.018) 
Gethfra -0.012b 
(.027) 
-0.035a 
(.000) 
-.032a 
(.001) 
-0.018a 
(.002) 
-0.022a 
(.001) 
-0.026b 
(.045) 
F-value 11.86a 
(.000) 
14.49a 
(.000) 
9.87b 
(.015) 
17.86a 
(.000) 
21.07a 
(.000) 
12.32a 
(.006) 
R2 0.153 0.178 0.097 0.207 0.299 0.099 
Number of countries is the same with main results. Constant terms were included but not reported.. 
gethfra which was referred to as augmented ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, which Posner,2004 
calls politically relevant ethnic group- PREG)  performed better than the usual one, hence it was 
used. This First Stage Regression results were those from total export; others had similar pattern 
and were not reported to avoid too many Tables.  
Source: Estimated by the Researcher. 
 
Moreover, the results in Tables 5.4(a-e) in the 2SLS as well as the sample of 
the First Stage regression results in Table 5.10 also affirmed that the OLS 
results were not reliable. This is critical given the fact that the results in the 
First Stage regression revealed that the chosen instrumental variables were 
significant in explaining the respective measures of institutional framework. 
Thus, not taking instrumental variables into consideration will result in biased 
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estimates. For instance, the OLS estimate for rule of law in Table 5.3 was not 
significant but, in column B of Table 5.4a, it was not only significant but the 
coefficients increased. Similarly, for agricultural export none of them was 
significant in the OLS estimates but in Table 5.4c (column B) they all became 
significant.  
 
In addition, the probability of Sargan statistics (Sargan-P) in the lower part of 
Tables 5.4(a-e), 5.6 and 5.7 implied that the null hypothesis of no over-
identification of the instruments cannot be rejected at the usual levels. In 
consonance with the above, the sample of the First Stage regression results in 
Table 5.10 had F-values that were approximately equal to and greater than the 
rule of thumb of 10 (Papaioannou, 2009). This equally confirms that the 
instrumental variables were good for the institutional framework. 
 
The coefficients of the instrumental variables indicated that settlers’ mortality 
and the augmented ethnolinguistic fractionalisation had negative and 
significant influence on the institutional framework in SSA, but legal origin 
and formalism had positive influence except for control of corruption. Both 
English and French legal origins were estimated but they were almost perfectly 
correlated, as a result one of them was used to avoid the challenge of 
multicollinearity and reported as legal origin (legalor). Thus, a more ethnically 
fractionalised society is more prone to the possibility of weak institutional 
quality than others. This is crucial for SSA where many of the countries have a 
high degree of ethnolinguistic fractionalisation. 
 
Moreover, when instrumental variables were used, the influence of the 
institutional framework for most of the export categories increased indicating 
the imperativeness of using the chosen instrumental variables. For example, 
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the coefficient for rule of law increased from 3.775 to 4.673 for total export 
and from 2.709 to 3.611 for service export as can be seen in the second row of 
Tables 5.4a and 5.4e, respectively. The use of instruments was observed by 
Meon and Sekat (2008) but they only found ethnolinguistic fractionalisation 
valid. The conclusion in this section is that the various tests carried out support 
the fact that the estimated results were robust and can be relied upon for useful 
inferences. 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Checks 
In addition to the above checks on the robustness of the estimated results, the 
study also examined the sensitivity of the results. This was achieved by 
estimating a sample of the political institutional variable (rule of law -RL) and 
a measure of financial institution (contract intensive money -cim). The aim of 
the sensitivity check was to examine the variation of the magnitudes of the 
institutional variables in terms of their influence on the indicators of 
international trade performance. This was carried out by estimating all the 34 
selected SSA countries in the study (SSA), then excluding South Africa (Less 
ZAF) and Nigeria (Less NGA)10.   
 
Estimation was equally carried out for only the least developed countries 
(LDCs) in the study. Countries in the study that are in the LDCs category are 
indicated in Table A1.2 in the Appendix. The reason for this was based on the 
need to ascertain whether the selected institutional variables in the LDCs had 
the same measure of influence with the entire sample. It was also considered 
expedient to examine these checks given the fact that some international 
                                               
10 A similar sensitivity check was carried out excluding Botswana but there was no significant 
difference; hence, it was not reported. 
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agencies especially the African Development Bank (AfDB, 2008), usually 
discuss African data by classifying North Africa, SSA, and SSA less ZAF. 
  
Table 5.11: Sensitivity Checks of Results 
 Dependent Variables: The indicators of International Trade Performance, namely: Total (Toex), 
Manufacturing,   maex, Agricultural (Agrex), Fuel and Mining (Fmex), and Service Exports (Svex)  
 Sample of Political Institutions Sample of Financial Institutions  
Regressors ALL Less 
ZAF 
Less 
NGA 
 LDCs ALL Less 
ZAF 
Less 
NGA 
LDCs 
                Toex    
LnRL 4.673a 
(.000) 
6.508a 
(.000) 
7.002a 
(.000) 
3.940a 
(.000) 
    
Lncim     4.648a 
(.001) 
3.927a 
(.000) 
4.948a 
(.000) 
3.212a 
(.000) 
R2  0.121 0.096 0.099 0.219 0.318 0.348 0.319 0.449 
              Maex    
LnRL 4.963a 
(.000) 
6.387a 
(.001) 
6.462a 
(.000) 
1.751a 
(.010) 
    
Lncim     2.509a 
(.007) 
1.991a 
(.000) 
1.764b 
(.018) 
1.192a 
(.001) 
R2  0.108 0.076 0.085 0.239 0.323 0.349 0.330 0.428 
              Agrex    
LnRL 3.339a 
(.001) 
4.513a 
(.002) 
2.246b 
(.027) 
0.358 
(.569) 
    
Lncim     2.160a 
(.003) 
2.017a 
(.000) 
1.913b 
(.011) 
0.911a 
(.000) 
R2  0.112 0.071 0.082 0.092 0.314 0.340 0.322 0.423 
                Fmex    
LnRL 3.623b 
(.022) 
4.998b 
(.037) 
6.162a 
(.009) 
0.091 
(.909) 
    
Lncim     2.085a 
(.003) 
0.892b 
(.023) 
2.821b 
(.013) 
1.937a 
(.004) 
R2  0.113 0.080 0.086 0.262 0.330 0.358 0.338 0.443 
                 Svex    
LnRL 3.611a 
(.000) 
5.079a 
(.000) 
5.813a 
(.000) 
2.752a 
(.000) 
    
Lncim     2.295a 
(.000) 
2.010a 
(.000) 
2.376a 
(.000) 
1.436a 
(.000) 
R2  0.121 0.098 0.098 0.216 0.322 0.353 0.323 0.329 
Notes: ZAF : South Africa; NGA: Nigeria;  LDCs : Least Developed Countries. In the 2SLS equations, instrumental 
variables were used. Only the coefficients of the variables (institutional) were reported to bring out the comparison 
clearly. 
Source: computed by the Researcher. 
 
Furthermore, South Africa has been known to have a different growth pattern 
compared to other SSA countries. That of Nigeria was done given her high 
population, which is about 18.31% of that of the SSA region and 15.32% of 
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that of the entire African continent as well as her reliance on petroleum exports 
(Olomola, 2009; World Population Reference Bureau, 2009). Thus, the 
sensitivity check was equally done to ensure that there was no considerable 
influence of outliers in the results. 
 
As shown in Table 5.11, the sensitivity checks points out that using rule of law 
as a sample of political institutional variable, there was not much difference 
with regard to the level of significance when the estimation was done without 
South Africa and Nigeria. As can be seen, rule of law was significant for all the 
indicators of international trade performance. This denotes that South Africa 
and Nigeria did not exert outlier effects in the estimated results. Their 
coefficients also indicated that the changes in the magnitude were marginal.  
 
When only the LDCs were estimated, there was appreciable difference in both 
significance and magnitude of the coefficients. For example, rule of law was 
not significant for agricultural export as well as fuel and mining export. Also 
the magnitude decreased from 4.963 for all SSA to 1.751 for manufacturing 
export for LDCs. The implication of the aforementioned observation is that 
institutional variables were significant for the sampled SSA countries; such 
level of significance has marked variation for the LDCs in SSA. This may not 
be unconnected to the structure of their economies in terms of adaptation to 
shocks and institutional changes.  
 
For the sample of financial institutions, the figures in Table 5.11 clearly 
indicated that contract intensive money was significant in all (i.e. All, Less 
ZAF, Less NGA, and LDCs) across all the indicators of international trade 
performance. It can also be observed that there was not much difference in 
terms of significance and magnitude of influence when South Africa and 
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Nigeria were excluded from the sample, respectively. This equally affirmed 
that South Africa and Nigeria did not exhibited possible outlier problems in the 
estimated results. On the other hand, when the estimation was done for only 
LDCs, there were some noticeable differences in magnitude. For instance, in 
agricultural export the magnitude decreased more than two-fold from 2.160 to 
0.911 for SSA and LDCs, respectively. Therefore, one can interpret the 
scenario to mean that financial institutions are relevant in improving 
international trade performance in SSA countries as well as LDCs; but it is 
quite less in the former than the latter. This also may be as a result of the 
difference in the institutional framework of the economies. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary of the major findings in the study, policy 
recommendations of the findings and conclusion. In addition, limitations of the 
study and suggestions for further research were also presented. 
 
6.2 Summary of Major Findings and Implications 
This study, which was basically motivated by the low level of international 
trade performance and institutional framework in SSA, had the major objective 
of investigating the impact of institutional framework on international trade 
performance as elucidated in the first chapter. This was achieved by 
unbundling international trade performance into five different indicators, 
namely: total, manufacturing, agricultural, fuel and mining, and service exports 
as well as institutional framework into political, economic and financial 
institutions. It was this unbundling that made the study unique as discussed in 
chapter four after presenting some patterns of international trade and 
institutional framework in the second chapter and establishing the gaps in the 
literature in chapter three. The fifth chapter presented and discussed the 
descriptive and empirical results of the study as well as some robustness and 
sensitivity tests where the robustness of the empirical results was ascertained.  
From the results, a summary of the major findings and their implications are 
highlighted in this section.  
 
At the first instance, the descriptive analysis established that service export 
was more stable than the rest indicators of international trade performance 
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while fuel and mining export exhibited the greatest fluctuation followed by 
agricultural export. This was based on the fact that service export had the least 
variability in the mean values compared to other international trade 
performance indicators especially fuel and mining export. The implication of 
this is that countries that export more of service products will face less 
instability in the event of unfavourable shocks in the world market while 
countries that export mostly fuel and mining products would be most adversely 
affected by shocks in the international market.  
 
The study also found that an increase in economic growth in a given period has 
the ability of promoting the indicators of international trade performance 
except agricultural export in SSA countries but such potential is yet to be 
tapped. The above finding implies that economic growth in SSA countries 
have not significantly induced their international trade performance, which 
may be as a result of slow economic growth. It was equally established that 
real exchange rate depreciation did not significantly promote international 
trade performance in SSA countries. The implication of this is that the policy 
of exchange rate depreciation will not yield much result especially with respect 
to promoting international trade performance.  
 
In terms of institutional framework, the variables of political institution were 
found to have positive and significant impact on the indicators of international 
trade performance in the selected SSA countries. Nevertheless, the study 
established that the different measures of political institutional quality exert 
varying degrees of influence on the respective indicators of international trade 
performance. Thus, there is the need to unbundle both institutions and 
international trade to appropriately examine the impact of institutional 
framework in international trade performance. In this regard, the study found 
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that rule of law was most important determinant of total and manufacturing 
exports but it was the fourth determinant of agricultural, fuel and mining, and 
service exports. Correspondingly, government effectiveness was found to be 
the major determinant of agricultural export but it was the second determinant 
of manufacturing and service exports, and third determinant of fuel and mining 
export. Furthermore, voice and accountability was seen to be the most 
important determinant of fuel and mining export, but it was the second 
determinant of total and agricultural exports, and third determinant of service 
export. It was equally established that control of corruption exerted the greatest 
impact on service export. However, it was the third determinant of 
manufacturing and agricultural exports and the fourth determinant of total 
export. This difference in their levels of impact may be as a result of the 
difference in the characteristics of the various indicators of international trade 
performance. 
 
The implication of the above finding is that the level of contract enforcement 
and procedures required for transactions differ from one trade sector to the 
other. For example, in agricultural export, small scale entrepreneurs may be 
involved, which suggests less requirement for contract enforcement compared 
to manufacturing and fuel and mining exports that involve a great deal of 
procedures and contract enforceability as a result of  reliance on credit 
facilities as well as compliance to rules and regulations. 
 
Turning to the impact of economic institutions on the indicators of 
international trade performance, it was found that the different measures of 
economic institutions had different influence on the indicators of international 
trade performance. This might have arisen from the difference in the rules and 
regulations that are formulated and implemented by the different regional 
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economic communities (RECs) in SSA. One of the main differences noted was 
that the RECs in Southern Africa, notably SADC was quite more relevant in 
promoting international trade performance especially manufacturing export 
compared to others.  
 
On the influence of financial institutions in SSA countries on their 
international trade performance, the study found that contract intensive money 
had positive and significant impact on all the indicators of international trade 
performance. It had the greatest influence on total export followed by service, 
manufacturing, agricultural and fuel and mining exports. On the other hand, 
the depth of financial services in SSA countries had the expected positive sign 
but it was mainly significant for fuel and mining export. The basic implication 
of this finding is that financial institutions are very important in promoting 
international trade performance in SSA countries. This is based on the need for 
financial services such as credit facilities and payment systems that aid the 
processes of international trade transactions. 
  
Apart from the institutional framework, the study also examined the relevance 
of trade policies to international trade performance of SSA. It was found that 
trade policy variables, namely: applied tariff and custom and excise duties 
were not significant determinants of international trade performance. This 
finding suggests that trade policy in the selected SSA countries may not be a 
very effective tool useful for the promotion of international trade performance. 
This does not mean outright jettisoning of trade policy measures but they 
should be complemented with measures that will ease export-supply 
constraints. On the other hand, landlocked countries performed less than 
coastal countries in the context of international trade. This means that 
landlocked countries experience lower international trade performance than 
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coastal countries as landlocked countries will have increased cost of 
transportation, which will adversely influence their export competitiveness. 
The basic economic implication of this is that landlocked countries require 
high transport costs and logistics more than coastal countries. Thus, the 
landlocked countries need economic integration with coastal countries to 
reduce effects of this militating factor.  
 
Finally, the study found that human capital had positive and significant impact 
on all the indicators of international trade performance with the greatest 
influence on manufacturing export followed by service, fuel and mining, total 
and agricultural exports. This means that improvement in human capital 
development will help to promote international trade performance especially 
manufacturing and service exports in the selected SSA countries. Furthermore, 
it was established that all the measures of infrastructural development had 
positive sign but internet usage had significant influence on service and 
agricultural exports, while the number of telephone subscription was only 
significant for manufacturing export. This implies that provision of internet 
facilities will improve the performance of SSA countries in international trade 
especially service export, while the improvement of telephone provision will 
enhance the level of manufacturing export. 
 
6.3 Policy Recommendations  
Based on the findings of this study, some recommendations that are relevant to 
international trade promotion in SSA are made in this section. First and 
foremost, there is urgent need for SSA countries to place more emphasis on the 
export of service products and make efforts to deemphasise the export of fuel 
and mining export. This will help to improve their export performance 
125 
 
 
 
 
especially with respect to mitigating the adverse effects of possible external 
shocks in the domestic economy. This can be a long-term policy measure given 
the time required to adjust the composition of export baskets. The component 
of service export such as e-commerce through the use information technology, 
which does not have so much transaction costs, can be a better starting point 
for SSA countries especially the landlocked countries. However, in the main 
time more efforts and awareness should be created on the essence of promoting 
service export. This does not imply that SSA countries should downplay other 
categories of export but there is the need to increase the contribution of service 
export in the total trade of SSA countries.  
 
Another policy recommendation is that efforts that will promote a sustained 
economic growth in SSA countries will improve international trade 
performance. Similarly, there is the need for SSA countries to place emphasis 
on policy measures that will ease export-supply constraints not only relying on 
exchange rate depreciation. The rationale for this is that even with a 
depreciated exchange rate, countries can only export to the rest of the world 
what they produce, and can be traded. 
  
Given the finding that different variables of political institutions exert different 
degrees of impact on the indicators of international trade performance, it is 
recommended that a given institutional framework should be used where it is 
most relevant. Thus, it is imperative that the respective governments of SSA 
countries employ the institutional framework that ranked the highest in a given 
sector as the focal point for that very sector. This is also applicable for donor 
agencies that before carrying out development assistance in SSA countries, an 
understanding of a crucial institutional quality in a given sector is important. 
For instance, to improve the participation of SSA countries in service export, 
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enhancing the control of corruption is most appropriate compared to 
agricultural export where improvement in government effectiveness is most 
relevant.  
 
In addition, there is the need to ensure that contracts are made easily 
enforceable. This is a very important factor to improve international trade 
performance of SSA countries. The reason for this is that the economic agents 
involved in international trade will be more confident in a given transaction as 
they are sure that moral hazards and adverse selection challenges are reduced. 
Moreover, foreign trade partners will be more inclined to engage in 
international trade transactions with countries that are reputed for contract 
enforcement. In view of this, the pursuance of rule of law and speedy delivery 
of judgement in the courts of law in SSA countries, which will promote the 
level of contract enforcement cannot be over emphasised. Thus, the institution 
of effective contract enforcement procedures will lead to reduction of 
transaction costs and eventually improve the level of international trade 
performance of the region. Policy measures that will strengthen financial 
institutions in SSA countries are also recommended. This is given the 
important roles that financial institutions play in international trade 
transactions. 
 
Furthermore, as human capital plays a crucial role in enhancing international 
trade performance of SSA countries, the improvement of the quality as well as 
the stock of human capital in the region is highly recommended. Some of the 
approaches entail the training and retraining of experts in international trade 
such as trade lawyers, economists, among others, in SSA countries. A well-
informed and trained crop of persons that participate in international trade 
negotiations, policy formulation and implementation are essential. This is most 
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crucial in this 21st century that is mostly knowledge driven. Thus, engaging 
experts that are conversant with the rapidly changing policy environments and 
the global issues would be very needful in enhancing international trade 
performance of SSA. 
 
The study also recommends the provision of internet facilities to ensure better 
flow of information in order to improve the performance of SSA countries in 
international trade. Akin to this policy measure is the need to improve the level 
of telephone provision in the region. Given the usefulness of affordable and 
effective communication in enhancing the performance of manufacturing, the 
provision of these facilities will go a long way in promoting international trade 
performance. The roles of the regional economic communities are very 
important in this respect. Thus, the regional economic communities need not 
focus merely on trade policies such as tariff reduction but the provision of 
trade-related infrastructures in the region. This will reduce transaction costs 
and improve international trade competiveness of Member States in the long-
run. Some of the regions such as ECOWAS already have it in their agenda but 
acceleration of the process to ensure the realisation is equally recommended. 
 
6.4  Conclusion  
At the wake of 1990s, there has been increased interest on institutions and their 
influence on different aspects of countries’ economic life. As was elucidated in 
the study, though there have been increased research efforts on institutions, 
most of the studies relate institutions to economic growth, investment, among 
others. This, inter alia, was what inspired this particular study. In effect, the 
study in literature exploration observed that not much research has been done 
in relating institutional framework to international trade performance 
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especially in SSA. Few studies that have related institutional framework to 
international trade performance were done mostly for countries in Americas, 
Asia and Europe. 
 
In addition, SSA performs less than other regions of the world, such as: East 
Asia-Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; and 
Middle East and North Africa, in most of the international trade performance 
indicators. The performance of SSA was not only less than those of other 
regions; it is equally lower than the world average. On another hand, SSA 
region has low values in the various measures of institutional framework. The 
SSA’s figures on institutional quality are both lower than those of other 
regions as well as the world average. 
 
In view of the above observations, this study used a sample of 34 countries in 
SSA for the period 1996-2008 to empirically evaluate the impact of 
institutional framework on international trade performance. In achieving the 
objectives, the study engaged data obtained from World Development 
Indicators, World Governance Indicators, World Trade Indicators, among 
others, in different aspects of the estimation process. The first aspect of the 
econometric estimation process involved the use of panel data analytical 
technique based on fixed effects model. The rationale for this choice was to 
have country’s fixed effects that were further engaged in the second aspect of 
the estimation.  
 
The second aspect of the estimation process employed the Two-Stage Least 
Squares technique. This was deemed appropriate given the fact that the 
variables that involved institutional quality had little time variation. Another 
reason was the imperativeness of employing some instrumental variables such 
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as legal origin/formation and ethnolinguistic fractionalisation that influence 
institutional variables but are orthogonal to the indicators of international trade 
performance. Based on the above techniques of analysis, the formulated 
models were estimated in the light of different categories of institutional 
framework and their influence on the indicators international trade 
performance. Other factors besides institutional framework such as human 
capital and infrastructure development were equally assessed with respect to 
their influence on international trade performance.   
 
Conclusively, the study has been able to examine the impact of institutional 
framework on the level of international trade performance of the selected SSA 
countries. It has made contribution by increasing the level of empirical 
research in the areas of international trade and institutions especially in SSA. 
Several findings were made from the analyses. One notable finding that made 
the study distinct from the previous research efforts was that different aspects 
of institutional framework had varying degrees of impacts for the different 
indicators of international trade performance. Thus, it is expedient to unbundle 
not only institutional framework but unbundling international trade 
performance in order to appropriately appraise international trade-institutional 
framework interactions. Some recommendations were made on how to 
improve international trade performance of SSA countries, which include the 
need to place more emphasis on service export to mitigate the adverse effects 
of external shocks. A related recommendation was policy measures that will 
ease export-supply constraints as well as the pursuance of rule of law, which 
will enhance the level of contract enforcement.  The strengthening of financial 
institutions and the improvement of the quality of human capital in SSA 
countries were also recommended. The study also recommended the need for 
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regional economic communities in SSA to focus more on the provision of 
trade-related infrastructures in the region.  
 
6.5  Limitations of the Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
This study did not use the usual gravity model given the fact that the focus was 
not on direction of trade but international trade performance and institutional 
framework. Also efforts were made to use the growth rates of the specific 
sectors (e.g. agricultural growth rate for agricultural export equation) but the 
data were not available for most of the sectors across the selected countries. 
Hence, the study used lagged economic growth rate as the best alternative. 
This will not hamper the validity of the results from the study given the fact 
that international trade performance indicators were not estimated with 
economic growth in contemporaneous manner. Further studies can investigate 
the influence of institutions on international trade performance using the 
growth rates of the respective sectors to complement this very study.  
 
Instrumental variables are quite crucial to institutional framework with regard 
to properly assessing their influence on international trade performance. 
Several instrumental variables exist in the literature. However, the study used 
three, namely: legal origin/formation, ethnolinguistic fractionalisation, and 
augmented settlers’ mortality due to the fact that others like distance from the 
equator, area of the country, latitude were seen not to meet the orthogonality 
condition with respect to some indicators of international trade performance 
especially agricultural export. Hence, they were dropped. Future empirical 
works that want to evaluate the relevance of institutional quality, which are not 
dealing with agricultural sector can consider some of these other instrumental 
variables to ascertain which of them are most relevant to a given institution. 
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The influence of international trade participation on institutional framework 
can be taken up in further research. This study did not cover this aspect in the 
empirical analyses but was mentioned in analytical framework in order to keep 
the focus. This area, which involves taking this study the other way round, will 
entail examining the impact of international trade on institutional framework. 
Thus, it will be essential for further research to empirically investigate whether 
a country’s involvement in international trade has significant influence on its 
institutional quality. The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation 
technique can also be employed with a view to making comparison with the 
fixed effects and instrumental variables techniques.  
 
The study attempted embarking on some field visits to some countries like 
Botswana, which have been known to be a success story in terms of 
institutional framework in SSA with basic aim of examining her trade capacity 
as influenced by her institutional quality. However, the exercise became 
elusive as a result of some limitations like adequate funding. Therefore, this 
research effort can be complemented by examining a single country or two 
countries in comparative manner, to carry out an in-depth case study. In line 
with the saying that ‘institutions are better studied than examined’ this exercise 
will further help in adequately providing better appraisal of the role of 
institutions in a given country. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix I: Panel Data Structure and List of Selected Countries 
 
Table A1.1 Structure of arranging Panel Data  
i t      y      x  
1     1       y11      x11 
1          2       y12      x12 
2          1       y21      x21 
2          2       y22      x22 
.           .          .            . 
.           .            .           . 
N        1         yN1       xN1 
N        2       yN2       xN2 
 
Table A1.2 List of Countries and their Identifier (id) 
id Central Id East Id Southern id West 
1 Cameron 4 *Burundi 17 Botswana 22 *Benin 
2 *Central African Rep. 5 *Ethiopia 18 *Lesotho 23 *Burkina Faso 
3 Gabon 6 Kenya 19 Namibia 24 Cape Verde 
  
7 *Madagascar 20 South Africa 25 Cote d’Ivoire 
  
8 *Malawi 21 Swaziland 26 *Gambia 
  
9 Mauritius 
  
27 Ghana 
  
10 *Mozambique 
  
28 *Guinea 
  
11 *Rwanda 
  
29 *Mali 
  
12 Seychelles 
  
30 *Mauritania 
  
13 *Tanzania 
  
31 *Niger 
  
14 *Uganda 
  
32 Nigeria 
  
15 *Zambia 
  
33 *Senegal 
  
16 Zimbabwe 
  
34 *Togo 
Note: * - Least Developed Countries (LDCs). 
.Source: UNCTAD (2009) Handbook of Statistics;  
WTO ( 2009) International Trade Statistics. 
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Appendix II: Sample of Results with Time and Country Effects  
 
Table A2.1 Fixed Effects Results with Time Effects 
. xtreg Lntoex Lnexch L.ecogr yr*,fe 
 
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       392 
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        34 
 
R-sq:  within  = 0.3281                         Obs per group: min =         5 
       between = 0.1370                                        avg =      11.5 
       overall = 0.1174                                        max =        12 
 
                                                F(13,345)          =     11.43 
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.9544                        Prob > F           =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Lntoex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       Lnexch |   .5763736   .0648593     8.89   0.000     .3890041     .644143 
       ecogr | 
         L1. |   .0365842   .0319362     1.15   0.254    -.0609731    .0646562 
         yr1 |  (dropped) 
         yr2 |  -.0271578   .0454252    -0.60   0.550    -.1165029    .0621873 
         yr3 |  -.0996236   .0453389    -2.20   0.029    -.1887989   -.0104482 
         yr4 |  -.1387746   .0452399    -3.07   0.002    -.2277554   -.0497938 
         yr5 |  -.0904938   .0457487    -1.98   0.049    -.1804751   -.0005124 
         yr6 |  -.0816212   .0457178    -1.79   0.075    -.1715419    .0082996 
         yr7 |  -.0805214   .0451445    -1.78   0.075    -.1693145    .0082717 
         yr8 |  (dropped) 
         yr9 |   .1254923   .0450636     2.78   0.006     .0368583    .2141263 
        yr10 |   .1782512   .0457149     3.90   0.000     .0883361    .2681662 
        yr11 |    .275804   .0480304     5.74   0.000     .1813347    .3702734 
        yr12 |   .2679069   .0508583     5.27   0.000     .1678755    .3679383 
        yr13 |   .3564085   .0558273     6.38   0.000     .2466037    .4662133 
       _cons |   3.681098   .0568761    64.72   0.000     3.569231    3.792966 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     sigma_u |  2.0500561 
     sigma_e |  .18222584 
         rho |  .99216082   (fraction of variance due to u_i) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
F test that all u_i=0:     F(33, 345) =   110.46             Prob > F = 0.0000 
 
Notes: The sample result was based on the first measure of international trade 
performance, total export. 
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Table A2.2 Results with both Time and Country Effects 
reg Lntoex Lnexch L(1/2).ecogr yr* count* 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     359 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 45,   313) =   26.43 
       Model |  114.074776    45  2.53499502           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  30.0226536   313  .095919021           R-squared     =  0.7917 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.7617 
       Total |  144.097429   358  .402506786           Root MSE      =  .30971 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
      Lntoex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lnexch |   .2671086   .1169759     2.28   0.023     .0369502    .4972671 
       ecogr | 
         L1. |  -.0046476   .0057314    -0.81   0.418    -.0159246    .0066294 
         L2. |  -.0081081    .005539    -1.46   0.144    -.0190065    .0027903 
         yr1 |  (dropped) 
         yr2 |  (dropped) 
         yr3 |  -.3597785   .0946485    -3.80   0.000    -.5460062   -.1735509 
         yr4 |  -.3802681   .1002658    -3.79   0.000    -.5775482   -.1829879 
         yr5 |  -.3223184   .1057075    -3.05   0.002    -.5303056   -.1143312 
         yr6 |  -.3117192   .1084094    -2.88   0.004    -.5250225    -.098416 
         yr7 |  -.3258602   .1040192    -3.13   0.002    -.5305254   -.1211949 
         yr8 |  -.2769507   .0967009    -2.86   0.004    -.4672167   -.0866847 
         yr9 |  -.1807042   .0924373    -1.95   0.051    -.3625812    .0011728 
        yr10 |  -.1262609   .0880059    -1.43   0.152    -.2994188     .046897 
        yr11 |  -.0415504   .0847916    -0.49   0.624     -.208384    .1252832 
        yr12 |  -.0654407   .0825218    -0.79   0.428    -.2278084     .096927 
        yr13 |  (dropped) 
      count1 |  -1.532238   .5254507    -2.92   0.004    -2.566101   -.4983764 
      count2 |  -2.387769   .5266771    -4.53   0.000    -3.424044   -1.351494 
      count3 |  -.4829812   .4463559    -1.08   0.280    -1.361219    .3952562 
      count4 |  -2.285579   .3783934    -6.04   0.000    -3.030096   -1.541063 
      count6 |  -.9975381   .2880397    -3.46   0.001    -1.564277   -.4307991 
      count7 |  -.9983894   .3346386    -2.98   0.003    -1.656815   -.3399638 
      count8 |  -.3143713        .12    -2.62   0.009      -.55048   -.0782626 
      count9 |    .242118   .1777998     1.36   0.174    -.1077159    .5919518 
     count10 |   -.603467   .1744564    -3.46   0.001    -.9467225   -.2602116 
     count11 |   -2.36074   .4583104    -5.15   0.000    -3.262499   -1.458982 
     count13 |  -1.470473   .4048208    -3.63   0.000    -2.266987   -.6739588 
     count14 |  -2.325025   .6435553    -3.61   0.000    -3.591266   -1.058783 
     count15 |  -1.259943   .5228101    -2.41   0.017    -2.288609    -.231276 
     count16 |   2.003578   .9129229     2.19   0.029     .2073362    3.799819 
     count17 |   .5942242   .1625278     3.66   0.000      .274439    .9140095 
     count18 |   .3572311    .131533     2.72   0.007     .0984305    .6160317 
     count19 |   .1773913   .1152181     1.54   0.125    -.0493086    .4040911 
     count20 |  -.1636099   .1160359    -1.41   0.160    -.3919188    .0646991 
     count21 |   .9217197   .1162992     7.93   0.000     .6928926    1.150547 
     count22 |  -1.511148   .4390618    -3.44   0.001    -2.375034   -.6472626 
     count23 |  -2.437281   .5233521    -4.66   0.000    -3.467014   -1.407548 
     count24 |  -.4109767   .1833315    -2.24   0.026    -.7716945   -.0502588 
     count25 |  -.8932208   .5105176    -1.75   0.081    -1.897701    .1112594 
     count26 |    .265124   .1191471     2.23   0.027     .0306934    .4995545 
     count27 |   3.011957   1.267402     2.38   0.018     .5182523    5.505661 
     count28 |  -1.766038   .6263434    -2.82   0.005    -2.998414   -.5336623 
     count29 |  -1.210023   .4509825    -2.68   0.008    -2.097363   -.3226823 
     count30 |  -.7898595   .4018753    -1.97   0.050    -1.580578    .0008592 
     count31 |  -1.812922   .4785084    -3.79   0.000    -2.754422   -.8714223 
     count32 |  -.4939373   .3276168    -1.51   0.133    -1.138547    .1506724 
     count33 |  -1.376113   .5215582    -2.64   0.009    -2.402317   -.3499098 
     count34 |  -.8323044   .3900892    -2.13   0.034    -1.599833   -.0647759 
       _cons |    4.55559   .3724921    12.23   0.000     3.822685    5.288495 
Note:  yr* and count* represent the respective time and country effects. 
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Appendix III:  Sample of Hausman Test 
Table A3.1 Hausman Test between FE and RE 
hausman fix ran,sigmamore 
 
                 ---- Coefficients ---- 
             |      (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-
V_B)) 
             |      fix2         ran2        Difference          S.E. 
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------- 
      Lnexch |    .5760991     .0298036        .5462956        .0698033 
     L.ecogr |    .0026719     .0031101       -.0004382        .0002738 
    L2.ecogr |    .0005842     -.000204        .0007882        .0002623 
         yr3 |   -.4816246    -.2525033       -.2291212        .0293113 
         yr4 |   -.5242029     -.249114       -.2750889        .0352003 
         yr5 |   -.4784181    -.1655168       -.3129013        .0400639 
         yr6 |   -.4698392     -.138903       -.3309362        .0424194 
         yr7 |   -.4669862    -.1677563       -.2992298        .0383605 
         yr8 |   -.3756863     -.141225       -.2344613        .0301205 
         yr9 |   -.2467254    -.0610773       -.1856481        .0239187 
        yr10 |   -.1944786    -.0367626        -.157716        .0202579 
        yr11 |   -.0922501     .0170209       -.1092709        .0140192 
        yr12 |   -.0978115     -.037007       -.0608044        .0077934 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
       B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
 
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
 
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
                          =       6.16 
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2106 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
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Appendix IV:  Sample of 2SLS Result 
Table A4.1 Sample of Complete Result from 2SLS and Sargan Test 
ivregress 2sls countfixsvex  Lnmkpot Lnplr Lnfindep (Lncim = englaw gethfra 
logemaug),first small 
 
First-stage regressions 
----------------------- 
 
                                                  Number of obs   =        195 
                                                  F(   6,    188) =      16.24 
                                                  Prob > F        =     0.0000 
                                                  R-squared       =     0.3413 
                                                  Adj R-squared   =     0.3203 
                                                  Root MSE        =     0.2289 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Lncim |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Lnmkpot |   .0205418   .0143721     1.43   0.155    -.0078095    .0488932 
       Lnplr |    .030058   .0386426     0.78   0.438    -.0461708    .1062869 
    Lnfindep |   .1189007   .0239578     4.96   0.000       .07164    .1661613 
     legalor |   .1421251   .0399213     3.56   0.000     .0633738    .2208764 
     gethfra |  -.0129249   .0411369    -3.14   0.001    -.0313179    .0231677 
    logemaug |  -.0374697   .0136471    -2.75   0.007    -.0643908   -.0105485 
       _cons |  -.0543608    .128566    -0.42   0.673    -.3079782    .1992566 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =     195 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,   190) =   22.53 
       Model | -194.499908     4 -48.6249769           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1550.30131   190   8.1594806           R-squared     =  0.1088 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1021 
       Total |  1355.80141   194  6.98866705           Root MSE      =  2.8565 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
countfixsvex |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------`------------------------------------------------------- 
       Lncim |    2.92463   0.530786     5.51   0.000     1.294191     4.55506 
     Lnmkpot |  -.7282605   .1625581    -4.48   0.000    -0.160175   -.9503462 
       Lnplr |     1.1217   .5241589     2.14   0.034    1.0775881    1.956412 
    Lnfindep |   .4241334   .4327891     0.98   0.334    -.6307826    1.033451 
       _cons |   .1661547   1.452604     0.11   0.909    -2.699147    3.031457 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instrumented:  Lncim 
Instruments:   Lnmkpot Lnplr Lnfindep legalor gethfra logemaug 
 
. estat overid 
 
  Tests of overidentifying restrictions: 
 
  Sargan (score) chi2(2) =  2.96637  (p = 0.2269) 
  Basmann chi2(2)        =  2.90406  (p = 0.2341) 
 
Note: This sample was from the interaction between service export and financial institutional 
indicators. Other 2SLS results for other export categories and institutional framework 
had these general features. 
